Since my last article, Tough Talk over a Defunct Treaty: The Case of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, there have been a series of articles on the Nile issue in several leading African publications. Notably, Sort Out Nile Water Before It's Too Late, Water wars loom along Nile, Kenya to chair Nile initiative, Unquiet Flows the Nile, and Claiming the Nile. 

The articles highlight the, competing aspirations of the riparian and suggest the need for cooperation, consultation, and collaboration to achieve an equitable utilization of the shared resource. Furthermore, devising a fair, just and coherent plan for the full and most efficient use of the sub-basin�s waters demands accommodations by modifications of existing uses or future plans, consideration of priorities and alternatives, or compensation for abstaining from taking action.  

However, the history of Nile Basin cooperation narrates a relationship, which has been characterized by unsuccessful diplomatic and political initiatives, hostility, tension, and non-cooperation. The history confirms lower riparian� perception of �superior rights� to the basin�s waters by virtue of relative need, prior appropriation, and a perceived requirement on upper riparian to maintain the absolute integrity of the basin�s rivers for the exclusive benefit of lower riparian. The history chronicles the lower riparian� failure to accept propositions to engage in negotiations with the upper riparian, and the lower riparian strategy of equivocation, avoidance, and hostility to deflect the issue of equitable utilization of the basin�s resources in preference for preservation of the status quo. 

Predictably, increasing tensions and frustration in the entire Nile Basin have called for creation of devices to reduce potential conflict by promoting basin-wide dialogue and cooperation, the most recent in the form of the �Nile Basin Initiative�. Despite the riparian� professed intentions and public statements to cooperate and to achieve the equitable and sustainable utilization of the basin�s resources, the riparian� succeeding actions do not provide a basis for optimism. Indeed the outcome of recent efforts towards cooperation confirms the continuing tension between upper riparian' demand for an equitable share of the basin�s waters and lower riparian� preference for maintaining the status quo, most recently on the basis of a perceived lack of comprehensive knowledge concerning the basin. 

This article is a review of the post-colonial Egyptian attitude towards sharing the Nile and the prospect's) for cooperation in the context of the Nile Basin Initiative - or more appropriately, the western �alternative� mechanism to obscure sovereign demands for equitable use of the shared resource. . 

Threat of Force

As deterrence, the Egyptian High Command has established contingency plans for armed intervention, in each country in the Nile Basin, in case of a direct threat to the flow of the Nile. I] Egyptian military plans, known as Waraa-el-hidoud (Beyond the Borders), were traditionally associated with Nile water. [ii] Some of the plans date back to the early nineteenth century, to the days when Mohammed Ali was rebuilding the Egyptian army. [iii] All have been updated several times since then, several by the British around the turn of the century. [iv] Today, a full-time staff at the Nasser Military Academy in East Cairo reviews and adapts the plans to changing circumstances. [v] While the military strategists are at work, Egyptian officials emphasize that they would prefer diplomatic solutions and compre�hensive agreements among all states concerned rather than confrontation. [vi] 

In 1977, when Ethiopia announced its intention to irrigate 90,000 ha of land in the Blue Nile Basin, and another 28,000 ha in the Baro (a tributary of the Sobat) to increase food production following the devastating drought in 1994.[vii] In the first case, President Sadat of Egypt immediately threatened strong countermeasures, including war, if any steps were taken by Ethiopia to alter the course of the Blue Nile River. [viii] In December 1979, the warning was repeated in much tougher language to the Ethiopian ambassador in Cairo. [ix] Yet, during the same time in 1979, Sadat offered to supply water to Israel in exchange for concessions on the occupied Palestinian territories and Jerusalem and a year later, in 1980, announced Egypt�s intention to divert the Nile waters out of the drainage basin to irrigate land in Sinai. 

The Ethiopian government, reacting to these events, sent a memorandum to the OAU accusing Egypt of misusing the waters of the Blue Nile and infringing the rights of other riparian states (violation of the riparian rule - on the ground that Sinai lay outside the Nile basin). [x] Sadat immediately countered with public threats of war. In an article on June 2, 1980 published in the Egyptian Gazette President Sadat was quoted to have said, �once I decided to divert the Nile water into Sinai I will not try to get permission from Ethiopia, if they do not like our measures, they can go to hell. �[xi] Following that statement Sadat openly called upon an audience of army officers to prepare a military plan to foil any attempt by Ethiopia to impede the flow of the Nile. [xii] At one point, Sadat instructed the Egyptian Second and Third Army officers to stand ready to deploy against Ethiopia should Ethiopia interfere with the flow of the Blue Nile River. [xiii] Sadat stated:If Ethiopia undertakes any action that will affect our full rights to the Nile waters, there is no alternative to the use of force� we will retaliate when something happens but we have to be ready with plans and alternatives to firmly stop any action. [xiv]

Until recently, President Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat after his assassination in 1981, had not repeated Sadat's threats [xv] However, Egyptian ministers continued to allude to their country's vital interest. In 1985, Boutros-Ghali, then the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, told an interviewer that the �next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics. �[xvi] In June 1990, Boutros-Ghali convened an African water summit in Cairo and invited Government delegates from forty-three African nations. [xvii] The conference gave prominence to what hydrologists in many countries had been arguing: the need for regional cooperation [xviii] Boutros-Ghali emphasized, �co-operation between African countries is essential in order to make the best use of the Nile River, through solidarity we will be able to achieve a common policy.� At this Cairo conference, Egypt publicly acknowledged the idea of �interdepen�dence� and �regional cooperation�. [xix] Less than a year later, despite the assurances of solidarity and cooperation, in October 1991, General Tantawi, the Minister of Defense, told an interviewer that Egypt might use force to protect Egypt's supply of Nile water. He made clear, however, that this would be a last resort, should all other means fail: �'We are not ruling out the possibility of using some acts of deterrence after exhausting peaceful means in case any party tries to control the River Nile�. [xx]  

The Egyptian warlike attitude was confirmed only a year later, in 1992, when the Egyptian parliament was given an up-to-date assessment of threats facing the country's water resources in a hitherto unpublished report by Dr Hamdi el-Taheri. [xxi] Dr el-Taheri, an inter�nationally known expert on water, concentrated on the �external dang�ers� because, he said, the internal difficulties [xxii] were well known and studies were under way to see how those matters could be rectified. For the external dangers, Dr el-Taheri had no ready solutions. He merely identified them in his report to the Parliamen�tary Select Committee on the Nile. The Committee was told the immediate external danger to Egypt was that either Uganda or Ethiopia, or both, would implement plans to build new dams on the White or Blue Nile River. The Committee was further advised of Egypt�s vulnerability in Sudan should the southern part of the country split off; that would have a direct effect on the future of the Jonglei Canal project, already halted because of civil war. [ixia] Dr el-There's report was subsequently presented to a special session of the Egyptian parliament, amidst shouts of �when are we going to invade Sudan?� and �why doesn't the air force bomb the Ethiopian dams?� from the Egyptian Deputies. [xxiv] 

In 1993, Ethiopia and Sudan protested published reports that there were plans to divert Nile water to Israel, as part of the Northern Sinai Agricultural Development Project. [xxv] Sudan and Ethiopia saw great risk in selling or diverting any Nile water to Israel because the decision sets an undesirable precedent and because once Israel begins to take water from the Nile it may compete for larger shares in future. [xxvi] If Egypt has water to spare in Sinai, Ethiopia and Sudan felt the water must first be offered to the other Nile riparian countries. [xxvii] for desperately needed development projects in the Nile Basin. 

The Sudanese protest was quickly followed by a series of Egyptian declarations. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amir Moussa bluntly warned Sudan's protesting Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi not �to play with fire� when Turabi countered by threatening to retaliate by reducing Egypt�s water quota. [xxviii] Information Minister Safwat el-Sherif stated Egypt �rejects the hollow threats [on water] from the Sudanese regime. Any [Sudanese] wrongdoing or infringement will be met with full force and firmness.� Water Resources Minister Abdel-Hadi Radi warned the 1959 Nile waters agreement with Sudan allocating water to Egypt was a �red line that can never be crossed. �[xxix] The Egyptian President added, while he had remained silent in the face of many �Sudanese provocations� in the past, �It is finished, I will not stay quiet, I do not want to hurt the Sudanese if they are helpless, but I say, and the world hears me, that if they continue with this stance and take other measures, then I have many measures of my own. [xxx] Most recently, Ethiopia�s announcement in 1999, to build a dam on the Blue Nile River, elicited a threat from Mubarak �to bomb Ethiopia. �[xxxi] However, the Ethiopian government considered these threats as an �irresponsible instance of jingoism that will not get us anywhere near the solution of the problem� and �there is no earthly force that can stop Ethiopia from benefiting from the Nile. �[xxxii] 

Last month, Kenya�s intended withdrawal from the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement was described by Egypt as �an act of war [xxxiii] and Egypt�s Minister for Water Resources and Natural Resources, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, accused Kenya of breaching international law by opting out of the treaty and threatening that Kenya could not lay claim to sovereignty to protect itself from any action that Egypt may want to take�. [xxxiv] According to the newspaper account, the Egyptian Minister ��hinted at sanctions, saying Kenya would suffer if [Egypt] and the other nine decided to punish it for quitting the treaty. �[xxxv] 

Early Attempts towards Collaboration

Hydro-met Project

Between 1961 and 1964, a sudden and unpredictable twenty percent in�crease in the rainfall on the lake plateau raised the level of the equatorial lakes by 2.5 meters, producing extensive flooding around their shores and the disastrous inundation of the Sod floodplain. [xxxvi] The East African countries sought to relieve the areas surrounding Lake Victoria by an increase of one hundred twenty five percent in the out�flow at the Owen Falls Dam causing flooding downstream. The Sudd basin in Sudan doubled in size from (13,100 km� to 29,800 km�) and the flooding destroyed an estimated 120,000 heads of livestock and tens of thousands of Nilotic lives .[xxxvii]  

These extraordinary events elicited a proposal from the World Meteorological Organization for a hydro meteorological (hydro-met) survey of the lake plateau financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The project was established in 1968, which the East African states joined and �in the spirit of African unity� invited Egypt and Sudan to participate. [xxxviii] Egypt and Sudan ea�gerly accepted this gesture and quickly proposed establishing a �Nile Basin Planning Commission� for the total planning of the waters of the Nile Basin. [xxxix]  

However, Ethiopia and the East African countries were not prepared for Egypt�s proposal. The countries were concerned that Egypt would dominate the Commission by virtue of Egypt�s technical and legal expertise, relative economic and political influence coupled with Egypt�s history of unilateral actions and unfavorable attitude towards co-operation and negotiations with the upper riparian.[xl] The damage and how to ameliorate the suffering inflicted by the floods upon citizens of new and unsteady states was of primary concern to the East African states rather than planning for storage of additional flood waters for Egypt and Sudan [xli]  

After its completion, the project was extended for a second phase with further assistance from the UNDP.[xlii] A Technical Committee was established with representation from all participating countries, with Ethiopia as an observer, to oversee and monitor the study project on behalf of the governments in the Nile Basin. However, Egyptian and Sudanese efforts to extend the study to other reaches of the Nile Basin came up against political suspicion and resentment that has accumulated over the years and brought the project to a close. [xliii] 

UNDUGU Group

The prospect for Nile Basin cooperation for water, or for that matter any concern, soon proved illusory. In 1977, Egypt and Sudan again invited the East African states to join with them in a commission of all the riparian states to plan the development of the water resources for the whole of the Nile Basin. [xliv] The proposed Commission was to serve as a framework for negotiations on the apportionment of the Nile waters and its development. There was every reason for Egypt and the Sudan to want to see such a Commission set up, but the other riparian had no incentive to agree to its establishment. They had nothing to gain and might well lose valuable water rights by making premature commitments. [xlv] 

The African states were suspicious of any organi�zation of nine sovereign states, seven with little power and less experience in matters hydrological that would be dominated by Egypt. [xlvi] They resolved this dilemma by deflecting Egyptian and Sudanese interests by creating the UNDUGU group, from the Swahili ndugu (Brotherhood), consisting of Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. UNDUGU soon delved into many furtive and unproductive conferences and ministerial meetings. [xlvii] Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia were conspicuously absent, and without them, there was little prospect for Nile Basin cooperation. [xlviii]  

Rebuffed but determined, Egypt and Sudan continued to press for a Nile Commission but despite numerous meetings of Ministers, Heads of State and a team from the PJTC, which aggressively toured the countries of the riparian states, the leaders refused to gather collectively at the negotiating table. [xlix] Egypt had little to offer the upstream states other than its own ambitious 17 Volume Nile Water Master Plan, which was unveiled in 1981.[l] The plan was conceived and produced by the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works and concentrated on the Upper Nile Basin without consultation or participation by any of the Nile Basin countries in whose territories the plan proposed to construct works. The plan also neglected to take into account Ethiopia�s Blue Nile Plan and Sudan�s Nile Valley Plan and the requirements of the East African states set forth in the British Diplomatic Note of 1959.[li] 

The UNDUGU commission held sixty-six meetings at the technical and ministerial level between 1977 and 1992 with more rhetoric than results. [lii] Communiqu�s issued after its meetings have made very little mention of the Nile apart from platitudinous statements on African and Middle Eastern political questions and tended to focus on closer cooperation in development matters unrelated to the use of the Nile waters, such as transport and communication. [liii] However, this dismal record of non-achievement and prevarication on the Nile issues could not continue. [liv] The 250 million people living in the Nile Basin states were rapidly increasing at three and six-tenths percent a year, the extensive en�vironmental degradation, and the looming demand for equitable sharing of the Nile waters was becoming imminent. [lv] Egypt responded to these needs with a policy of confidence building by offering assistance for regional projects for pollution control and watershed management in the upstream states to divert attention from the fundamental but contentious issue of the division of available water. [lvi] Despite the Egyptian initiatives, the member states proceeded to abolish the UNDUGU Commission and reorganized it in 1993 as the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion, Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE) to address the contentious matter of equitable use of the Nile waters. 

TECCONILE

In 1993, at their sixty-seventh meeting in Aswan, the ministers for water resources abolished and reorganized UNDUGU into the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE).[lvii] Since its establishment, TECCONILE has participated in the preparation of an atlas of the Nile Basin, conducted a series of training sessions for staff members of water resources agencies in the basin in Geographical Information Systems, Hydrological Modeling, Monitoring, Forecasting, and Simulation and organizing a series of annual Nile 2002 Conferences [lviii] The conferences provide a forum for local as well as international experts to present technical studies related to the development of the Nile basin, to exchange views and to foster cooperation. [lix] TECCONILE has organized workshops to develop and elaborate the �Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP)� which includes twenty-one basin projects for funding at an estimated cost of US $100 million. [lx] With funding assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency TECCONILE has also developed a �cooperative framework� among the basin countries to formulate agreements for the equitable use and protection of the shared resource. [lxi] 

TECCONILE was at first concerned with the water quality of the equatorial lakes and then drafted the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP), which was not so much a plan as �an expression of commitment by the basin states.� The Plan was enthusiastically approved at the third meeting of the Nile 2002 Conference in February 1995.[lxii] During his open�ing remarks to the conference the Tanzanian Prime Minis�ter announced that his government was committed to the principle of �eq�uitable entitlement� to the water resources of the Nile, formally challenging the opposing Egyptian principle of �historic and estab�lished rights. �[lxiii] The principle of equitable entitlement advocated by Tanzania elicited strong support from its neighbors .[lxiv] The following year, in May 1996 at the fourth 2002 Nile Conference in Kampala, an in�ternational basin association was proposed (to include Eritrea) by the members who fervently blessed the spirit of cooperation. [lxv] 

Nine months later in February 1997, at the seventy-first meeting of TECCONILE held in Cairo to approve twenty-two projects mostly for en�vironmental protection contained in NRBAP, Egypt strongly supported the US $100 million needed to carry out the NRBAP environmental activities, hopefully to placate the opposition to its historic needs and to demonstrate confidence building among the upstream riparian who would gather a week later at Addis Ababa for the fifth annual Nile 2002 Conference. [lxvi] However, Egypt's coopera�tion and support for the environmental concerns of their upstream neigh�bors could not disguise the fundamental issue of �equitable use. �[lxvii] 

In his opening address to the three hundred representatives from the ten riparian and international agencies, the Ethiopian Minister for Water Resources insisted that �as a source and major contribution of the Nile waters, Ethiopia has the right to have an equitable share of the Nile waters and reserves its rights to make use of its water. �[lxviii] In 1956, the imperial Ethiopian government offi�cially declared that Ethiopia �would reserve for her own use those Nile waters in her territory, �[lxix] but in 1997, Ethiopia was simply de�manding an �equitable share.� Indeed, Ethiopia�s position appeared to be more in keeping with the theme of the conference � �Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation� - than the declaration by Ethiopia fifty years earlier.  

The Nile Basin Initiative

Built upon earlier initiatives of TECCONILE and NRBAP, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), was launched in February 1999[lxx] in common pursuit of the sustainable development and management of Nile waters and to achieve a regional cooperative framework acceptable to all basin countries [lxxi] in order to promote basin wide cooperation in integrated water resource planning. [lxxii] The riparian agreed to pursue this goal under a transitional arrangement (NBI) until a permanent legal framework is in place. [lxxiii] It was believed that the basin wide network would promote international support for sustainable Nile water development and management. [lxxiv] The Objectives are:1. To develop the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable way and to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its people. 2. To ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources. 3. To ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains. 4. To target poverty eradication and promote economic integration. 5. To ensure that program results in a move from planning to action. 

Strategic Action Program The strategic action program of the Nile Basin Initiative comprises two sub-programs, a "Shared Vision Program" and a "Subsidiary Action Program. "[lxxv] 

The Shared Vision Program consists of those measures being undertaken jointly by all of the member countries �[T]o achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.� [lxxvi] The main task is the creation of an enabling environment for investments through a set of basin wide activities and projects [lxxvii] to include the preparation of proposals for international financing of projects to develop a cooperative framework, confidence building and stake-holder involvement, socio-economic, environmental and sector analysis, development and investment planning and applied training. [lxxviii] The idea is that basin wide measures are needed in order to foster the right enabling environment for basin wide investments, as well as investments at the sub-basin level, where joint development projects could bring about �tangible benefits� to the riparian.[lxxix]  

The Subsidiary Action Program consists of measures to be undertaken by groups of countries [lxxx] and comprises actual joint development projects at the sub-basin level, involving two or more countries. While local and national governments would address what needs to be done at the local and national levels, the subsidiary program would address development opportunities with transnational implications. [lxxxi] To help identify subsidiary action programs, two working groups of countries were established by sub-basin. The East Nile Sub-Basin Group (Blue Nile Sub-basin) consists of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt and the Southern Nile Sub-Basin Group (Equatorial Nile Sub-basin) consists of Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and the DRC. The sole responsibility of joint projects would rest with the concerned riparian working group but with all Nile Basin riparian being able to participate in a basin wide framework .[lxxxii]  

Organizational structure

The Nile Basin Initiative is governed by the Council of Ministers (Nile-COM), its highest decision-making organ. This Council is made up of water affairs ministers of the Nile basin states. Chair of the Council is rotated annually [lxxxiii] Supporting the Council is the Nile Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC), which is made up of senior officials from the various countries. The Technical Advisory Committee consists of one member from each country and an alternate. [lxxxiv] The day-to-day work of the preparation of project documents is the task of the Nile Secretariat (Nile-SEC) assisted by the Nile-TAC. [lxxxv] The Nile-TAC has divided into two Working Groups to oversee the preparation work and provide their approval at essential points in the process. [lxxxvi] The NBI established a secretariat in Entebbe, Uganda, on September 3, 1999. [lxxxvii]

International Consortium for the Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON)

 Immediately after its establishment, the Nile Basin states called on the international community to provide support through the ICCON. [lxxxviii] The Nile-COM officially requested the World Bank to act as a partner to organize and host the ICCON. The objective of ICCON is to seek coordinated and transparent support for cooperative water resources projects in the Nile Basin. Through this forum, the countries could then seek funding pledges for support from bilateral and multilateral as well as private sources. [lxxxix]

Accordingly, on May 30, 2001, the World Bank announced the establishment of a trust fund and invited donors to a consultative meeting in Geneva Switzerland in June for riparian countries to present the development project plans they sought to undertake. [xc] On June 28th the World Bank and donor countries including Britain, Canada, Germany and the Nordic countries pledged US $140 million to the ten Nile riparian as the first phase of an eventual three billion dollar investment to fully implement the �shared vision� of the Nile riparian.[xci]

 Prospects for Cooperation

Two months before the ICCON conference in Geneva, the Ethiopian Minister of Water Resources announced Ethiopia�s intention to develop close to 200,000 ha of land through irrigation projects and construction of two dams in the Blue Nile Sub-basin. He further stated these projects would the first phase of forty-six projects, which Ethiopia proposed to execute along with ten joint projects which Egypt and Sudan proposed such as a watershed management, flood control, basin studies and dam projects. The announcement was made immediately following a meeting between the three Blue Nile Sub-basin riparian in Khartoum, in preparation for the ICCON conference. The Minister further announced jubilantly that a consensus had been reached with both Sudan and Egypt for the realization of these as well as other projects. [xcii] The following day, the Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia confirmed Egypt�s commitment to the utilization of the Nile waters for the benefit of all riparian countries. However, the Ambassador emphasized that Egypt was only committed to multilateral arrangements of joint development projects of the Nile waters that would benefit both upstream and downstream countries without harming downstream countries, provided projects did not lead to a reduction of the waters reaching Egypt. [xciii] During the same week, amid rumors that the Ethiopian Government had secured Israeli experts to commence studies for the proposed irrigation projects, the Egyptian Minister of Water Resources was obliged to reassure his audience at a Nile conference in Egypt that he had personally inspected irrigation projects in Ethiopia and that projects in which the Israelis were involved were potable water and sanitary drainage projects. [xciv] A week later, the

Ethiopian Minister of Water Resources retorted that the agreement to participate in the Nile Basin Initiative reserves Ethiopia�s right to implement any projects in the Blue Nile Basin Sub-basin unilaterally, at any given time and charged that the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan impedes sustainable development in the basin and called for its nullification. [xcv] The latter part of the statement was in response to the Egyptian Government�s statement a year earlier that the 1959 Nile Water Agreement was in effect without any limits on its duration. At the time, Egypt emphasized the agreement would not be amended, modified, substituted, or terminated and that it was obligatory for Egypt and Sudan to receive their entire share of Nile water. [xcvi] Egypt has reiterated the position at every opportunity. At the Sixth Nile 2002 Conference in February 1998, Egypt again reminded the participants of the sanctity of the Nile water sharing arrangements, which allocates the entire discharge of the Nile waters at Aswan to Egypt and Sudan and the validity of all colonial and post-colonial treaties. [xcvii]  

East Nile Sub-basin Action Plan

Following the ICCON Conference in Geneva, the Blue Nile Sub-basin states proceeded to establish the East Nile Sub-Basin Regional Bureau in Ethiopia, [xcviii] to develop the East Nile Sub-Basin Action Plan (ENSAP). The plan will initially involve joint measures to prevent flooding and watershed management, a simulation project and joint hydro-electric/power sharing projects between Ethiopia and Sudan in the Baro, Akobo and Birbir River sub-basins of the Blue Nile Sub-basin in Ethiopia and Sudan. [xcix]Egypt views the ENSAP as the conduit for planning and financing joint projects focusing on the management of water quality, pollution, watershed, conservation and erosion management and scientific studies and data collection. Ethiopia, on the other, considers the framework as the means to secure financing for its development aspirations. Accordingly, Ethiopia has proposed a series of irrigation projects and two hydropower projects to generate 3,000 MW to be executed under ENSAP.[c] According to the Ethiopian Minister of Water Resources, US $21 million is required to implement the first phase of Ethiopia�s projects. [ci]

The Ethiopian projects include irrigation schemes, for which Ethiopia had previously sought international financing through an African Development Bank (ADB) opposed by Egypt and blocked on grounds that the project would �do damage to others. �[cii] The noted Egyptian Nile scholar Rushdi, believes that while small scale projects:[I]ntended to � capitalize on the flooding caused by seasonal precipitation will not significantly affect the quantities of water that reach Egypt and are simultaneously cost effective means of solving Ethiopia�s food shortage� the projects intended for long term storage at the Blue Nile headwaters, of the nature � under technical study in the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative, will seriously affect the water available to Egypt and Sudan. For Egypt in particular, they could wreak havoc on the many land reform projects underway�. [I]t is difficult to imagine how Egypt could survive with a lower quota of water as seems to be the plan under the initiative. Quite possibly, this would spell an end to agriculture as a primary activity, for which Egypt has been known since the dawn of history.

According to the current system, Egypt obtains approximately three fourths of the [Nile waters], a quota that barely meets the needs of its increasing populace�and in view of its lack of other significant reliable water resources to fulfill its requirements, it is determined to maintain. One can safely state that the maintenance of [the present quota] resides at the very heart of Egypt�s national security [ciii]Ethiopian plans to construct dams or irrigation projects in the Blue Nile Sub-basin are perceived by Egypt as a �grave threat� to Egypt�s water security and are considered �purely theoretical� and �impractical� because of the �extremely costly prospect. �[civ] Egyptians perceive that since the �balance of power� in the region is tilted in Egypt�s favor, projects likely to jeopardize Egypt�s welfare have few chances of success. [cv] Instead, according to Hammad, Ethiopia and Egypt should pursue cooperative endeavors in water �recuperation and exploitation� to secure Egypt�s quota of water from the Nile [cvi] Hammad further believes Egypt�s new policy, which emphasizes cooperation, must also take into account the possibility of �political disputes� that could trigger tension and Egypt must have recourse to a credible military deterrent as a permanent feature of Egyptian strategy. [cvii]

Data Requirement

 Egypt also maintains that without reliable water resources information and data projects, cannot be implemented and believes that a basis must first be found for exchanging information and conducting studies. [cviii]

According to Egypt, information and data on the entire drainage basin are essential elements that are necessary to support the implementation and monitoring of basin-wide integrated development. [cix] Though data and information on the Nile basin are available, Egypt believes the varying quality and quantity of the data requires a standard methodology to be prepared and applied uniformly through out the basin. Each Nile riparian in preparing national water development, management, conservation, environmental protection, sustainability, and other related plans should then use the methodology. [cx] Egypt also insists that each riparian should compile an inventory of surface water, other river basins, rainfall, hydro-power potential, water utilization, water requirements, water quality, groundwater resources, lake levels and storage capacities to assess the amount of water available in each state. [cxi] Each riparian should establish national data banks to gather, update, and provide this information to a regional system. [cxii] This information can then be used to determine the �equitable utilization� of the Nile. [cxiii]Implicitly, without this information, Egypt would not be in a position to engage in any meaningful negotiations for equitable utilization. Ethiopia, however, believes that there is presently sufficient information available in most of the basin countries and views Egypt�s call for more data as an attempt to prolong the issue of equitable utilization. [cxiv]

Ethiopia cites studies such as the Hydromet study, which took twenty-five years to complete without any tangible benefits to any of the upper riparian, as evidence of Egypt�s intentions to evade negotiations. [cxv]Ethiopia refers to studies that suggest riparian should rely on the available data or data, which can be easily collected as was done in the negotiations between Egypt and Sudan in 1959 and the decisions underlying the construction of the Aswan Dam. [cxvi] Records have been kept at the Nilometer in Rhoda since 860 BC and intermittent records go back 220 years before Hurst commenced formal technical studies and record keeping in 1902; furthermore, the Egyptian Irrigation Department has since 1900 kept relatively accurate and reliable records.[cxvii] A number of studies have also looked at the implications of fluctuations in Nile discharge for water resources in Egypt, particularly since the prolonged period of low flows during the 1970s and 1980s[cxviii] and others have also reviewed the historical fluctuations in Nile River discharge. [cxix]More recently, a few studies have attempted to evaluate the impacts of �the new phenomenon� of climate change on runoff in the Nile Basin. Some believe that there is a serious threat that global warming over the next twenty to forty years will reduce Nile water flows by as much as twenty five percent. [cxx]

The various mathematical, hydrological and theoretical models and assumptions have produced inconsistent results ranging from a fifty percent reduction in runoff in the Blue Nile Sub-basin due to a twenty percent decrease in precipitation to a surplus of water until the year 2025, based upon Egypt�s demand projections with or without climate change. [cxxi] If the negative projections prove accurate, the basin is likely to experience profound environmental change with serious security implications for Egypt. [cxxii] However, others have concluded that, rather than data and forecasts, what is lacking is the capacity in each basin state to analyze the available information in a way which allows the decision makers to confidently adopt a negotiating position that does not compromise their interests. [cxxiii]

Conclusion

Strong political rhetoric and �saber-rattling,� avoidance, prevarication, and suspicion have exemplified relations between the countries. Throughout the past four decades Egypt has continually announced that if any upstream country diverts the Nile, it would view such action as a threat to its national security and would use force to rectify the situation. This stance is despite Egypt�s diversion of the Nile waters to areas outside of the Nile Basin and tendering the resource to countries outside of the Nile Basin to achieve its political ends. With such political maneuvering over the Nile's flow, threats and counter- threats have reached dangerous levels.

The Nile Basin Initiative offers hope and a promise of cooperation �in pursuit of the sustainable development and management of the Nile waters.� It is however difficult to remain optimistic when viewed in the context of most recent statements from the respective governments. Pious pronouncements for cooperation and clar�ion calls for confidence building cannot disguise the reality that the Nile riparian are no nearer to a resolution at the end than at the beginning of the twentieth century. Equitable utilization must necessarily be based on the availability, variability, and quality of the basin resources. The call for cooperation towards sustainable development of the basin is hopelessly obscured and can hardly be reconciled to needs, rights, economic development and �equitable share� which translate into more water for each riparian. Because of Egypt's present and future water needs, experts cannot agree whether Egypt has enough water to meet its present needs, much less �extra� Nile water for diversion to Ethiopia and Sudan.The uncertainty of scientific and technical information cannot be underestimated in light of the conflicting nature of the predictions and the more recent phenomenon of climate change, rapid population growth, pollution and the increasing aspirations of the basin riparian to exercise their sovereign and internationally recognized rights to development.

Because of uncertainty and disagreement among experts, Egypt perceives the need for accurate scientific and technical studies to gain a comprehensive understanding of the entire Nile Basin before negotiations on the equitable utilization of the waters of the basin. Egypt does not believe that it is prudent to negotiate an agreement with any of the upper riparian and therefore prefers the �no-agreement� alternative and the status quo as its best alternative to a negotiated agreement, until all of the relevant facts become known. This reality compels me to urge the Ethiopian government to insist on a consensus building approach proposed in A Path for Achieving Equity in Sharing the Nile, and From Polemics to Indigenous Consensus Building Refocusing the Approach to �Equitable Use� in the Blue Nile Sub-basin to achieve the equitable use of the waters of the Blue Nile Sub-Basin rather than the conventional approach which delays the inevitable, to the detriment of the Ethiopian people.

Comments are welcome:  [email protected]

[i] John Bulloch and Adell Darwish, Water Wars, Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Victor Gollanz, 1993) at 79.[ii] There are several different levels of national secur�ity in Egypt but only one in Category A - which comes under the direct protection of the armed forces. Any threat to the Nile allows the Egyptian High Command to order an immediate military response, without parliamentary approval. Ibid. at 85.[iii]Ibid. at 128.

[iv] Ibid. at 85.

[v] Plan Aida provides for intervention in Ethiopia. Al-Timssah (Operation Crocodile) sets out the modalities for a campaign in Sudan, and the silting at Aswan, detected early in the 1980s, prompted the Egyptians to map out a scenario for an invasion of Libya, plans which were unsuccessfully put into practice in 1976. Ibid. at 128.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] G. Shapland, Rivers of Discord, International Water Disputes in the Middle East (N. Y.: St. Martins Press, 1997)  at 79. In the medium term, the total abstraction of the Nile waters might reach four billion m� per year.[viii] Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia, , translated by BBC Monitoring (June 1, 1978); SWB (June 3, 1978).

[ix] Bullock and Darwish, supra note 1 at 84.

[x] Shapland, supra note 7 at 79.

[xi] �Ethiopia Flogs Dead Horse Over Nile� Egyptian Gazette (June 2, 1980); See also Yacob Arsano, �Towards Conflict Prevention in the Nile Basin� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation (Proceedings of the 5th Nile 2000 Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 24-28, 1997, Ministry of Water Resources: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: ECA Printing Dept., 1998) at 487, 500.

[xii] The Guardian, June 6, 1980 �Sadat Warns Ethiopia� Egyptian Gazette (June 5, 1980).

[xiii] Okidi, Charles, �Environmental Stress and Conflicts in Africa: Case Studies of African International Drainage Basins� (paper presented at the second session of the Workshop on Environmental Stress and Acute Conflicts, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, May 1992) [unpublished]

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Shapland, supra note 7 at 79.

[xvi] The International Herald Tribune, February 22, 1985 �Egypt is African and its Principal Problem is Water.�

[xvii] Bulloch and Darwish, supra note 1 at 90.

[xviii] This was particularly important in Egypt, where there was a real national debate about the policies to be followed, with the government apparently favoring closer links with the Arab Gulf states at the expense of relations with Egypt's African neighbors. Ibid.

[xix] Ibid. at 91.

[xx] See Al-Ahram, Official Egyptian Newspaper, October 5, 1991.

[xxi] Bullock and Darwish, supra note 1 at 88.

[xxii] The rise in water consumption owing to the expected increase in population, misuse in agriculture, urban waste, poor distribution networks and so on. Ibid. at 89.

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] See Ronald Bleier, �Will Nile Water Go to Israel?: North Sinai Pipeline and The Politics of Scarcity� (Sept. 1997) 5 (3) Middle East Policy at 117.[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Translated by Prof. Arie S. Issar from Ha�aretz (January 1, 1993) online: <wysiwyg://content.363/https://www.geocities.com/khodari/law.htm> (date accessed: 11/14/00) at 2.

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix] Bahaa El-Koussy, �Sudan Briefs Arab League on Tensions� UPI (July 3, 1995). The Wall Street Journal echoes warning of the scarcity of the Nile water. �But there isn�t enough water to complete the irrigation plans of Ethiopia and Egypt, let alone the other nations that share it.� The article quotes Dale Whittington, a University of North Carolina water expert speaking at a 1997 conference in Addis Ababa warning that Ethiopia and Egypt �are set on a collision course that both may have difficulty changing.� See Amy Dockser Marcus, �Egypt Faces Problem It Has Long Dreaded: Less Control of the Nile� Wall Street Journal (August 22, 1997) at 1.

[xxx] �Something is Being Cooked Up� (June 29, 1995) 9 Mid East Mirror, Section: Egypt-Sudan No. 123.

[xxxi] Waltina Scheumann and Manuel Schiffler, eds., Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation (Springer-Verlag: Berlin: Heidelberg: New York: Springer, 1999) at 148.

[xxxii] See Statement by Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Seyoum Mesfin, �Egypt is Diverting the Nile Through the Tushkan and Peace Canal Projects� Addis Tribune (January 30, 1998) online: <file://C:\aol30\download\SEYOUM.htm> (date accessed: 3/23/98).[xxxiii] Argwings Odera, �Egypt Talks Tough Over Nile Waters,� East African Standard, Addis Ababa, Friday, December 12, 1004 posted on the web on December 12, 2003 at: https://www.eastandard.net/headlines/news12120317.htm. [Accessed on 12/12/2003]

[xxxiv] Ibid.

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Discussed in Dante Caponera, �Legal Aspects of Transboundary River Basins in the Middle East: The Al Asi (Orontes), the Jordan and the Nile� (1993) 33 NAT RESOURCES J. 629, 659.

[xxxvii] P. P. Howell, �East Africa�s Water Requirement: The Equatorial Nile Project and the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. A Brief Historical Review� in P. P. Howell & J. A. Allan eds., The Nile: Sharing a Scarce Resource, a Historical and Technical review of Water Management and of Economic and Legal Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 123.

[xxxviii] Hon. S. A. Maswanya, Minister of Home Affairs, Tanzania, (speech at the meeting of the Hydro Meteorological Survey, 27 February, 1967 reprinted in Hydromet Bulletin, Entebbe, 1968) at 21.

[xxxix] Howell, �East Africa�s Water Requirement,� supra note 37 at 126.

[xl] Ibid.

[xli] United Nations Development Program and World Meteorological Organization, �Report of the Hydro Meteorological Survey of the Catchment of Lake Victoria, Kyoga and Mobutu Sese Seko: Project Findings and Recommendations� (Geneva: UNDP, 1982).

[xlii] For formulation of mathematical models representing the Upper Nile.

[xliii] See Yahia Abdel Majid, �The Nile Basin: Lessons from the Past� in A. K. Biswas, ed., International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates � Tigris to the Nile (London: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 170.

[xliv] Robert O� Collins, �In Search of the Nile Waters� Erlich Haggai and Israel Gershoni, eds., in The Nile: History, Cultures, Myths (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000)  at 260.[xlv] G. Shapland, Rivers of Discord, International Water Disputes in the Middle East (N. Y.: St. Martins Press, 1997) at p. 76.

[xlvi] Collins, �In Search of the Nile Waters,� supra note 44 at 260.

[xlvii] Ibid.

[xlviii] Ibid.

[xlix] Ibid.

[l] The Nile Master Water Plan, (Cairo, Egypt: Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, 1981) 17 Volumes.

[li] See Collin, �In Search of the Nile Waters,� supra note 10 at 264. The plan included a dam at Lake Victoria, Lake Kyoga, and Lake Albert and regulators at the Bahr-el-Gebel and the tributaries of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, diversion canals around the Sudd in the Sudan connecting to Bahr-el-Arab and additional canals to drain the Machar Swamps.

[lii] Ibid.

[liii] Shapland, supra note 7 at 76.

[liv] Ibid.

[lv] Ibid.

[lvi] Ibid.

[lvii] The agreement to this effect was signed on January 1st, 1993 by Ministers from six countries (Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo) Online: <https://www.tecconile.org> (date accessed: 11/14/00).[lviii] Ibid.

[lix] The first was held in Egypt in (1993) in Sudan (1994), Tanzania (1995), Uganda (1996), Ethiopia (1997), Rwanda (1998), Kenya (1999), Ethiopia (2000) with the remaining two to be held in Eritrea and the Congo. The first round will be completed in 2002, hence the Nile 2002 Conferences. Ibid.   

[lx] See Ibid.[lxi] See Ibid.

[lxii] Jackson Makwetta, Ministry for Water, Energy and Minerals, Tanzania, quoted in �Development Plan Approved for Nile Basin States� Xinhua News Agency (February 13, 1995) item No. 0213102).

[lxiii] Cleopa Msuya, Prime Minister, Tanzania, quoted in �Review of International Laws: A Nile Waters Agreement Urged�, Xinhua News Agency (February 14th, 1995) Item No. 0214130.

[lxiv] See Collins, �In Search of the Nile Waters,� supra note 44 at 264.

[lxv] Ibid.

[lxvi] Ibid.

[lxvii] For example see �1997 Country Paper: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia� Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation (Proceedings of the 5th Nile 2000 Conference, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 24-28, 1997, Ministry of Water Resources: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: ECA Printing Dept., 1998) at 37-44.

[lxviii] Shiferaw Jarsso, Minister for Water Resources, Ethiopia, quoted in �Ethiopia Stresses Equitable Use of Nile Waters� Xinhua News Agency (February 24, 1997) Item No. 0224259.[lxix] Statement by the Imperial Ethiopian Government, February 6, 1956.

[lxx] The NBI supersedes the disbanded Technical Co-operation Committee for the Promotion of the Development & Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE). The Nile Basin Initiative Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/nbibackground.htm> (date accessed: 3/28/00).[lxxi] Member countries are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

[lxxii] See Sustainable Water Management: Nile Initiative Online:: <https://www.undp.org.seed/water/region/nile.htm> (date accessed: 9/8/00).

[lxxiii] Ibid. The Canadian Development Assistance Agency, UNDP, The World Bank and the Government of Italy through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization provide funding assistance. The Nile Basin Initiative Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/nbibackground.htm> (date accessed: 3/28/00).

[lxxiv] Ibid. Policy Guidelines for the Nile River Basin Initiative Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/document/tacpolicy.htm> (date accessed: 3/28/00.

[lxxv] Ibid. Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States, Policy Guidelines for the Nile at: River Basin Strategic Action Program. Ibid. at 2

[lxxvi] Ibid. at 2.

[lxxvii] The �Shared Vision Program� comprises 5 broad themes, as follows: 1. Co-operative Framework; 2. Confidence building and stakeholder involvement; 3. Socio-economic, environmental and sectoral analyses; 4. Development and investment planning; and 5. Applied training. Ibid. at 2.

[lxxviii] The objective of ICCON is to seek coordinated and transparent financing for co-operative water resources development and other related projects in the basin. The Initiative is presently soliciting the participation of additional donors including the Ford Foundation, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the governments of Italy, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. See Press Release, �Nile Basin Initiative Launches Secretariat�, Entebbe, Uganda, September 3, 1999 Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org./pressrelease.htm> at 1 (date accessed: 3/28/000).

[lxxix] Ibid. at 3.

[lxxx] Two groups of countries are in the process of forming themselves to investigate the development of investment projects on the Nile Basin. These are the Eastern Nile Group, which has already been formed, which includes Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia; and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Group comprising Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is in the process of being formed. Ibid.

[lxxxi] Ibid. 1. Generic Water Resources Management Project Possibilities: Water Supply & Sanitation; Irrigation & Drainage Development; Fisheries Development; Hydropower Development & Pooling; Watershed Management; Sustainable Management of Wetlands & Bio-diversity; Conservation; Sustainable Management of Lakes & linked Wetland Systems; River Regulation; Flood Management; Desertification Control; Water Hyacinth & Weeds Control; Pollution Control & Water Quality Management; and Water Use Efficiency Improvements. 2. Other Related Joint Development Project Possibilities: a) Infrastructure - Regional energy networks, including power interconnection and gas pipelines; Telecommunication development; Regional transport, including railway and road networks; river and marine navigation; and aviation; b) Trade and Industry - promotion of trade (including border trade); Industrial development; Regional tourism development; Promotion of private investment and joint ventures; Marketing and storage of agricultural products; Forest crop harvesting c) Health, environment, other - Malaria and other endemic diseases control; Protection of wildlife; Environmental management; Disaster forecasting and management. Ibid.

[lxxxii] Nile Basin Initiative, Policy Document Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/document/TACPolicy.html> (date accessed: 9/8/00).

[lxxxiii] Ibid.

[lxxxiv] Ibid.

[lxxxv] The Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/nile-sec/htm> (date accessed: visited 3/28/00).

[lxxxvi] Ibid. The Working Groups met for the first time at the Nile Basin Initiative's offices in Entebbe, Uganda at the end of August 1999 and again in the December 1999. Ibid.

[lxxxvii] Ibid.

[lxxxviii] Ibid. The Secretariat's activities are geared towards supporting this process. Consultants have been appointed to prepare the project documents. National consultants will be appointed to provide comments from the Nile Basin countries where appropriate to ensure that the projects are prepared with participation from each country.[lxxxix] NileTac Policy Online: <https://www.nilebasin.org/document/TACPolicy.html> (date accessed: 9/8/00).[xc] �World Bank to Finance Development Projects in River Nile Basin� Xinhua, News Agency (May 30, 2001) online: &lhttps:////library.northernlight.com/FA20010530000073.html> (date accessed: 5/30/01); see also Geoffrey Kamali, �World Bank to Finance R. Nile Projects� New Vision (May 30, 2001) allAfrica.com online: <https://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200105300043.html> (date accessed: 5/30/01).[xci] Stephanie Nebehay, �Donor�s Pledge $140 million for Nile Basin Projects� Reuters (June 28, 2001) online: <https://dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archives/0453.html> (date accessed: 6/28/01).

[xcii]  �First International Consortium of Cooperation for Nile Opens Today� Ethiopian News Agency (June 26, 2001) online: <https://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2001/Jun/26Jun01/jun26e6.htm> (date accessed: 6/26/01).[xciii] �Egypt Explains Position About Nile Waters� Panafrican News Agency (April 6, 2001) online: &lhttps:////www.sudan.net/news/posted/2013> (date accessed: 6/28/01).[xciv] �Egypt: Minister denies Israeli Participation in Projects on the Nile in Ethiopia� BBC Monitoring (June 14, 2001) online: <https://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html>  (date accessed: 6/14/01).[xcv] �Nile Basin Initiative SVP Program Advantages for Ethiopia� Ethiopian News Agency (June 22, 2001) online: <https://www/telecom.net.et/~ena?Newsenglish?62367.2206.htm> (date accessed: 7/25/01).

[xcvi] �New Proposals and Modalities for a Nile Accord� (occasional Paper Series No. 14, June/July 2000, by the Ethiopian Institute for Peace and Development). Also online at: <https://chora.virtualave.net/nile-proposals.htm>  (date accessed: 7/25/01).[xcvii] �Report of Session III, Country Papers: Ethiopia� Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: To Benefit All (Proceedings of the 6th Nile 2002 Conference, February 23-27, 1998) at 12 Online at: <https://www.tecconile.org/vicon/rep6/htm> (date accessed: 11/14/00).

[xcviii] See �Nile Cooperation Bureau to be set Up in Addis Ababa� AllAfrica.com (July 11, 2001) Online: <https://allafrica.com/stories/printable/20010711056.html> (date accessed: 7/11/01).[xcix] See �Ethiopia to Carry Out Irrigation Projects Along River Nile� Xinhua News Agency (April, 2001) online: <https://www.sudan.net/news/posted/2009.html> (last visited 5/12/01).

[c] Ibid.

[ci] �First International Consortium of Cooperation for Nile Opens Today� Ethiopian News Agency (June 26, 2001) online: <https://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2001/Jun/26Jun01/jun26e6.htm> (date accessed: 6/26/01).[cii] Alan Cowell, �Now A Little Steam, Later, Maybe, a Water War� New York Times, (February 7, 1990) at A.4.[ciii] Said Rushdi, �Will Plans to Redistribute Nile Waters Spell an End to Agriculture as Egypt Knows it?� Al-Ahram Weekly (April �May 2, 2001) issue No. 531 Online : <https://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2001/531/special.htm> (date accessed: 11/02/01).

[civ] Abdel Azim Hammad, �Water, Water Everywhere� Al-Ahram Weekly (February 10-16, 2000) issue No. 468 Online at: https://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2000/468/op5.htm. (date accessed: 11/02/01).

[cv] Ibid.

[cvi] Ibid.

[cvii] Ibid.

[cviii] See �1997 Country Paper: Arab Republic of Egypt� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra note 67 at 27-36.

[cix] Ibid.

[cx] Ibid.

[cxi] Ibid.

[cxii] Ibid.

[cxiii] Ibid.

[cxiv] �1997 Country Paper: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra note 67 at 40.

[cxv] Ibid.

[cxvi] J. S. A. Brichieri-Colombi, �How Much is Enough? A Review of Data Needs For Cooperative Development of the Nile in Egypt� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra 67 at 147,154.

[cxvii] Ibid.

[cxviii] M. Demisse, �Analysis of Drought in Ethiopia based on Nile River Flow Records� in The State of the Art of Hydrology and Hydrogeology in the Arid and Semi-Arid Areas of Africa (Proceedings of the Sahel Forum, Illinois, International Water Resources Association, 1990) at 159-168; M. A. Abu-Zeid, and S. Abdel-Dayem, �Egypt Programmes and Policy Options for Facing the Low Nile Flows� in M. A. Abu-Zeid, and A. K. Biswas, eds., Climatic Fluctuations and Water Management (Oxford: Heinemann, 1992) at 48-58; D. Conway, and M. Hulme, �Recent Fluctuations in Precipitation and Runoff over the Nile Sub-basins and their Impact on Main Nile Discharge� (1996) 25 Climatic Change at 127-151; Yilma Seleshi, �Causes and Variability of Summer Rainfall and Runoff over the Highlands of the Nile River Basin� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra note 67 at 199-214; D. Conway, N. Brooks, P. D. Merrin and K. R. Briffa, �Historical Climatology and Dendroclimatology in the Blue Nile Basin, Northern Ethiopia� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra note 67at 265-275 and Tesfaye Gisella, �The Nile and its Variabilities As Could be Inferred from Metereological Parameters� in Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile Basin: Basis for Cooperation supra note 67 at 279-284.[cxix] Ibid. See also M. Shahin, Hydrology of the Nile Basin (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985); J. V. Sutcliff and J. B. C. Lazenby, �Hydrological Data Requirements for Planning Nile Management� in P. P. Howell and J. A. Allan The Nile, Resource Evaluation, Resource Management, Hydropolitics and Legal Issues (London: School of African and Oriental Studies, 1990) at 107-136; S. Rushdi, The River Nile, Geology, Hydrology and Utilization (Oxford: Elsevier); and Evans, T., �History of Nile Flows� in P. P. Howell and J. A. Allan The Nile, Resource Evaluation, Resource Management, Hydropolitics and Legal Issues (London: School of African and Oriental Studies, 1990) at 5-39.

[cxx] Richard Matthew, �Environmental Security: Demystifying the Concept, Clarifying the Stakes� (American Association for the Advancement of Science, Woodrow Wilson Center for Environmental Change and Security Project, Issue No. 1, spring, 1995).

[cxxi] See M. Hulme, �Global Climate Change and the Nile Basin� in P. P. Howell and J. A. Allan, eds., The Nile, Resource Evaluation, Resource Management, Hydropolitics and Legal Issues (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1990) at 59-82; P. H. Gleik, �The vulnerability of Runoff in the Nile Basin to Climatic Changes� (1991) 13 Environmental Professional at 66-73; D. Conway and M. Hulme, �Recent Fluctuations in Precipitation and Runoff over the Nile Sub-basins and their Impact on Main Nile Discharge (1993) 25 Climatic Change at 127-151; D. Conway and M. Hulme, �The Impacts of Climate Variability and Future Climate Change in the Nile Basin on Water Resources in Egypt� (1996) 12 (3) Water Resources Development at 277-296.

[cxxii] In her article, �Redefining Security� Jessica T. Matthews endorses �broadening [the] definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues.� Pointing to the interrelated impact of population growth and resource scarcity, she forecasts a bleak future of "[h]uman suffering and turmoil,� conditions ripe for �authoritarian government,� and �refugees spreading the environmental stress that originally forced them from their homes.� Jessica Matthews, �Redefining Security� (1989) 68 Foreign Affairs at 162-177.

[cxxiii] Ibid.

By Yosef Yacob, JD, LM, PhD