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The objective of
this article is to critically examine the overall thesis of Meles
Zenawi�s paradigm shift with respect to African development. It
is, in effect, an overview of the theme under discussion and the
tenets and points of view incorporated in the preliminary draft
presented by Meles Zenawi (henceforth MZ), the Prime Minister of
Ethiopia.
From
the outset, however, I like to warn readers not to impregnate a
misconception of the oneness of political proclivity (or ideological
faith) and personal theoretical observation. As far as I am
concerned I like to delineate (and cautiously de-link) what Meles
has stood for so far � irrespective of his future commitment �
and what he presented to the public now. I am interested in the
latter, and it is in this spirit that I like to critique African
Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings. It is difficult to
try to dissociate ones political devotion (especially for a head of
a state) and his relatively scholarly thesis or presentation of an
historical account. But if one can read and critique My Life and
the Progress of Ethiopia without bias to Emperor Haile Slassie
(the author of the title), one can definitely read MZ�s �Dead
Ends and New Beginnings.� Reinforcing my argument further, I like
to simply state, if we want to learn anything, we must pay attention
to the information to be learned irrespective of who provides it.
I
have no doubt that most Ethiopians have burning curiosity why MZ
came up with a comprehensive development analysis at this point in
time. I too share this curiosity. However, I like to step a little
ahead and catalytically catapult the �forbidden knowledge� into
a permissible curiosity. Whatever is produced and whoever delivers
it must be evaluated in the context of a permissible knowledge. Let
me, therefore, dissect and thematically highlight MZ�s thesis.
The
leitmotif of MZ�s thesis is paradigm shift from neo-liberal to a
�democratic developmental state.� His work, by and large, favors
government intervention in the economy and the prioritization of
rural development. In the first part of Chapter I, thus, he argues,
�government created rent does not necessarily have to be socially
wasteful. It becomes wasteful only if solely self-interested
maximizing individuals use it to create wealth at the expense of
society and only if the state is incapable of improving on the
market � i.e. there are no market failures.� Well said, but
there is a problem in terms of what currently plagues the African
state.
Out
of the 53 African countries, it is believed that only 15 are
relatively democratic and less corrupt. Actually, the
�self-interest maximizing individuals� have virtually strangled
the public purse and, thus, the preponderance of the predatory state
in Africa is not surprising. It has to be clear, however, that the
�self-interested individual� that catapulted the capitalist
development in Europe is markedly different from the self-interested
corrupt African officials. The former was essentially progressive
(in light of overall historical development) while the latter is
inherently regressive and anti-development.
It
does not really matter whether the wealth makers, the early
harbingers of capitalist development, or the kleptomania of the
African state are few in number. After all, in most instances,
history has been influenced and shaped by few individuals. Hence the
Pareto Principle, aka the 80-20 rule or the law of the vital few or
the principle of factor sparsity, is whereby 80% of the consequences
are fashioned by 20% of the causes. Therefore, the rule-of-thumb
application determines the fate of a given political economy in
spite of the laudatory proclamation of democracy (government by the
people).
MZ
has attempted to reconcile the dual nature of self-interested
individuals by stating, �only individuals with a blend of
self-interested and non self-interested behavior can create a night
watch man state, and such people are equally capable of creating a
state which intervenes in the economy in the larger interest of
society.�
I
don�t see any problem with the above utilitarian sounding
argument. In a nutshell, a watchman state can be forged in Africa,
but the question remains how and when? Is there any fertile ground
for the formation of such state, especially if examined in light of
domestic fragility and global cynicism?
In
Chapter 2.5, the author stipulates �technological capability
accumulation as central to developing countries as it is to
developed countries.� But he also acknowledges that �the
neo-liberal assumption of efficient competitive markets has no basis
in fact or in theory� vis-�-vis accelerated economic growth.
Again, this is a correct argument. However, beyond the limitations
of the neo-liberal paradigm, we must also seriously consider the
impact of incidents such as terrorism on technological transfer
towards Africa. The incidence engendered as a result of terrorism
could be debatable, but corroborating this grim scenario, Sidney
Morse indicates, �most experts believe the drop of capital flows
like FDI are tied to the bust in technology sector world wide.�1
Additionally, the use of information technology must be
complemented by a sustained flow of big data. That is a plus but not
adequate by itself. The political leadership must have a quality of
doggedness, endurance, and perseverance in the effective
implementation of appropriate technology.
In
Chapter 4, the author argues that �agriculture is the engine of
growth� and taken in a historical context, this line of reasoning
is indisputable. He further extrapolates that �equity accelerates
the adoption and diffusion of agricultural technology. Equity plays
a vital role in the establishment and strengthening of market
support and other rural organizations and institutions. Equity
enhances the linkage between agriculture and non-agriculture and
increases the multiplier effect of agricultural growth on the growth
of non-agricultural and structural transformation. Equity
facilitates the accumulation of social capital which in turn plays a
critical role in accelerating development.� I cannot agree more!
Distributive justice is indeed vital to development if the latter is
perceived as social welfare and not simply as economic growth. But,
how is equity applied, implemented and sustained? Where will the
huge finance come from to garner (subsidize) the effective
utilization of equity? The government policy-planning spectrum
should seriously consider such grand agenda as equity! Otherwise,
the talk on equity and other justice-related concepts will only
prove a watered-down version of our engagement or remain
spectacularly implausible as to lack of their credibility.
Before
the discussion on equity, however, the author clearly puts the
failure of the neo-liberal paradigm as is egregiously felt in
agriculture, and countries that followed such a paradigm are
�mired in poverty traps.�
We
have known all along that development-oriented institutions have
fostered glib definitions or superficial techniques in relation to
poverty reduction. If Ethiopia indeed is going to overcome poverty
once and for all and eliminate famine for good, it should meet the
challenges of agricultural globalization whereby new agricultural
countries (NAC) have been made to specialize only in exporting
�labor-intensive and off-season exotic fruits (bananas,
pineapples) vegetables (tomatoes, cucumbers) and fresh cut flowers
(roses, lilies)�2
for the industrialized world market.
In
Chapter 6 and under 6.3, in regards to the developmental state, MZ
argues ��behavior does not depend on the size of the state on
the degree of its activism in economic matters but on the nature of
the state�� There is no doubt that the nature of the state is of
prime significance, but size also is equally important. For
instance, country x endowed with natural resources and visionary
leadership is better off than country y with strategic minerals and
bad leadership. Lets assume that x and y are of the same size.
Another hypothetical country z that enjoys the same blessings as
country x happens to be tiny and thus plays a secondary, if not
insignificant role in regional and world history. Georgia will not
exhibit significant clout in international affairs as Russia would;
same logic applies to Vietnam/China and/or Togo/Nigeria. Ethiopia is
a big country in the Horn of Africa and it could play a significant
role in regional and continental politics. It must reckon with its
potential!
In
the same chapter, MZ argues, �development is a political process
first and economic and social process later.� This is a clear
departure from the neo-Marxian thesis of economic determinism, and
by design or by default it happens to be plausible. I myself have
entertained the primacy of politics in development in many of my
previous writings. The Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca is
credited with developing the primacy of politics in society, or more
specifically with developing the theory of elitism or the political
class. Mosca actually
anticipated a universal theory of political society. For Mosca,
elites are not hereditary and with this reality in mind, he foresaw
a �circulation of elites� in a given political party or a
governing entity. He further argued that the circulation is
manifested in a dialectical theory of constant competition between
elites, with one elite group replacing repeatedly over time.
The
Mosca phenomenon is clearly lacking in Ethiopia as is conspicuously
absent in most African nations. How is it possible, thus, MZ�s
developmental state would meaningfully realize its agenda in the
absence of a democratically circulating elite? Unless MZ and his
close associates are ready to revamp and overhaul the Ethiopian
state, there is no way a developmental state could be realized.
MZ
argues that �historical practice have shown that state
intervention has been critical in the development process. Economic
theory has shown that developing countries are riddled with vicious
circles and poverty traps that can only be removed by state
action.� In Africa
in the Global Economy, I have thoroughly examined the role of
the state in African development and indicated that even world
institutions like the World Bank have acknowledged the positive role
states can play in development.3
In Chapter 7, the
author discusses the importance of democracy with reference to the
experience of Northern Italy and he makes the following factual and
interesting remarks: �In the North there is a very dense network
of civic organizations of all types and an individual is usually a
member of a number of them at the same time. Such networks are
horizontal and based on mutuality. People actively participate in
public affairs. There is a large measure of trust. People assume and
expect that the law will be obeyed by everyone.
People including politicians are relatively honest.
Politicians and the people value equity and tend to seek mutually
beneficial solutions, they do not take politics as a zero-sum
game.�
How
is Mr. Zenawi going to reconcile the virtual absence of democracy in
Africa with the rich democratic culture in northern Italy? Moreover,
the Ethiopian political landscape of the last fifteen years have not
witnessed a climate of democracy and tolerance, and unless MZ is
anticipating a democratic Ethiopia of the future and his associates
and himself are ready to lay the cornerstone for such a future,
zero-sum politics will continue unabated in Ethiopian political
culture.
In
fact, MZ himself argues, �it is therefore the developmental state
that will have to prepare the ground and accelerate development at
the same time.� But, again, do we have the requisite elements in
Ethiopia for such groundwork? As far as I am concerned and as I have
indicated in one of my works entitled Humanizing the Ethiopian
Political Culture4, the Ethiopian phenomenon clearly
demonstrates that our rationality is bounded and our adaptability
limited. Put otherwise, there is no fertile or conducive groundwork
for launching the developmental state. Although I may welcome the
rationality of MZ and similar thoughts must be encouraged as
standard operating procedure, we must recognize that we need to
decidedly engage ourselves practically to foster democracy in
Ethiopia. This may sound abstract and impractical but I have
attempted to clarify the notions, elements and characteristics of
democracy in many related articles that I wrote in the past.5
As
I have indicated earlier, the main thrust of MZ�s work is rural
development. He says, �we have argued that widespread and
relatively equitable ownership of assets is a requirement for
accelerated development. It is clear [that] accelerated agricultural
development will have to include commercialization, it cannot be
based on sustaining subsistence farming.� That is a fair and just
statement, but more specifically what will happen to poor farmers in
due course? Will the developmental state salvage the poor peasant
from poverty through subsidy of provisions or wittingly let them
disappear gradually? It is quite apparent that commercialization of
agriculture entails relatively robust mechanized agriculture that
would effectively brush aside poor farmers that are bound in their
primordial small plots of land. The poor farmers could be the
�unfortunate class in history� unless the developmental state
seriously considers their fate. On the other hand, unless the
peasants are made partners to commerce agriculture (graduating from
their abject poverty to a new hybrid of wealth creating middle class
farmers!), the entire edifice of the developmental state could be a
romantic enterprise.
At
the end of Chapter 7.4, MZ again entertains the justification for
the formation of the developmental state. Very much like Gaetano
Mosca, he argues that �policy stability and continuity could be
achieved even when parties regularly replace each other in governing
the country,� but he also tells us that �such a situation is
very unlikely to emerge in a developing country. He further argues,
�The most likely scenario for a state that is both democratic and
developmental to emerge is in the form of dominant party or dominant
coalition democracy.�
I
personally am opposed to a �dominant party� theory and am in
favor of a �dominant (preferably, �strong�) coalition
democracy.� �Dominant� insinuates dictatorship; �strong�
implies a solid foundation for a coalition that is inclusive and
ready to launch a broader democracy. Moreover, as I have discussed
in Political Culture in the Context of Contemporary Ethiopian
Politics, �the best solution�does not lie with extremes; it
lies in the middle of the continuum where political rivals enter a
covenant for a greater good of the nation. In effect, they
compromise a deal in order to fashion a comprehensive, yet
accommodating national agenda that, in turn, secures cooperation,
transformation, and stability.�6
The Asian Tigers
as effective interventionist states, and of course their success
stories, are discussed in Chapter 9 through Chapter 13. Their
�miracle� success especially in agriculture is emphasized.
Whether Ethiopia and other African nations can emulate the Tigers
remains to be seen, but we must also underscore the unique
historical circumstances that enabled the Tigers to succeed.
In
Chapter 14 MZ discusses �the genesis and crisis of the predatory
state in Africa,� and this is a fine expose of the marginality and
disadvantaged status of Africa. Due to European hegemony, African
marginality and subsequent distortion of African history by the
colonialists, the world got the impression that Africa was a
recipient and not a giver of civilization. That this was not the
case was thoroughly discussed in my article entitled Modernism,
Post Modernism and Afrocentrism: Meanings forEthiopia.7
In
17.1, agriculture under economic reform is discussed and more so the
necessity of agricultural technology is emphasized and the failure
of the neo-liberal paradigm is re-emphasized in this respect. When
it comes to financing the agricultural projects of the developmental
state, we are confronted by African marginality and conundrum of
globalization. Unless adequate finance is secured for
rural/agricultural development, it is impossible to even witness the
initial stage or kick-start in agriculture.
In
17.3, not to my chagrin but to my pleasant surprise, MZ said the
following: �Unless a country has sufficient infrastructure, an
educated and healthy work force, world-class managers and
professionals and well functioning support institutions, it is
unlikely to attract much FDI.�
In
the last fifteen years, I have argued all along that the EPRDF
government needs to attract Ethiopian intellectuals and
professionals and utilize their expertise and talent. So far, I have
not witnessed the use of Ethiopian professionals en masse for
nation building, notwithstanding the few and far in between favored
officials that hold ministerial positions and other portfolios. If
the Meles regime is indeed in favor of �educated and healthy
workforce, world-class managers and professionals,� it should
openly extend its hands to all Ethiopians, especially those who are
scattered all over in the Diaspora. Irrespective of our differences
and political inclinations, I personally like the government of
Ethiopia to reach out fellow Ethiopians who are willing to
contribute for the transformation of their country and the welfare
of their people. I am making this kind of clarion call not for my
own selfish interest, but for the sake of my beloved motherland.
To
be sure, the unexploited experience of Ethiopian intellectuals and
professionals potential is tremendous, and if the Meles
developmental state is going to bear fruit and meaningfully uplift
Ethiopia, its agenda should be grasped not only conceptually but
also at a gut level emotionally.
In
21.2, the author expounds �the possibilities for the success of
the democratic developmentalist paradigm.� In this Chapter, one
argument that made uncomfortable, but sounds logical nonetheless, is
the following: �if developmental states are to emerge in Africa
they will emerge and succeed not only because the neo-liberal
paradigm has visibly failed but also because the global environment
and the domestic environment are permissive of such a development,
if not conducive to it.�
Firstly,
MZ does not substantiate the permissiveness of the global and
domestic environment; secondly, I am of the opinion that neither the
Ethiopian domestic environment nor the global climate is favorable
yet for the take-off of the developmental state. My argument is
based on two factual realities: 1) as I have indicated in many of my
writings, Ethiopians as a whole were unable to liberate themselves
from quid pro quo politics; they were unable to make a transition
from feudal bravado to a bold democratic platform (such as dialogue,
peaceful coexistence, and negotiated settlements of disputes). For
this cultural predicament, the government, civic leaders, opposition
parties, and Ethiopian intellectuals are responsible; 2)
globalization has yet to prove that it is indeed meant to benefit
African economies. It may have created some economic opportunities
and new vistas in development agendas, but it has also served as a
remote control for somewhat invisible corporations (without
accountability) against African interests. There is no doubt that
Africa was better off during the Cold War era than during the
colonial period; it could have been better off now compared to the
Cold War times. But the �permissive attitude of the major
powers� is untenable and unpalatable to me insofar the lingering
cynicism and bias against Africa continues.
Interestingly,
although MZ sounds optimist in his argument of permissive
environment he seems to share my own stance when he states, �the
external environment is, however, not rosy from the point of view of
democratic develpmentalism.�
Another
interesting argument that MZ brought forth and that reflects the
current Ethiopian reality is the following: �there are vested
interests who benefit from the current dysfunctional system that are
likely to vigorously oppose the new paradigm. The rent-seeking
business, the �ethnic entrepreneurs� who have used ethnicity as
a means of accessing state power and accumulating personal wealth,
many of the domestic �NGO and VO entrepreneurs� who have used
domestic NGOs and voluntary organizations as instruments of
patronage and personal welfare, if not wealth accumulation, are
likely to at least initially vigorously oppose the democratic
develeopmentalist paradigm.�
If
MZ is thinking about his own Ethiopia and its problems and is ready
to use the broom at his disposal to clean the mess, that would be a
step in the right direction. If the concept of the �vested
interest� is conjured metaphorically, however, the realization of
a developmental state could be remotely conceptualized and not
implemented practically.
Chapter
21.3 is about �steps in the direction of the African
Renaissance.� The author states that �developmental states come
in all shapes and sizes and therefore there cannot be a single blue
print for all democratic developmentalist states in Africa.� This
is absolutely right. To begin with, Africa is highly diverse in
terms of size, culture and historical experience. This reality
apparently presupposes that Africa as a whole should not be compared
to the Asian Tigers. Moreover, the blue print of the
developmentalist state should first be experimented at individual
countries level or at regional level (like ECOWAS or SADC).
Under
the same sub-chapter, the author tells us, �in the end leadership
is bound to play a critical role�� to realize the developmental
state agenda in Africa. In relation to leadership, we must reckon
with the hard fact that quality leadership seriously matters. By
quality leadership, I don�t mean that all leaders in the
government be erudite and intellectual, but I strongly believe that
a visionary, committed, and patriotic leadership is prerequisite to
the effective implementation of the developmentalist state.
Incidentally, MZ has been emphatic on the problem of ethnic-based
political patronage through much of the body of the text of his
work. However, like most African nations Ethiopia suffers from
political patronage and unmistakably from ethnic-based politics. It
is for this apparent reason, therefore, that I suggested earlier the
PM of Ethiopia need to clean up his mess before he ventures on the
grand agenda of the developmental state.
In
this sub-chapter, the author explicitly tells us that �the rural
areas are crucial to the success of democratic
developmentalism�rapid and sustained development in African
countries will crucially depend on agriculture.� While this
reasoning reflects the realities for most African countries, it does
not necessarily apply for some. As pointed out above, Africa is
diverse and priorities for countries are most certainly variegated.
For instance, Egypt, a country that depends solely on the Nile,
could not possibly adopt same rural development agenda as Ethiopia
does. Similarly, Botswana�s priority in development has been
mining industry instead of agriculture.
As
far as I am concerned, Botswana is one of the earlier developmental
states in Africa and I like to share with the PM, my Ethiopian
readers, and the general African audience what I wrote about
Botswana in �Africa in the Global Economy:�
�Botswana�s
success lies in its implementation of a diversified economy and its
commitment both to democratic governance and to a strong private
sector through its Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) that made the
country a major exporter of goods, which, in turn, guaranteed
independent linkage with the global economy. Botswana�s commitment
to the corporate sector is, of course, directly linked to the
country�s political commitment to ensuring democratic governance
that includes an effective partnership between the state, the
private sector, and civil society. In fact, Botswana has
consistently committed itself to alleviating poverty and to
expanding public education and primary health care. As a result of
its on going success, Botswana is now depicted as �the brightest
spot� and/or �the jewel that shines brighter� on the African
continent.�8
Finally, MZ
emphasizes the strengthening of the state, the establishment of new
institutions, and the effective state intervention in addressing
market failures. �A fundamental transformation and building up of
the state,� says MZ �is thus bound to be a central tenet of the
paradigm.� Furthermore, he states, �the state will have to be
strengthened primarily by transforming it from the locus of personal
wealth accumulation to an effective instrument of restructuring the
playing field and enforcing the new rules of productive
investment.�
It
is in light of the above statement that I have made recommendations
time and again so that Ethiopia adopt a policy of non-partisan
inclusion of Ethiopian intellectuals and professionals.
Whatever
the merit of the developmental Ethiopian state of tomorrow, it seems
to me that the regional states and local governments should be the
bulwark for the implementation of the policy and development agenda
of the central government. Lets assume the central government is
like an octopus with an overlooking head and strong tentacles. The
rural areas in Ethiopia, thus, should serve as strong (empowered)
tentacles and not as weak detachments. Otherwise, the entire edifice
of the developmental state will collapse ignominiously.
The
developmental state should not only be an interventionist,
monitoring, gargantuan apparatus. On the contrary, it should serve
as a platform for citizen involvement in the political process and
nation building. It should relentlessly seek feedback from the
masses if indeed the latter are going to be the massive backbone and
bulwark for state policy and actions.
Finally
and most importantly, the developmental state should purposely
foster tolerance and encourage an ambience where a myriad of ideas
can be propagated and flourished. As I have stated in many of my
previous writings, state policy, like science and other enterprises,
is a gregarious business and it is by interacting with other people
and by clashing ideas that one could get a satisfactory result for a
sound development agenda. After all, the developmental state is a
system and not an individual phenomenon.
Some
people may perceive the MZ thesis as some form of re-emergence from
obscurity; others could surmise that the author�s insight may have
appeared slowly, in separate disconnected flashes that may have
taken years to coalesce into a coherent idea. The above conjectures
could be true, but in spite of the various assumptions I like to
reason that any initiative must be evaluated at face value and given
the benefit of the doubt. My only fear is that the MZ agenda, like
plethora of AU, ECA, UN, WTO etc. proposals and rounds before it,
could encounter the fate of a crashing tree in a forest when there
is no one to hear its sound. Unless there is a committed leadership
and a reservoir of audience ready to cooperate in the making of the
developmental state, all policy recommendations pertinent to
development will evaporate in thin air. Lets wait and see for the
implementation and fruition of the developmental state in Ethiopia.
Notes
- Sidney
Morse, �How Will Sub-Sahara Africa Technology Transfer and
Investment Fare in a Post September 11 �New World Order,��
African Link, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2001
- Korbla
P. Puplampu, �Globalization of Agriculture: Lesson From
Ghana,� in Malinda Smith (editor) Globalizing Africa,
African World Press, 2003, page 386
- Ghelawdewos
Araia, �Africa in the Global Economy: Aid, Debt, and
Development,� Globalizing Africa, Ibid, pages 190-95;
see also Ghelawdewos Araia, �Africa�s Place in the Global
Economy,� www.africanidea.org/critcal.html
- Ghelawdewos
Araia, �Humanizing the Ethiopian Political Culture,� www.africanidea.org/humanizing.html
- Ghelawdewos
Araia, �Designing Continuum to Enrich Ethiopian Educational
Discourse and Debate Culture,� www.africanidea.org/designing.html
and �Education for Tolerance: Sustainable Dialogue for Human
Dignity,� www.africanbidea.org/tolerance.html
- Ghelawdewos
Araia, �Political Culture in the Context of Contemporary
Ethiopian Politics,� www.africanidea.org/political_culture.html
- Ghelawdewos
Araia, �Modernism, Post-Modernism and Afrocentrism: Meanings
for Ethiopia,� www.ethiomedia.com/newspress/modernism_040705.html
Dr.
Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted at [email protected]
for educational and constructive feedback.
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