�A Question of Justice?�

What is social justice and what would a socially just society look like?

By Tekue Woldemariam

�Until the great mass of the people shall be filled with the sense of responsibility for each other�s welfare, social justice can never be attained.� � Helen Keller

Since the late nineteenth century, the dream of �social justice� has been the rallying cry of those millions who supposedly yearn for society to fully realize the concepts of human rights and equality. The term is thrown about from the political platforms of characters ranging from presidential candidates in the United States to minor Ethiopian politicians. Large organizations, mainly non-governmental groups such as Oxfam international, have even established specifically with the aim of advancing the principles apparently inherent in this idea. Yet in my own experience the general public appears to see social justice as significantly more than a political catch phrase, since I have had the somewhat dubious pleasure of listening to many diverse people divulges their views on the subject.

We are led to believe that the principles which social justice allegedly upholds would be present in the eponymous just society. To quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this is a society which has fully embraced the principle that �recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.� All these concepts are usually expressed, some would say necessarily so, in emotive, elegant, but nonetheless vague words such as freedom, peace and dignity. Although stirring, this fails to clarify what social justice exactly means. The only effect such descriptions have is to emphasize that whatever social justice might be, it is certainly not a quality self-evident in any contemporary society. By far the prevailing view is that although a socially just society is desirable, it is plain that the world falls far short of this loft goal.

The twentieth-century academic Friedrich Hayek baulked that a blatantly vague term like �social justice� was commonly used to describe the greatest achievable societal good. Such abstract phrases are open to a wide range of interpretations, which is reason for discomfort, as they can be used to justify many otherwise inexcusable actions. The very notion of justice � in itself a fine thing � has become perverted through its constant employment as an indiscriminate catchphrase to condemn that which the speaker personally disapproves of. To give a rather tame example, Ethiopian politicians have been known to portray the lack of public tertiary education as a social injustice, when it appears plain that such claims are simply sensationalist. By identifying an apparent lack of social justice, and individual can then claim to be morally justified in taking steps to remedy the perceived problem � which may very well be a matter of preference rather than an actual injustice. In Novak�s words, social justice actually �becomes an instrument of ideological intimidation, for the purpose of gaining the power of legal coercion.�

It becomes plain that one must have a clearer idea of social justice if indeed one is going to use the term in a constructive way at all. Hayek asserts that since most believe social justice should be considered as a virtue, then the term should only be used as such. Hence social justice must apply solely to interpersonal issues, which are directly associated with the relationships and decisions of individuals. most appeals to social justice concern impersonal matters such as unequal economic development; yet those systems which underpin our society, whether they are social, economic or political, cannot either posses or lack virtue. If social justice is seen as a virtue (a characteristic of individuals) then theoretically all that would be needed for the existence of a socially just society would be for an individual to treat all other individuals justly. Indeed, this very concept is the building block of Hayekian social justice.

It is interesting that this emphasis on the responsibility of individuals to determine the nature of society through their actions is not a phenomenon that has arisen only recently. Many religious traditions, in particular Christianity, have recommended that the transformation of society should not take place through extravagant reforms but rather by changes in the behavior of society�s individual members. Thus the very first Christians felt moved to share all their material possessions with one another in a genuine attempt to change society, not by force but by a radical transformation of their own actions. Arguably all of history�s most successful and enduring social movements have made their impact through changes in individual behavior rather than mass structural societal adjustments.

Both the religious and Hayekian views allege that the root cause of the unjust nature of our society is not the structure of that society but the nature of those who inhabit it. It is indeed peculiar that �human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way. Yet they do not in fact behave in that way.� You may call this human nature or injustice or sin � making the presumption that the three concepts are all different, but it is agreed upon that in many ways we do not act as justly as we could (or should, or would like to). Society is unjust only because humankind is fundamentally flawed, and deliberate structural changes to any society (while having the potential to achieve great good), will not remove all injustice because they fail to deal with the internal injustice that is present within human beings. No amount of social or political engineering, however benevolent, shall prevent a man from acting unjustly towards his neighbor if his impulses drive him to do so.

I have introduced justice in its social sense (that it can refer to a personal virtue which involves one group of people acting justly with the intention of benefiting society), but have yet to address what exactly is meant by an individual �acting justly.� In his Republic Plato treats justice as one of the primary virtues (if not the primary virtue) of both individuals and of societies. Plato chose to categories most ethical decisions under the broad heading of �dikaosoune,� the Greek word usually translated as �justice.� Yet modern usage has altered the term so that in its common application the word �justice� refers only to one element of individual morality. Justice is now not always equated with goodness, and it is quite possible for a person to commit some wrong (such as being dishonest or cruel) without necessarily being labeled as unjust. Thereby an individual acting with justice towards his neighbor does not necessarily have to act with particular benevolence. Slote notes that although justice is not longer a strictly moral issue, we still assert that it is �unjust for someone to steal from people or not to give them what he owes   them, and it is also unjust if someone called upon to distribute something good (or bad or both) among members of a group uses an arbitrary or unjustified basis   for making the distribution.�

In its modern sense, justice as an individual virtue is primarily concerned with moral dilemmas of the actual distribution of goods such as property (although presumably this may refer to intangible objects as well as to material goods).

Having differentiated the virtue of justice from a vague concept of the �good�, it is now necessary to enquire as to what particular distribution of goods could be regarded as �just.� Although he declines to envision social justice as a personal virtue, William Frankena sums up well the basis for the classic egalitarian argument of just distribution:  �The just society, then, must consider and protect the good life of each man equally with that of any other, no matter how different these men might be, and so it must allow them equal consideration, equal opportunity, and equality      before the law.�

This emphasizes the equal worth of all men, although Frankena hastens to add that �individual needs and capacities differ� in an apparent attempt to avoid recommending the equal distribution (or redistribution) of material goods. Furthermore, this is a view emphasized in many religious teachings, albeit using a different line of argument. C.S. Lewis wrote that it was idle to say that men were of equal value, as if the human soul had some worth of its own; rather, the only value people have is through the supposedly equal love God bears for each individual. Nevertheless, whether you are a philosopher or theologian or psychologist, we may assume that all men have an equal fundamental worth (however this determined) even though men may differ in its gifts and abilities when compared with each other. On this basis everybody has the same rights to those resources which would allow a lifestyle of relative security and comfort. It can be argued that a truly just man would recognize this and, depending on the strength of his conviction, would either impartially redistribute his various goods to those who require them most, or merely decide to refrain from cheating or lying to his peers in matters of goods distribution. However the redistribution model simply raises another set of questions about what kinds of resources should be redistributed in this situation. We might well as whether redistribution should be limited to property and income, or whether other forms of privilege should somehow be accounted for, such as the opportunities afforded by birth or education. It must be emphasized that what is being discussed is not a forceful redistribution of goods but a voluntary dispersal by an individual who simply wishes to help the other members of his or her society.

It is difficult to imagine a society where every man, woman and child could live and act according to the Hayekian virtue of justice. Certainly there would be very few disagreements or conflicts over the distribution of material goods, except for those which will always arise out of misunderstandings. However, it must be questioned whether the sudden mass attainment of the virtue of social justice would in fact create a socially just society. It is unarguable that the economic, political and social structures which underlie Western civilization contribute to vast injustices in this world (although not necessarily Hayekian social justices) and throughout history reformers have put these systems under severe scrutiny. As we established earlier, the injustices of society have their root cause in the unjust nature of humankind itself; and these systems which maintain the social arrangement of the world today were birthed from the same unjust womb. Therefore many of them work to the end of promoting and sustaining such injustices as forced labor, abject poverty and the exploitation of vulnerable groups. I realize that these are not social injustices in the Hayekian sense, but even an entire society of individuals who have those to live out the virtue of social justice will have to exist within this system, which holds together an increasingly interdependent international community. Furthermore, it is likely that even within a so-called socially just society these systems would continue to propagate such unjust conditions. Thereby it is necessary to turn for a moment to consider what might be done with these institutions; for surely an individual who has been moved to act justly towards his immediate neighbors and familiar society would also be concerned for those he cannot directly influence but who are treated unjustly nevertheless.

What I therefore term the �structural adjustment� of aforementioned global system may be necessary to establish and spread social justice in its form as a personal virtue. Questions must be asked about whether our political system is truly appropriate for a socially just society, and whether a capitalist or a socialist system would best foster this virtue of social justice. I do not intend to discuss here those characteristics of the capitalist market which by definition generate inequality and at least partially inhibit the creation of an environment which would cultivate social justice. However I suspect that a truly socially just electorate would demand that their government, address these structural issues in order to prevent large scale injustices from occurring as described earlier. In any, case, it is advisable to keep such speculations in context to avoid the danger of unwittingly reverting to the conventional meaning of social justice.

It is easy to unconsciously slip back into well � worn arguments and discuss social justice in the sense in which it is presented to us through the vein of popular thought. We must keep in mind that Hayekian social justice is not some transcendent goal, and that the socially just society is not some necessarily one of pleasure, happiness, peace and material equality. Yet it is interesting that we constantly have to remind ourselves that �social justice is not the only feature of an ideal society. Societies can be loving, efficient, prosperous, or good, as well as just, but they may be just without being notably benevolent, efficient, prosperous, or good. Our problem is to define the concept of the just society, not that of the ideal society.�

We must be careful that in attempting to describe a socially just society we do not begin to portray what we simply view as a good society. Indeed, since the time of Plato, attempts to depict a just society have resulted in descriptions of the writer�s personal utopia; this is largely because a society of just citizens will always appear far more likely to cultivate this happiness than any kind of contemporary culture. However it would be self � destructive to see the possibility of realizing this happiness as the only reason for pursuing the virtue of social justice, for �society must for the most part allow virtue to be its own reward, else it is not virtue.

What we learn from these observations is that most people would see the probability of a socially just society ever existing as being just as unlikely as the realization of their utopian dreams. Although this may not be unrelated to the common false association of the two concepts, it is notable that most cultures and religious see perfection in any facet of society as something that cannot be attained to earth. Christians for example, are almost unanimous in their view that a truly just society will never be established until the Second Coming of Christ. The effect of this accumulation of preconceptions and beliefs, both those of religion and of popular culture, is that it is unrealistic to expect to be taken seriously when talking about a completely just society. Far more positive influence can be exercised by simply encouraging the public to take small steps in the direction of a just society by practicing the personal virtue that is social justice.

The most radical characteristic of Hayek�s view of social justice is that it puts the onus for change onto individual people. It does not lay excessive blame for the situation of our society at the feet of any particular societal system, instead recognizing that these structures are merely the tools and constructions of the human beings who create and maintain them. This is primarily why I have repeatedly used religious teachings as examples and illustrations. Apart from the fact that religious has historically been one of the most socially influential forces, many faiths, particularly Christianity, have shown themselves to be superior to any other influence in driving personal, individual change. If social justice as a personal virtue is to increase, then an entire rejuvenation of psychology is required for individuals to change their subconscious beliefs and worldviews, and thereby change their actions which flow from these beliefs. I do not advocate any attempts to proselytize any particular religion, nor would I dream of recommending any form of theocracy, since the union of church and state is toxic for both institutions. Nonetheless we can see in genuine religious belief and example of the kind of conviction which would be needed to persuade individual hearts and minds to sincerely embrace the idea that social justice is a virtue worth pursuing.

To conclude, the Hayekian school of thought which sees social justice as a personal virtue of individuals has not weakened the long struggle for justice of all forms in our world. Rather it has the potential to rejuvenate this efforts by allowing ordinary citizens, particularly those of developed states like New Zealand, Australia to make realistic, tangible changes in their relationships immediate communities. Social justice has long been seen as a utopian goal, a kind of earthly paradise to be striven for but never achieved. This vision still has its place, as a goal to inspire us all while we routinely work towards a more socially just society, and to provide continual motivation to try and make the world a better place. I suspect that at some point in the future large-scale structural reformations shall take place; after all, no system of man lasts forever. Aside from being necessary, such changes may eventually even become desirable in their own right, to prevent the weight of years and escalating lack of momentum from suffocating an otherwise bright and dynamic society. Nevertheless, grassroots action within individual spheres of influence is always going to be the driving force and lasting impact of any worthwhile change towards a more socially just society.   

Tekue Woldemariam

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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