Kenya�s
recent declaration that it had pulled out of the 1926
River Nile Treaty signed between Britain and Egypt must
have come as a surprise to many. The surprise announcement
of December 11, came just when interest groups on water
matters had gathered at the UN Headquarters in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss, among other things, the
treaty.
In characteristic style,
the Egyptian water minister, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, termed the
pronouncement an act of war, even though this was not the
first time Kenya had tried to disown the treaty. Besides,
a UN Assistant Secretary-General, Mr Shafqat Kakhakel,
raised questions over the dispute, which former UN
Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, had predicted
would lead to water wars. Mr Shafqat pointedly said that
the UN will not arbitrate should Egypt invade Kenya.
The interesting thing is
that Kenya later retracted the comments, saying that it
was still bound by the treaty and was still part of the
negotiations to have the treaty reviewed to allow it to
use the waters of Lake Victoria and its rivers � Nyando,
Sondu Miriu, Mara, Yala and Nzoia. It was not surprising,
though, as since independence, East and Central African
states have been whining over the treaty but, with Egypt
threatening war, proved too helpless to do anything.
Nonetheless, the treaty,
signed by Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha for Egypt and Lord Lloyd
for the United Kingdom in 1929 in Cairo, has been the
subject of heated debate, and it has quite intriguing
stipulations. Article 4 (b), which is probably the most
contentious, states: "Save with the previous
agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or
power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on
the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from
which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in
countries under British administration, which would, in
such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests
of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in
Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its
level."
Others have argued that the
treaty was signed merely to protect the interest of Egypt
and Britain�whose main mode of transport from Africa to
colonial India was through the river Nile�without taking
into account the interests of the Eastern and Central
African states.
What is not clear is
whether, either under the treaty or the international law,
Egypt has any powers to go to war in the face of
violation, though Egyptian legal experts have widely
interpreted it to arrogate their government such powers.
What is evident in the treaty is, however, the provision
for arbitration. It states: "in case of any
difference of opinion arising as to the interpretation or
execution of any of the preceding provisions or as to any
contravention thereof, which the two Governments (Ethiopia
and Britain) find themselves unable to settle, the matter
shall be referred to an independent body with a view to
arbitration."
It is argued that Egypt was
pushed into coming up with such treaty by pressure from
the independence movement in various countries. In 1956,
therefore, in Cairo, Sudan agreed to the full utilisation
and control of the River Nile waters. Shortly after
independence, East African States roundly condemned the
treaty and gave Egypt ultimatums over the treaty.
Setting the ball rolling
was the then leader of Tanzania�s freedom struggle,
Julius Nyerere, who declared on the eve of independence
thus: "As the result of such considerations, the
Government of Tanganyika has come to the conclusion that
the provisions of the 1929 agreement purporting to apply
to the countries under British administration are not
binding on Tanganyika." Nyerere gave Egypt two years
to respond failure to which the treaty would be nullified
as per the Vienna convention on international treaties.
But on November 21, 1963,
Egypt replied to Tanganyika saying the treaty was still
valid. Uganda also raised similar questions in 1962.
"During the time of the British Protectorate, Uganda
was not in a position to enter in its own right into
treaty relationships with foreign sovereign States,"
it stated.
On its part, Kenya sent a
note to Egypt asking for negotiations within two years
failure to which such treaties "which cannot be
regarded as surviving according to the rules of customary
international law will be regarded as having
terminated." But Yosef Yacob, a scholar, argues that
since "Egypt did not reply, as far as the sovereign
Kenyan Government is concerned, the treaty ceased to have
any effect with respect to Kenya as from December 12,
1965." The Kenyan position has, however, been that
fundamental change�such as the revocation of
colonialism�in circumstances, as provided for in the
treaty necessitated re-negotiation so that the country can
sell its water to Egypt as Egypt has been doing with other
countries.
However, the Vienna
Convention states that countries that won independence
through succession inherit treaties and agreements entered
into by their colonial masters. But Yacob argues that
"dispositive treaties create real rights and
obligations resembling the conveyance of the English and
American private law." As such, he says, such
treaties are immune to the change of sovereignty and run
with the land. "In other words, they are not personal
to the contracting parties and impress upon the territory
a permanent status that remains unaffected by the change
of territorial sovereignty.
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