III. Corruption,
disinformation and duplicity, inalienable elements of treason
Laeke Gebresadik
Treasons of this scale and
persistence for over a decade cannot be isolated incidents of a
transient nature. Crime of treason is rather modus operandi of EPRDF�s
conduct of government. The regime makes use of the nation�s wealth
to conduct crimes of treason with debilitating consequences. Its
habitual crimes are contrary to what must be a government�s duty
of nation building. Corruption, duplicity and disinformation are
distinguishing characteristics of EPRDF�s government intertwined
with the works of its crimes.
Corruption and treason are
corollaries of the decadent administration pervasive of more or less
all levels of government and institutions. They are well entrenched
in EPRDF�s own affiliate ethnic parties and mass organizations,
including the diplomatic core, the bureaucracy, the security, the
national defense, etc. The treasonous system of government, though a
unique political phenomenon born to Ethiopia�s decades of adverse
political development, is proven by the nihilist ideologues in the
EPRDF to be a viable system of government, like fascism, communism,
and Nazism are in their own way. The viability of the treasonous
system of government is not contingent upon political repression
alone; ethnic politics, akin to treason in many ways, perpetuated
treason as a political system. Ethnic politics as a manifestation of
a dissolute form of political expression by the public is inevitably
exploited by the regime for its destructive purposes.
Boston University developed Control
of Corruption Index where Ethiopia scored �0.35 in the year 2002.
The study uses index ranging between the highest point 2.5 and the
lowest �2.5. Corruption takes purely an economic and cultural
connotation when applying an index to measure good governance among
countries of the world. Corruption for the EPRDF administration,
however, has political significance, making it a promotional item
due to the special component of treason. EPRDF leaders are seen
encouraging corruption overtly, and not controlling it, as the above
index would suggest of a legitimate government; they also use
corruption as a double-edged sword in the name of combating
corruption to implicate their political opponents on false
corruption charges. Prime Minister Meles zienawi committed a crime
far beyond corrupting his political power when he drafted a bill
overnight to put to prison his accusers of treason like the former
Defense Minister Siye Abreha.
The EPRDF encourages corruption,
embezzlement of public funds, and unethical practices in state
administration for the following two reasons: one, it employs
corruption to blemish the integrity and practice of public service
thereby eroding the contractual relations between the state and the
people. The delivery of quality government amenities that took root
since the time of Emperor Haileselasie, the school system, the army
and police, justice system, etc are at their lowest standard; and
two, as an indispensable part of treason, EPRDF has made corruption
attractive to the bureaucracy and to all those who can send their
hands into it by corrupting the police and court system.
Acclimatized as a normal practice, corruption has been instrumental
in sustaining the EPRDF. It helped it to minimize or neutralize the
political impact of treason arising from the army or even the
bureaucracy. Corruption and fraudulent administrative practice also
helps the EPRDF to conceal evidences of treason as in the example of
one major case where the leaders arranged the illegal transfer of
funds in the tune of two billion Birr to Eritrea prior to the war;
the same would be true for the embezzlement of national wealth in
the billions of dollars to foreign personal accounts.
Manipulation of information has
become a treacherous undertaking that can afflict vulnerable states
in today�s world. Specially handled information on non-existent
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq by the Bush Administration was
sufficient enough to rally public support and start the war against
Sadam.
The EPRDF by its treasonous nature is
well adept to deceitful use of information in facilitating its
crimes. It never refrained from fabricating information to mislead
or influence public opinion in an attempt to execute its
objectionable policies. The blatant use of deceptive information is
transformed into coercion when eventually met by strong public
opposition as in the border fiasco.
The use of information has an
instantaneous global reach with the advent of the Internet. Western
nations with their colossal news networks use information to sway
global politics in their interest and often against the interest of
the weaker nations in an intrusive and interventionist terms. It is
no coincidence that the EPRDF finds the Western media an
indispensable collaborator in blackmailing Ethiopia using skewed
information. For instance, Western news coverage of the border war
was explicitly directed at weakening Ethiopia�s position creating
tremendous pressure on the Ethiopian people to accept the agreement.
Information is used as an instrument of foreign policy to infringe
on national sovereignty of countries like Ethiopia since the
paradigm shift in global politics after the cold war.
Falsification of facts for ethnic
consumption is another equally daunting problem showing abuse of
information. Misrepresentation of ethnic issues is one known reason
that has created a barrier on open dialogue between ethnic groups.
The insinuation of false information on development initiatives by
the EPRDF in Tigray, for example, is extremely common among other
ethnic groups. It is expressed in the following malicious manner:
�the province of Tigray is sinking from property overload looted
from the rest of Ethiopia�. This communication pattern is an
upshot of corrupt government policies for the last century where the
state either granted or denied development opportunities according
to ethnicity. The public�s view of development is something that
is dealt out by the state based on its ethnic orientation and not a
free enterprise left to the endeavor of all Ethiopians according to
their entrepreneurial merits and potential where the state should
play a secondary role fostering it.
The relative freedom of expression in
Ethiopia that came at a heavy cost to the Ethiopian people is
wrongly accredited to the EPRDF. Informational blackout sanctioned
by the EPRDF in Ethiopia today marks a deep ethnic divide in
information gap. Ethiopians have very little means of learning what
actually goes on from one end of the country to another, for
instance from Welega to Mekelle to be able to reach a political
consensus on matters of national interest contrary to the rumors
that feed into the divisive ethnic politics. Hence, the fight
against EPRDF�s incursions into what is left of the freedom of
expression in the smallest segment of the country, i.e. Addis Ababa
is a precarious one. On the other hand, the lack of sincerity on
part of the local private media concentrated in the capital is
partly to blame for promulgating ethnic politics.
One of the most intractable problems
of ethnic politics is that it obstructs openness in information
exchange that could enhance national unity and political consensus
as a solution to the political crisis posed by the EPRDF. There
cannot be a unified political front to combat the regime without
open dialogue to solving political problems. The real motive behind
the crime of treason is one that as fallen prey to ethnic
categorization stipulated the main reason for the crimes. The quest
for the root causes of treason is a lost cause as long as the
self-defeating ethnic politics continues to dump EPRDF�s crimes in
unlikely places. One would think that the there would not be
controversy over the motives for treason since EPRDF�s crimes of
treason transcend ethnic politics. The misguided public perception
about the EPRDF being an ethnic dominance is in essence self-serving
when the other organizations also part to the crimes are
deliberately ignored. It is even cowardly to remove these parties
from the crime seen for the purpose of vilifying one ethnic group.
This no doubt will alienate Tigary in the long run from the national
political movement unless the opposition parties and the public
alleviate this problem by encouraging the culture of openness and
constructive use of information in the local media.
IV. Motives for treason
TPLF�s military agility and
tremendous success over the Dergue was often interpreted as an
indication of its political maturity and independence. Contrary to
popular believes, the TPLF was unable to acquire political maturity
or independence once it submitted to the mentorship of the more
powerful and senior EPLF in the 1970s; �After the Tigray National
Organization accepted the EPLF�s view that Eritrea was a colony
and therefore had a right to secede from Ethiopia, they were
promised support� writes John Young (Young, J. 1997 p. 85) A
strategic issue of national sovereignty was negotiated for material
gains of trivial nature by the TNO (the precursor of the TPLF). The
EPLF wasted no time taking control of the TPLF by implanting its
agents in key positions. The EPRP getting into the same quagmire in
its infancy with the EPLF (still inexcusable for its treasonous
implications) later retracted its policy on the independence of
Eritrea. TPLF leaders on the contrary expedited the separation of
Eritrea. The TPLF, in other words the people of Tigray, were made to
pay heavy price in terms of human and material cost to make Eritrea�s
separation a reality.
The current Prime Minister who embarked with a
group supposedly to form the TPLF eluded the group and was missing
for some time until he run into a couple of his colleagues in
Eritrea. (Abiy Araia, July 2001). He is suspected that he picked up
even more radicalized anti-Ethiopian views and a mission with
political backing from the EPLF when he returned to the TPLF in 1976
after a prolonged stay in Eritrea. It comes too late even for
Aregawi Berhe (a former leader of the TPLF later to be thrown out by
Meles himself) to save his career with the organization. Aregawi�s
remark also underlines the same suspicion about Meles� mysterious
disappearance; �� the mystery of his unexplained absence
continues to hung over Meles.� (Aregawi Berhe, 2004 p.587).
Meles carried out numerous purges as he worked
his way up to the top leadership. Successfully outmaneuvering and
defeating his opponents over the years, he followed a stringent
policy of recruiting people of Eritrean lineage or who believed in
Eritrean independence to his squad of cadres whose loyalty to him
proved decisive during the infighting in the TPLF leadership. The
Eritrean and Ethiopian mixed parentage helped the anti-Ethiopian
elements in the TPLF to work for Eritrean independence masquerading
themselves as Tigrean nationalists. They cunningly used Tigrean
nationalist fervor and repugnance to the Dergue to their advantage.
Infatuated by ELF/EPLF�s creation
of new identity suited for a would be modern Eritrean state,
antithetic to the cultural history of Ethiopia, TPLF leaders with
Eritrean connections are emotionally attached to Eritrean
nationalism of its colonial history. They are disciples of a school
of thought created by the ELF and EPLF that spent a good portion of
three decades warping Eritrea�s historical and cultural identity.
The postcolonial generation lacked a historical point of reference
to place Eritrea in a historical context before and after the
colonial period except for the Eritrean mythology created by the
movement. It is led to believe that colonialism is the most
favourable historical incident that has shaped Eritrea in body and
soul. It is this historical perspective of the EPLF that sets
Eritrea apart from Ethiopia engendering it with the only necessary
condition to establish itself as an independent state. The
separatist and anti-Ethiopian sentiment, no doubt, has also shaped
Meles� identity constantly pulling him towards Eritrea. While he
expressly shown his disdain for Ethiopians and their country, at the
same time, he managed to put the issue of his partly Eritrean
heritage out of bound for discussion as the source of his conflict
of interest and the root cause for his crimes of treason.
Tekeste Negash provides historical evidence
that will help shade light on the continued saga of understanding
the enigmatic psyche of the postcolonial Eritrean generation that
defied any rational explanation to its destructive aspects: �From
the mid-1930s a combination of three factors further contributed
towards the evolution of what may rightly be called the Eritrean
consciousness. The first was the growing racist ideology which began
to draw a distinction between the Eritreans who were fortunate
enough to be under the civilizing umbrella of Italy and the
inhabitants of the Ethiopian empire. This policy, though devised to
bolster Italian imperial or colonial ego, appeared to have trickled
down to the Eritrean literati. The language of many Eritrean
politicians in the 1940s betrays the pervasiveness of the colonial
racist ideology of the 1930s.� (Tekeste Negash, 1996 p.16)
The other motive for TPLF leaders crimes of
treason is forming the republic of Tigray. Aregawi Berhe speaks of
Meles zienawi, Sibhat Nega, Siyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye as the
�ultra-nationalist� group who drafted the 1976 manifesto of the
TPLF stipulating the establishment of an independent republic of
Tigray. (Aregawi Berhe, 2004 p.591). Again, in spite of public
outrage and strong opposition it generated from the ranks and files
of the TPLF at the time, the leaders never renounced their secret
agenda of separation publicly, nor was it made available for
discussion within the organization. Even though the argument of
separation could have more credence in terms of Tigrean nationalism
years ago, there still are separatist elements within the TPLF who
did not abandon their separatist dream. The separation agenda for
Tigray like the Oromo case plays well into the hands of Eritrea to
reduce Ethiopia into a fragmented and weaker state easy to deal
with. Any of the crises Ethiopia is facing today could easily render
it a failed state (which is only steps away from becoming one)
leading to its disintegration.
It may seem ironic at the time but the idea of
a rival independent Tigray state did not sit well with Esayas
Afewerki of Eritrea two decades ago. He rebuked the TPLF leaders in
general for their separatist stance and succeeded altering the
political direction of the TPLF away from Tigray independence.
Esayas must have developed an accurate assessment of Eritrea�s
economy as an independent state and what it means if Tigray
separated from Ethiopia. It would mean a complete economic
strangulation for his newly formed state without the strategic
presence of Tigray in Ethiopia to take full advantage of the vast
resources and market. It would also be impossible to use Meles
Zienawi as Eritrean emissary in his present position as Ethiopian
Prime Minister; Esayas� fear still came to be true after Ethiopia
curtailed all relations due to the treasonous crimes of EPRDF
leaders.
Regardless of the agreement reached between
the two leaders, the indications are that involuntary change of
political direction from separation does not entail a change of
heart in its leaders. John Young provides firsthand testimony from
one of EPRDF�s most powerful individuals; the following is Sibhat
Nega�s own words, �the national question is a primary question
and we doesn�t believe the unity of Ethiopia should be pursued at
all costs�. (Young, J. 1997 p.100) The paradox in Sibhat�s
statement is, however, the only cost Ethiopians will have to pay for
a united Ethiopia is to eliminate the treasonous and divisive EPRDF
regime and guard against similar despotic regimes in the future.
Sibhat�s response in a confrontation with
one of his opponents in the TPLF regarding the handing over of
Zalanbesa area to Eritrea in the border dispute sums up intentions
of the TPLF leaders. He sees no harm if the territory remains with
the enemy state for 20 to 30 years to come. The current state of
affairs could only confirm a transformation of their mission to a
long-term objective of slowly infringing on Ethiopia�s sovereign
existence. Contrary to implied separation of Tigray in Sibhat�s
statements, there is no benefit in the future or at present for
Tigray that could justify the handing over of its lands to Eritrea
based on its expected separation sometime in the future. Their only
objective remains to be Eritrean expansion as a bigger and
economically much stronger state.
The more realistic motive and most
pressing one for handing over Ethiopian territories by Meles Zienawi
is to free Eritrea from its economic predicament by allowing it to
expand southwards into the mineral rich, vast agricultural lands and
fertile valleys of Tigray and the Afar territories. It is expected
that Eritrea could alleviate part of its chronic deficit in food
production by annexing more lands from Ethiopia. As part of the
meticulously planned aggression, Eritrean geologists and engineers
held a meeting with their counterparts from the Ethiopian side on an
investigative mission to learn the availability of mineral and
precious metals on the border areas of Tigray weeks before the EPLF
army invaded these lands. Eritrea conducted extensive groundwork
study for its invasion on which basis it identified areas it claims
today.
Soon after independence, it became
clear that Eritrea�s inherent economic problem came to the
forefront as a major concern for the TPLF and the EPLF leaders
alike. Unwilling to accept a natural defeat that followed the
struggle for Eritrean independence, they devised a comprehensive
ploy against Ethiopia to garner all that Eritrea needs in resources
and market. Tekeste Negash takes us back in time to the 1952
federation to discover what was true then weighs even more for
Eritrea today; �The economic reason for the incorporation of
Eritrea into Ethiopia was grounded in the widespread appraisal of
the period that the former would not survive economically if granted
independence. Its dependence on Ethiopia for vital food imports was
repeatedly stressed. � (Tekeste Negash 1996 p.60). Albeit Eritrean
mythology of superior human potential thanks to Italian colonialism,
century later the economy becomes the battleground for current and
future relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Meles zienawi in an
interview to the BBC talks candidly what his five-point peace
initiative exactly meant to Eritrea�s economic dilemma: �The
boundary issue became a problem when our economic and political ties
became a problem. So even if we're to have a perfect resolution to
the boundary issue, unless we address the root causes - the economic
and political relationship issues - we're not going to have
sustainable peace.� (Meles Zienawi�s interview to BBC Radio of
January 19, 2005). No one could speak for sure more than Meles
himself that the border wasn�t the reason for the conflict.
Thanks to the crimes of the EPRDF, Ethiopia�s
sovereignty is in a precarious state for the first time since the
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the Second World War. The election
unable to solve the political crisis by itself, nonetheless, has
opened up a venue for the opposition and the Ethiopian people to
forge a new way of resolving political crisis. Unlike the armed
insurgency that brought the EPRDF to power, the election has
provided a unique opportunity for a united, peaceful and democratic
resolution of the crisis; and public protest is part of the
democratic right, peaceful and legal means of changing unlawful
government. No matter how the EPRDF could be violent and ready to
spill civilian blood, the election has shown how shaky the regime
has been. The peaceful public protest that ensued the violent
election has proven that the regime could be brought to submission
with the peoples� power. The protest prompted by taxi drivers
alone forced the shut down of government offices and private
businesses paralyzing the administration in a couple of days. This
regime has inherent weakness like any other dictatorial regimes
making it susceptible to the peoples� power like in the
Philippines, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. The opposition coalitions
political leadership has yet to be put to the test if Ethiopia will
come out as the clear winner out of decades of crimes of treason and
corruption for a new political beginning.
References:
Abiy Araia, July 2001 �the rise of
an Eritrean clique from the womb of TPLF�
Aregawi Berhe, 2004 The origin of the Tigray
Peoples Liberation Front, p. 587; unpublished memoir.
Brown, M. E. 1997 Nationalism and Ethnic
Conflict, The Mit Press, Cambridge.
Carter, J. �Ethiopia National Parliamentary
and Local Elections� May 19, 2005.
Chossudovsky, M. �Sowing the Seeds of Famine
in Ethiopia� The Ecologist, September 2000.
Joireman, S. 2000 Identifying Potential Ethnic
Conflict, The Ethiopian Prospective Case, Rand�s Publication.
Looker, D. 2004 �Grain companies lobby
harder for more food aid� Successful Farming Magazine.
Meles Zienawi, January 19, 2005 BBC Radio
Interview.
Tekeste Negash 1996, The Federal Experience.
Young, J. 1997 Peasant revolution in Ethiopia;
The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991, Cambridge
University Press.
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