By Tecola W. Hagos

FINAL INSTALLMENT

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, TRUTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

By Tecola W. Hagos

PART TWO: TRUTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section II: Theories of Verification and Truth

�To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.�                                                                                             

            From �Auguries of Innocence� by William Blake

Introduction

In this part of my essay, I have departed considerably from my usual preference of  analytical (not deconstruction) writing; I am more inclined toward synthesis in this piece of writing.[1] There is no question that the first safest approach to solving a problem is to compartmentalize or break the problem down to its basic structure thereby making it manageable. Issues dealing with truth and human rights, probably due to the nature of the subject matter, might necessitate synthesis as the better illuminating approach more than analysis. To a great extent, I must confess, that I mustered some courage to present this article after having read a small but dynamite book by an Oxford University philosopher Flipe Fernandez-Armesto, Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (Black Swan, 1998).[2] If perplexity is a measure of inadequacy, then I am the most perplexed person about life in general and Ethiopia�s future in particular.  

There is much that is extremely complex about the subject of human rights, a subject matter that I spent studying, debating, analyzing et cetera most of my adult life. At one point in my search, I went through a phase whereby I adopted the structuralist understanding of human rights. It was a passing phase, and a kind of throw-back antithesis to my early (HSIU years) attraction to existentialism, a philosophy that answered to my basic needs of the time of the possibility of absolute freedom in an absurd universe�a core philosophical school providing answers to a young man asking investigatory questions about life for the first time. It is later through my close examination of Parmenides and Plato/Socrates that I came to realize that the connection between �truth� and �human rights� has an ontological aspect as profound as any other adventure of the mind. Transcendental and universalized concepts have became overwhelmingly persuasive to my mind. Thus, my argument that human rights principles are universal principles has its own tortured evolution.        

I have tried to answer basic questions of human rights dealing with minorities and ethnic groups in light of the universality of human rights. I have dealt with the contentious principle of self-determination at its basic formulation in order to provide my readers a coherent picture of human rights as universal principles. Too often, our voice is a voice in the wilderness when we challenge minorities and ethnic groups demanding special considerations that effectively breach the peaceful coexistence of the many constituents of the whole. In an attempt to show how the principles of human rights are universal principles cutting across the entire human spectrum let alone one country, I have also addressed the misapplication of principles of self-determination that has spawned a number of �liberation movements� in Ethiopia. I have included pertinent citations at the end of this article that would be a good starting point for more extensive research.  There is no need to be a toothless lion roaring in the wilderness as ye gedel mamito, for I believe I have moral, legal, historical, and cultural justification for insisting for a unitary state of Ethiopia and the respect and safeguard of human rights.

1) Beware of History Repeating Itself and Corrupting the �Truth�

Most of our political disagreements revolve around claims dealing with legitimacy of political power, economic benefits, cultural identity, and nationalism. Much of such conflicts would have been avoided by simple acknowledgement of a common understanding of how to verify assertions of truth in cases of disputed claims and conflicts, in our general social interactions.  Of course, the search for truth and even finding such truth is no defense against an immediate destruction perpetrated by the single-minded selfish pursuit of individuals organized as a group.  No society is ever free from �barbarians.� In every society the world over, there are individuals that truly are the scourge of social and cultural developments. It is in society�s fight against such destructive forces that society also achieves a degree of enlightenment. Am I being deterministic or fateful? To a limited extent, the answer could only be �yes,� however, it would be a mistake to frame a thesis based on such limited scope.

My statements (above) are grandiose overgeneralizations, but I rather err on the side of overemphasis and overgeneralization as such than walk cautiously with minced ideas that will not be sufficient to display the splendor of Ethiopia. In the effort to understand our particular history, I had ventured out challenging very many myths and  taboo subjects for Ethiopians to discuss. I have been vilified by individuals who hid behind fake names in chat groups and the like, but never challenged properly on any of my research and analysis except once by an individual I do not want to mention here since he has completely disappeared from the ongoing discourse on Ethiopia. I seek truth, for truth is not mere matching of events to perception or the pedantic matching of witnesses to such events. I believe the very search for truth is a positive act. In fact, I may even consider it as an act of worship. In fact, it was in Eighth Grade that I realized �truth� is something very special as I tug along reading the book by Sir H. Ridder Haggard, She, where �Truth� was worshiped.

The modern world is far more complex than a young boy would ever comprehend. Thus, the concept of truth has become also far more complex than mere statue to be worshiped by people in loincloths. It is in this sense of intense complexity that I am discussing the concept and reality of �truth� and verification not just as a subject of speculation and intellectual indulgence. If we take as an example of the disembodied identity and scope of what Ethiopian reality signifies to individuals who are far removed from Ethiopia in all measurements of proximity, we will be able to measure our own distance from the reality of Ethiopia, This is a sort of sociological/cultural cum political triangulation. It is amazing how much our understanding of our Ethiopian reality contrasts with the cursory and often corrupted perceptions foreigners have of Ethiopia and Ethiopians.

One can make a defensible case for the cyclical nature of history. Even though this may be a contradiction to my objection to the deterministic perception of human life, there is enough latitude within such organic structure that may not be as deterministic as it might look.  In other words, our judgment of history is always after the fact, a reflective one and does not in any rational manner establish the deterministic nature of human life. Having said that, it is alarming to see the monster of Red Terror rearing its head camouflaging itself as part of the opposition movement to the current Ethiopian Government. Yesterdays supporters and defenders of Mengistu�s brutal government that had caused for over seventeen years untold atrocities with tens of thousands of murders and disappearances, are now reinventing themselves by associating with the few honorable men and women of the leadership of the Opposition. Even though it is delayed justice, the recent conviction of Melaku Tefera for crimes of genocide and crime against humanity, represent the tip of the iceberg of barbarism and Red Terror violence of the seventeen years rule of Mengistu and his collaborators. Like Melaku Tefera, also known as the butcher of Gondar, there are thousands others still at large, and even some well established within the Diaspora communities of Ethiopians.

We have individuals who were serving Mengistu as junior and senior diplomats, high-ranking officials, privileged businessmen, et cetera now waving the banner of the Opposition and putting themselves beyond criticism and accountability. Such enablers of Mengistu and his brutal government for almost two decades are now dressed in new political dress within the Opposition. People who could not even raise their faces to see us straight in our eyes because of their shameful past are now draping themselves in the national flag as vanguards in demonstrations and meetings. What a tragedy Ethiopians have to endure?  Even some dare address and represent our voice in important meetings and conferences. What is wrong with Ethiopians in the Diaspora these days? There is not enough volume of perfume in the world that could mask the stench of the Red Terror of Mengistu and his executioners who caused the death and mutilation of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians. The Opposition must clean itself from such abominable individuals before it can truly lead or be an important and constructive political organization in Ethiopian politics. Ye woga biresa, yetewoga airesa!

Ethiopia was profoundly affected by the involvement of foreign nations and individuals  for over a century. There is a direct link between most of our current problems with the events that took place in the past as a result of foreign governmental interferences in the internal affairs of Ethiopia. Even though we have now different actors with significant role in the shaping of the current Ethiopian government policies and the cause of the prevailing political disharmony, the characteristics of the problem remains constant. History may be repeating itself in the sense of the effort to destroy Ethiopia is very much underway with new Governments at the helm of such effort. Ethiopians must be very wary of the United States and Britain especially the United States Government for its leaders lack consistency and long term strategic planning ability or foresight.

Foreign individuals who have played crucial roles in the modern history of Ethiopia are few in number. Individuals such as Paul Henze are household names in the Diaspora communities of Ethiopians around the world. This is not an exaggeration but a matter of fact when one examines what such individuals have done to deserve such ignominious fame. For example, if we take into account Paul Henze�s recent comment on the article by Christopher Clapham, we can observe that the criticism goes far beyond critical analysis and is a polemical advocacy defending the indefensible acts and policies of Meles Zenawi and his government. At one point he even stooped so low to state his personal relationship as the measurement for good governance. Is this rationalism or an apology? May be it is neither but the sad evidence of Henze�s disregard of the value of the lives of Ethiopians. Is it possible for Henze to explain away the gross disregard of the fundamental rights of Ethiopians, who were massacred on November 1, 2005 and after, and the tens of thousands arrested, dehumanized with atrocities to date? There is a danger of becoming like the many Germen academics who were defenders of Hitler and providers of his barbaric programs. Specially having read Max Weinreech pioneering work on the role played by German academics, I have the sickening feeling that Henze and others are doing the same for Meles Zenawi and his regime.

Christopher Clapham�s article is a rather mild criticism of the current Ethiopian Government. Clapham is absolutely within his right to be concerned about the ongoing Ethiopian political crisis for he is an Ethiopian in a more meaningful way than most of us in the Diaspora. He lived in Ethiopia, wrote his dissertation on Ethiopia, and had had close contact with a number of Ethiopians and the nation itself for decades. It is amazing to me why Henze jumped to attack Clapham, when he should be encouraging healthy criticism of a leadership that has turned its guns against its own people. I believe that Henze is a very influential person within the United States Government, and as a result has deformed America�s policy toward Ethiopia and its leaders from 1975 to date. Because of such undue influence on the government of the United States, Ethiopia to a significant extent is driven into a political and economic quagmire. By simply following his droppings of articles and essays for the last thirty years, one can observe the terrible consequences of his activities in the affairs of a sovereign nation. Henze�s hold on current Ethiopian leaders has to do with the type of mystical and undefined role of America�s leadership, the role of America�s security agency et cetera.

2) Truth: Basic Understanding

When the pre-Socratic philosophers [3] such as Thales, Aniximinder, Pythagoras et cetera started asking fundamental questions as to the nature of reality, such as what is the �stuff� everything is made of or what is the common thing in all things, one may say philosophy was born away into some thing more substantial than mere myth and fables. However, such great start was brought to a screeching stop by a question asked by another of the pre-Socratic philosophers�Xenophanes. The question asked by Xenophanes was as simple as it was thoroughly understandable. He simply asked how do we know the truth when we get to it. Of course, not everything was lost because of one philosopher�s superb question. Then came along Parmenides, a few years younger than the rest, and probably the greatest philosopher that ever lived, with answers on the �unconcealment� of truth that to this day philosophers are in some way using his ideas on the �unconcealment� or of verification of truth.

In the fragments of the philosophical writings of Parmenides, the philosopher tells us how he was received by a �goddess� during his travels. Martin Heidegger in his lecture titled �Parmenides and Heraclitus,� which was later edited into a book [Parmenides], devoted his analysis to that very identification of the �Goddess� referred to by Parmenides. It is important that we take note of the distinction that Parmenides is alleged to be making by simply stating the identity of his hostess as the �Goddess� Truth, i.e., Άλήθεια (Aletheia), and not the �Goddess of Truth� if we accept the interpretation by Heidegger. [4]   

Truth may be one, but how we get to know or approach that truth could be through several ways coming from diverse directions as of necessity because of the fact of multiple trajectory points as well as multiple agents. Here is where one starts encountering problems for it is the case that some philosophers as well as scientists overreach in accepting their manner of inquiry or search methodology as the finding of the �truth� that is the very center of disagreement in contemporary philosophical and scientific enquiry.  Seen from such perspective truth seems to be multiple in some aspect and �one� in another. Even with my limited understanding Eastern philosophies, the Zen masters seem confused on questions of truth and verification for they seem to be thorn between dualism and monism in limited ontological understanding of being.

There are three traditionally acknowledged theories dealing with the establishment or verification of truth:

1. The Correspondence theory of truth[5]

2. The Coherence theory of truth [6]

3. The Pragmatic theory of truth [7]

However, I am adding a fourth theory of truth, which is as capable in resolving certain contested nature of reality as would be achieved by the pragmatic theory of truth. Thus, the fourth I named as the �agency� theory of Truth.

Each approach has its strength and weakness that we can find out as we engage in our quest for truth in establishing both metaphysical and physical nature of reality. For example, the philosopher Popper surmised that philosophical inquiry is not a search for truth, but an effort to establish the falsehood of our assertions or beliefs. The world perceived from such angle then becomes frightful to the individual warping social life from being full of meaning and engagement. One good reason for thinking about the nature of reality with a range of possible levels of relationships is the fact that one is left open to possibilities rather than with a conclusive and deterministic universe.    

Simply put, the correspondence theory of truth or verification is the simplest and most used by individuals from the existential to the metaphysical. What the individual seeks is simply that his or her mental imagery (?) corresponds to the physical reality that has an independence from any individuality. Experienced nature without any mediation except to record compare and contrast by our mind, if that is possible at all, is what is meant by �correspondence� between mind and the external. The problem of this approach is that there is no real distinction in the theory that would allow us to differentiate the quality of our observation as human beings with the sight �observation� of other creatures. It adherers to the idea that the human mind is like a photographic plate simply recording reality. This type of �tabula-rasa� conception of the mind and the nature of reality is not adequate on very many important issues.

On the other hand the coherence theory of truth and verification has far more versatility than the more pedantic and straight-cut correspondence theory of truth and verification, but may lack precision. The coherence of other well-established theories or assumptions with the new one introduced into the gauntlet is purely dependant not on outside verification but rather on how well the new idea fits with accepted theories. This approach is closer to the Parmenidean approach of non-empirical knowledge formation and verification of truth.

The great appeal of the pragmatic conception of truth to some individuals seems to be the fact of its emphasis on what is practical and of use to society and the individual. It is one philosophical thinking that the United States may claim some degree of origination or acknowledgement for it is a home-grown philosophical thinking having its root in the positivist thinking of Charles Pierce further developed by William James. Dewey may be also credited for the humanist tradition in that pragmatic rubric.

My own addition to the understanding of what �truth� may be, which I have identified as the �agency theory of truth� may be also identified as the lazy-man�s truth. In this theory, the truth of a claim is ascertained not by its ontology or falsification/verification, but rather by looking at the credibility of the person (agent) making such assertions. Under such understanding of what �truth� is, it seems the hard work of establishing the truth is already carried out by the individual whose reputation as a scholar, moral teacher, et cetera has the force of evidence or proof without any other reference.   

Section III: Human Rights � The Case for Universalism

The subject of human rights is best understood in the life each of us live in a particular community. Since definitions tend to freeze dynamic concepts, by my effort to define or concreticize the concept of human rights, I may be undermining what I am ultimately aiming at�the safeguard of maximum human rights to all everywhere. A while back, I wrote in one of my articles that life is not a set of multiple choices where one can tick off right answers from a ready made and nicely fitting clinical series. It is through living ones own life, warts and all, that one may come close to answering fundamental inner and, at times, universally felt questions. In that process, I believe, the purpose of individual life is realized and maybe even fulfilled. The issue of human rights seems to come into discussion in situations where there is an expansion of an individual's interest affecting and encroaching on the autonomy and integrity of other individuals. In an ideal world where individuals have minimal contact with each other and are able to act and do what they desire, there may not be any dispute or controversy on questions of human rights. Thus, much of the discussion of human rights is unduly affected by existential factors such as acquisitive conflicts and power competitions, and the general struggle for survival. On the other hand, without the pressure of the struggle for survival and competition, we might have stagnated as amoebas. With such understanding that life in general is being shaped by forces beyond our control, I will attempt to understand the role and scope of principles of human rights.

I believe that it is possible to discuss human rights from three distinct approaches to justify or assert the reality of human rights: the ontological approach; the religious approach; and the evolutionary or biological approach.

a) The  ontological (epistemological) approach -  conceptualization of rights through purely intellectual (analysis or synthesis) and intuitive processes, e.g. Plato's republic, the categorical imperative of Kant, the 'will' generated world-rights of Schopenhauer, rational liberal democracy of Rawls, et cetera. As a subcategory, I have included the hermeneutical or historical and structural approach, ideas mainly represented by cultural and political relativism.

 b) The religious approach - the acceptance of Divine origin of man thereby incorporating concepts that are contradictory of determinism and inherent free will and rights in the soul of man. Most religious dogmas dealing with the creation episode of man and the universe, as represented by views of Hinduism on one side and Judio-Christian-Islam theology on the other side, as well as ancient Pharaonic ideas of creation and concepts of immortality, accountability; and

c) The evolutionary or biological approach - empirical and corporeal development of ethics and morality as a basis of human rights; Darwinian perception of the evolutionary development of life and the corresponding evolutionary development of cooperative effort of living beings as the source of ethics in animals as expounded by Kropotkin, de Waal and others, as well as the development of the human psyche as  expounded by Jung et cetera.

One other evidence of the universal nature of human rights may be deduced from the way all human beings recognize themselves and feel love, emotional pain (empathy), suffer and mourn. The emotion of losing a beloved one, a friend, a child et cetera, even if the expression of such feelings might differ, the basic underlining emotion is universal. Similarly, the appreciation of beauty, music or a good story is a human fact - all affirming the universality of intimate emotions. Having said that,  I believe there is more to rights beyond the 'human' ones. Animals and all life in a way are also in the same continuum in the larger sense of 'life' even if subjects of utilitarian perception of them by human beings. It seems non-Western cultures are much more aware of the deeper interconnection between all living things than cultures in the West .

The structuralist or relativist and non-foundational perception of human rights is no less metaphysical than the perception of the universalism of human rights. Even though the claims of relativist non-foundational thinkers assert that rights are social and cultural constructions or innovations that facilitate better relationships between individuals and create social cohesion, the fact of the mater is that such perception in itself is also metaphysical if we use similar physicalist argument.

When I compare the three approaches identified above, the weakest seems to be the religious approach and the strongest seems to be the biological or empirical approach. One cannot escape the unadulterated, maybe even crude, reality of self-awareness, which might indicate that our very struggle for existence could be seen as an affirmative evidence of the struggle for autonomy (freedom) as well. Irrespective of whether we see the 'Divine' in man or in all of 'Creation' i.e., what has corporeal existence, no one can doubt the enormity and complexity of the question I am faced with in relation to the reality of my own existence and by extension of things and being(s) outside of my person. The very fact of the reality of 'being' as opposed to 'non-being' or 'nothing' is beyond human full comprehension irrespective of the advantages or limitation of the dialectical intimate relation between thinking and reality. Self-awareness cannot be fully aware of itself. In this article what I am dealing with is the relatively existential and limited issue of the concept of human rights, and not about metaphysical concepts or theories of knowledge and methodology. In these discussions of human rights principles, there is an underlying assumption that my search is the search for the truth and that truth when ever found is a good one. Thus, perceived human rights is intimately connected with the search for the truth, even though this may not be the classical search and interpretation of truth in relation to nature, language, being, and ethics. 

1) Ethics, Morality, and Truth:

I start this Section by asserting that the awareness of having individual rights and the struggle to realize such rights is as old as mankind and in some aspect even older supra-species. It is extremely difficult to discuss the religious, philosophical, sociological and jurisprudential issues involving human rights in few pages. Other than the fact of presenting a segmented picture of human rights, what I have done in this section is to examine the history of human rights starting from a period a few thousand years further into the remote past to a time where mankind started out on an extraordinary journey in Africa and crossed over into Asia and Europe and finally into the New World (the Americas) down to our time. The awareness of having �rights� might be the one true distinguishing feature of man that sets him apart from other animals, especially from his fellow primates.

The old ideas of demarcation of tool usage and language as attributes of humankind only in order to accord humankind a special place with rights and privileges are very much obsolete concepts.[1] Moreover, any discussion of human rights based solely on national and international law or custom and practices without consideration of the process of evolution of societies (groups) as well as the cognitive development of the individual i.e., the psychological and sociological dimension of human existence, is inadequate.[2] It seems that some scholars, who so earnestly wrote on human rights issues, did not consider at all the very basic 'humane' factor of the individual's moral and cognitive development (psychological base) within a temporal and spatial specificity (historical base). There are the exceptions who thought of human rights as inherent, and moral development as inevitable consequent in society.[3] Earlier scholars and their modern counterparts who thought of human rights as inherent in human beings, seem to have considered the psychological basis of human rights in unbounded universe, a universe almost unanimous to the concept of God. Their assertion of human rights as inherent in the nature of man contrasts with views held by many contemporary scholars[4] who seem to base their entire exposition of human rights issues on the Modern Western superstructure of states (history) and jurisprudential material of positivism and of critical theory.

The idea of human rights as transcendental to history has very many attractive features; notwithstanding the admonishment of the post-modernists (school of critical theory).[5] If human rights is taken to be inherent, immutable or fundamental, even where such assumption is wrong, it would still contribute to positive human development. By comparison, if we accept the concept of critical or contextual understanding of rights we would also have to accept the appalling repressive social conditions (such as slavery, Nazi concentration camps, colonization, cannibalism, human sacrifice, caste systems, child labor, suppression of women, female genital mutilation et cetera) in the past or in the present or in the future as events neither bad or good,  without normative judgment or condemnation or possibility of revolt. �Inherent� does not necessarily mean goodness; it simply means that a quality is linked intimately and intrinsically with the individual being.

I think critical theory is a methodology on how to validate or weigh a positive assertion or proposition even though the aim is not to ascertain truth or fallacy but to question. Since it is a method of valuation of contradictions, it does not of itself have independent and identifiable philosophical propositions other than a philosophy on methodology. Unlike a philosophical statement dealing with human rights, which does not need any other condition for its consideration, critical theory necessarily, must have a preexisting condition, such as a philosophical proposition, in order to function or to have any meaning. The relationship between critical theory and any other philosophical statement is like the relationship between style and content or language and thought or books/words and ideas therein�a method of measurement can neither negate nor create elements of a thing (or a proposition or a philosophy). At any rate, the fact of having a measurement or a methodology does not of itself set limits to statements of philosophy, or propositions et cetera. Reality maybe a lot more than the description, impression, or expression of it. Recognition of that does not in any way set limit to our thought process in our effort to have a better grasp of reality. It simply is not enough to tear down a social edifice no matter how useless without understanding it expansively.  The value in a critical method of inquiry is in what it exposes as weakness or strength (the contradictions) of an argument or a statement, and more importantly in what it offers through its implied negation, as an alternative choice or method of looking at a hitherto accepted proposition or situation.

A far more epistemic (theory) statement about critical theory "stresses that social research is itself a form of social interaction in which the objects of knowledge are potentially subjects of the very same knowledge, and thus it is willy-nilly to a potential factor in changing social relations."[6] In other words, critical theory is the socio-political sieve that is supposed to catch pretenses and stupid ideas, however that sieve needs to go through itself for the same purpose. For example, by contrast to the progress of man�s understanding of physical laws, say in the case of quantum physics wherein a whole new language of higher mathematics was invented in order to speak the language of the physical world more effectively, in case of critical theorists no such comparable innovation in language in order to deal with what is claimed to be a new (different) philosophical departure. In other words, critical theorists use more or less the language, logic, and conceptualization of the old schools of philosophy.

I believe we could include the post-modern philosophy of European anti-rationalism, namely deconstructionism, as an aspect of critical theory.[7] In simple terms, the problem with anti-rationalism philosophical theory is its super-fine tuning and  concentration on non-content issues such as 'decentering' past philosophical principles on the assumption that such philosophical works are biased in favor of a dominant civilization. There is nothing wrong with critical thinking and criticism. There is no doubt in my mind about the fact that Derrida's approach and concern as quintessential deconstructionist has merit, even maybe profound with deep philosophical precepts. However, in the deconstruction process such exercise is killing the patient as well while administering allegedly curative potion. For example, in the case of decentering (deconstructing) past Western philosophers, through my criticism of deconstructionism, I attempting to bring to our attention the relative importance of content over form. The fact that deconstructionists tell us that Western philosophy is biased toward the dominant Western culture, of itself does not remedy that philosophical bias nor determine the issue of right and wrong. Even more important is the acknowledgement that any demarcation is not necessarily a limit to our ability. Thus, for example, the  issue of whether what is presented by an individual is better presented in 'writing' or 'speaking' is of secondary importance.[8] The problem of the significance of the form of presentation as opposed to its content is not that new either. Starting from the pre-Socratic philosophers such as Heraclitus [9] to date, philosophers from varied schools of thought had struggled with the problem of the contamination of content (subject) by the method of delivery or communication of thought. [10] Thus, such insight on epistemology maybe interesting but does not help much by way of explanation or sourcing to our concern of human rights principles.      

The obvious question that comes to mind is what is meant by human rights. There is no conclusive record to show who used the term �human rights� for the first time. However, the absence of language designation does not imply the absence of awareness. People can be so parochial that they will compete on anything to aggrandize their own group or self. For example, as unbelievable as it is, one author has asserted that the term was adopted for the first time in the present century where its importance and applicability at international level was reveled in 1948 by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[11] However, there are several conclusive evidences the term �human rights� has been used prior to 1948 or even prior to the Nineteenth Century. As a matter of fact, in the 18th Century, an African slave (who later bought his freedom from his White owner) wrote about how the �human rights� of slaves was destroyed by slavers.  He wrote: "Our meeting affected all who saw us; and indeed I must acknowledge, in honour of those sable destroyers of human rights, that I never met with any ill treatment, or saw any offered to their slaves, except trying them, when necessary, to keep them from running away."[12] The term �human right� was specifically used in the contest of its generally accepted meaning by Olaudah Equiano (1735?-1797), an African slave, who later was freed and lived in England as subject of the British Monarch. There are numerous references to acts of oppression and appeals to justice and human compassion in the Narratives as well as personal letters to magazines and political personalities of the period.  What we have here is the impression of the teenage Olaudah (Vassa) describing the behavior of his African slavers before he was sold to a succession of owners. His usage of the term �human rights� is precisely in the context of the modern concept of human rights that we can relate to and understand in our own time.

2) Civilizations and Universal Human Rights

It has been asserted by some scholars, such as Rhoda Howard, that European civilization is the source of the foundational and developmental ideas of human rights, and that the modern human rights movement is based on Western tradition.[13] Other than the facts of unwarranted assertions on African history and culture, some of Howard's statements are blatantly racist or condescending, to wit she stated: "A more charitable explanation may be that African intellectuals are themselves victims of the intellectual imperialism they so vigorously decry. Blocked in their earlier attempts to Europeanize and join the dominant Western culture, they instead adopted the long-standing Western myth of the noble savage who exemplifies the virtues of generosity and self-sacrifice within his own community. The noble savage is incapable of a selfish, profit-seeking act. But he is also incapable of the scientific and technological innovation that such selfishness allegedly impels, and that is the basis of Western economic, political, and cultural dominance in the contemporary world. The noble African is doomed to stagnation in his closed, isolated, subsistence-level village, while the mundane Westerner purses individual wealth and collective economic prosperity in the modern city." (25) 

This type of claim of European (Western) source for human rights principles is not limited to European or American writers. There are also non-European who seem to have adopted such Eurocentric views wholesale with minimal critical analysis of such assertions. [14] I find this type of assertion to be a result of a narrowly constructed meaning or understanding of the concept of human rights. Even worse, it might be a racist and blatantly Eurocentric opinion. At ant rate, the mere denotation or identification of fragments of human experience does not mean the creation of those fragments. In other words, unlike art, fragments of human experience do not acquire new content by acts of mere recognition and by being placed in a category.

This essay is not meant to undermine the contribution of Western civilization to the advancement of humankind but to appreciate it in the right context for its both destructive and constructive roles in world civilization.[15] The term �Third World� was first coined by the French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, who used tiers monde the way the French have always used the term  tiers etat, i.e., the 'third estate' of pre-revolutionary France. The first estate was the nobility, the second the clergy and the third everybody else, including the bourgeoisie, artisans, trades people and many others who were not poor by a long sight. It is a good distinction to keep in mind these days when 'Third World' tends to evoke undifferentiated misery. Not everyone is poor there, as the book shows in some detail. "The First World consists of developed market-economy countries represented in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 'Second World' is some times used to refer collectively to the socialist countries of the North - the USSR and its satellites."] As a matter of stark physical reality, and as observed by a distinguished scholar, "[w]estern civilization has become what might be called a 'super tradition' that remains resilient and constantly influential because of the flexibility that reason gives to its values, not because of a presumed superiority of any one of the values it espouses."[16] However, it would be wise for the rest of the world to weigh carefully the idea that a higher form of civilization results also in higher moral development of the individual in such civilized societies.

If we adopt the type of reasoning behind such claim of Eurocentric perception of human rights, we ought to narrow further such identification of human rights on questions of the development of languages and semantics, for example. A critical  writing on Eurocentric traditions of analysis of history and the over simplification of the history of Africa is thoughtfully presented by Professor Clinton M. Jean.[17] One such example is the attempted distinction between �human rights� and �human dignity�.[18] "The argument that different societies can have different concepts of rights is based on an assumption that confuses human rights with human dignity. All society have concepts of human dignity, but few accept the notion of human rights, in the sense that individuals have the right to make claims on or against the state."[19] The difference between the two is that �rights� are conceptualized as equally applicable to all human beings irrespective of their individual circumstances, whereas �dignity� refers and depends on individual circumstances. Although these types of  distinctions do not go to the core of real problems of oppression, abuse et cetera, nevertheless, such distinctions have created some confusion. Whether human dignity is a consequent or a source of human rights, it is not an Earth shaking or a fundamental distinction. To pursue this line of reasoning would give us ridiculous results. This type of human rights understanding or analysis is similar to one of earlier times ridiculous claim, by over enthusiastic Western scholars, that the whole of philosophy was a Western creation and that Africa did not make any contribution to philosophy. This is one good example that illustrate the tyranny of formalism over life experiences. Every human being has a philosophy of life, that is how individuals see their connection with society and nature. Without such a device of philosophical interface none of the cultures or political structures in the world would have been possible. It is as simple as that.

From history, we learn one important lesson the fact that violence has been a permanent feature of civilizations; thus, may even be inevitable. However, every generation need not repeat nor walk down similar destructive routes of its forefathers. "Since time immemorial man has longed for freedom and equality, for guaranteed human rights and for fraternal relationships in a society in which the people run and manage their own affairs." [20] Human rights are not mere creation of international treaties, conventions or municipal legislation (positive law) that came about after the Second World War. [21] "Many discussion of the expansion of human rights legislation and awareness seem to imply an uninterrupted and easy development. This is misleading for at least three reasons. First, it shows historical amnesia. The evolution of human rights has been complex, convoluted, and bitterly resisted. Though many people when they think of human rights think only of the past few decades since World War II, the struggle to define and protect human rights has lasted for centuries. Wars have been fought, people tortured and murdered in the struggle for these rights and laws. Each right represents prior bitter experience...with what happened in the absence of that right's legitimacy. Second, there are significant differences between the idea (or, in this instance, the legal) and the real - that is, between human rights as defined in law and treaty and as practiced in the streets,  barracks, countryside, and frontier areas. All too often, governmental and private prejudices, vested and conflicting interests, and simple brutality intercede between law and practice. Universal standards of moral behavior have been debated and agreed on in many state and international laws, declarations, and conventions, but we are still forced to witness every year the systematic and widespread abuse around the world of these agreed-on human rights. The progressive development of legal rights is beneficial because they provide standards, goals, and a moral persuasion and pressure, but the struggle must be fought on other fronts as well." [22]

Often scholars have identified that concepts do not fit perfectly reality or life on the ground. This should not come as a surprise to anybody. Even as children we knew that ideas in our mind do not have a one to one correspondence with things that we deal with in our encounters with the reality around us. Contrary to the views of modern days legal positivists, the struggle for human rights and the recognition of rights predates by thousands of years our Twentieth Century treaties and conventions, and municipal laws that deal with human rights. Even then, what treaties and conventions, and municipal laws did was to acknowledge and codify in a more formal setting a body of customary international law on human rights. In other words, what treaties and conventions, and municipal laws did was to codify what was already a subject of a struggle and at times accepted to a significant depth. It is absurd to think of human rights as a consequence of the experience of the Second World War and the initiative of a handful of men, mostly career diplomats and technocrats, and their counterparts in academia from that time on. The struggle for freedom, for equal treatment, for justice et cetera should not be considered detached from mankind's struggle for existence.[23] 

3) Relativism: Self-Determination, Ethnic and Minority Rights

The after-birth of positivistic approach to human rights is the structuralist approach to human rights. That approach has elements of positivism and critical theory methodologies. It is not a fully developed method, and at times quite confusing. The fact that structuralism imputes the concept of human rights with ideas that rights are divisible and interdependent - the very reason used to support the structural approach - undermines its validity.[24] Its proponents hail from both public international professionals from organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank et cetera, and from academia mostly individuals who are connected with mildly activist human rights centers in some American law schools. This structural approach "links human rights to major world wide patterns and issues, identifies root causes of violations, and recognizes the diversity of political and social systems, cultural and religious pluralism, and different levels of development."[25] All these may sound responsible, democratic and concerned; however, the totality or the practical effect would undoubtedly result in the creation of a hierarchy of national groups and accord them different levels of human rights with Third World peoples being at the bottom.

Thus, the structural approach to human rights maybe seen as a thinly disguised racist idea of rights, or it is a very elitist point of view, at best. One must realize that the concept is self-serving, the group of people who would end up at the top of the hierarchy will be White men and women of the industrialized West irrespective of the devastating crimes committed by the West on the rest of the world in the last one hundred years. One must understand that development is not synonymous with good or virtuous activities, or good morality or ethics, and even less with good citizenship. The mere fact of being a Westerner should not be taken as a demarcation for a separate set of human rights for Westerners distinct from the rest of the world (mankind). There is real danger of another horrendous genocide if we let the relativist approach to human rights to culminate in its illogical conclusion.

The views of Michael Ignatieff in his Tanner Lecture at Princeton (later published, Human Rights as Politics and as Idolatry: The Tanner Lectures 1999) outlined a conflicted interpretations of human rights principles�a view that led him to support �pre-emptive strike� and the war on Iraq. He expounded the view that human rights is not a matter of fundamental or foundational principles, but rather an item that is negotiated for and expedient. It is such structuralist understanding of the concepts of human rights that inevitably led him to defend the war on Iraq by the Bush/Cheney  Government. The impact of his position was exponentially magnified due to the fact that Ignatieff is an outstanding scholar and the Director of the Human Rights Center at Harvard. (Some even believe he might become the next Prime Minister of Canada.) To a lesser extent Henry Steiner and Phillip Alston�s book, International Human Rights in Context, which otherwise is an outstanding textbook, also seems to be a relativist or structuralist book.[26] These books seem to contextualize or existentialize human rights in terms of socially constructed system of rights based on expediency, at least that is what the titles of the books seem to suggest. In addition, the title of the book by Steiner and Alston seems to suggest a distinction between �international human rights� as opposed to �national human rights� with a possible consequence that human rights safeguard and practice in Western nations will be distinctly different from the rest of the world. This suggests that our international mess seems to be dealt with in a different and watered down standard of human rights. If such is the true intention of our contemporary scholars on human rights, it is indeed a frightening prospect.

At the core of the thesis of the structuralist or relativist human rights philosophers is a misunderstanding of the concept of �universals� and �universalism.� It seems they are building their understanding of the concept of universalism as a type of inductive generalization by simple enumeration. This is a mistake that has been repeated over and over for thousands of years. The concept of �universalism� need be discussed and understood through Parmenidean form of reason, whereas relativistic propositions are existential items that can be considered through observation and synthesis. In other words, this type of limited understanding of �universal human rights� by relativists is similar to the limited even faulty understanding of the meaning of Platonic concept of the �Ideal� or the concept of �Form� as understood by Aristotle. The motive of  Ignatieff, or Steiner and Alston, or very many scholars of human rights may not be at all misanthropic, but a misunderstanding of the concept of  �universalism.� However, the effect of their work might lead to such undesirable results. The reason I chose these distinguished scholars discussed here above is because of the fact of their impeccable record as human rights advocates and scholars of great depth and understanding. I have also studied their work very deeply.  Thus, there can be no other motive for the position these scholars took except for their understanding of certain philosophical concepts erroneously.

One such misconception of the application or operation of human rights principles is in the area delineated as minority or ethnic rights. This is an improper use of the concept of human rights in connection with minorities or ethnic groups. There is no such thing as such that can be identified distinguishable as �minority rights or �ethnic rights,� but rather we are dealing with safeguards in the protection not to deny already universally applicable rights to minorities and ethnic groups. It is not a case of having a peculiar type of rights called �minority rights� or �ethnic rights� as some additional �rights� of expanded or original import. The international instruments applicable to the issues of minority and/or ethnic rights are the same international instruments. They are not different than the ones we refer to in recognizing the civil and human rights of every individual in the world.[27]  Thus, when there is a claim of minority or ethnic rights it is simply a claim to have equal access to the universally declared or acknowledged rights. As we can see from the many declarations, covenants, conventions and resolutions, it is never meant or designed to empower or endow minorities or ethnic groups with rights that are different and superior to those recognized universally.

The confusion in this area of international law principles and practices is due to the apparent contradiction of the many declarations dealing with seemingly �unique rights� of a protected group as entertained by several international instruments, such as the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992); the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; the declaration at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993); the declaration at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen; and the Habitate II conference in Istanbul and the charter of the United Nations dealing with the issue of self-determination.[28] The ILO convention of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1957 and 1989 has simply added to the confusion. It is important to reconcile these sets of principles contained in such declarations specifically dealing with minorities and ethnic groups with the universal declarations and covenants dealing with universal principles of human rights.

In support of the limited application of principles dealing with self-determination issues, it is very enlightening to read the recommendation of the watchdog institution within the United Nations system itself namely the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In 1996 the Office of the High Commissioner elaborated the meaning and scope of self-determination as understood within the United Nations system of several declarations, resolutions dealing with the issue of �self-determination� and put a definitive limit to the claims of every aspiring  �liberation� front to a rest. In Section 6 of its Recommendation No. 21 it stated, �The Committee emphasizes that, in accordance with the Declaration on Friendly Relations, none of the Committee's actions shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and possessing a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory, without distinction as to race, creed or colour. In the view of the Committee, international law has not recognized a general right of peoples unilaterally to declare secession from a State.� (Emphasis mine)[29]

There are also several interpretations by respected international law experts supporting such interpretations of limiting the meaning and import of the concept of self-determination.  The less contentious principles of protecting minorities and ethnic groups  and others is not that difficult to understand in light of the above mentioned recommendation on the far more challenging concept of �self-determination� by the Office of the High Commissioner  as stated above. The obvious starting point under that regime of international law principles is to identify minorities and ethnic groups that are threatened with extinction, abuse, marginalization, exclusion, et cetera if no step is taken to protect such endangered groups. In the Ethiopian setting, there is none that could be seen entitled to such protection. There is of course the question of neglect in the sharing of resources, particular assistance, effort to encourage social and political participation, but such shortcoming on the part of the Ethiopian State does not amount to an active persecution and immediate threat to the continued existence of such groups.

The many liberation movements that mushroomed in Ethiopia whether they are Eritreans, Tygreans, Oromos, Somali, Sidama, Gambela et cetera fall within the exigencies or constraints of that regime of international law (cited herein above) that tells us none of such movements could be considered legitimate in light of Ethiopian socio-political reality. All such aggrieved groups need solve their problems peacefully as part of the political and social process within the state framework of Ethiopia. All liberation organizations mentioned here in (except that of Eritrea that is in different politically troublesome situation but no less illegal), as long as their demand is for independence and secession as such, are illegal and the Government of Ethiopia has the legal and moral right to prosecute such divisionary or secessionist liberation movements. Any government of a foreign state that gives sanctuary and military assistance to such liberation movements is committing an illegal act, and such involvement of a foreign state in the internal affair of Ethiopia can be considered by Ethiopia as an act of hostility. This includes the governments of several countries around the world such as Egypt, Sudan, the many Arab states in the Middle East, Britain, Canada, Italy, France, Germany, Pakistan, the United States, governments involved in some form of illegal funding and/or military assistance to such liberation movements.

Most of the border conflicts whether it is in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and even in present day Europe is a direct consequences of the legacy left by the brutal colonialism of England, France, Italy, Spain, Holland, and Germany.  European colonizers left in their former colonies troublesome legacies where they continued to perpetuate their control and instigate conflict between related groups of people who were either free or under subjugation under contending European colonizers even though they were all shared a common history before colonialism. A good example is that of  the new state of �Eritrea�  and its parent country Ethiopia. Djibouti is another example  of a territory curved out of Ethiopia as a colonial beachhead earlier and now as an independent nation serves as a French outpost to keep an eye on the Red Sea passage (corridor) of vital business and military strategic importance. Belize is another example of England excess of slavery and serfdom, a pure creation of a British plantation turned sovereign country at the cost of the parent country of Guatemala. Kuwait is an example of a reneged enclave of a minority group that is a bone inserted in the very throat of Iraq siphoning off oil from a shared field of oil and depositing all that wealth in British Banks. The United States, a new comer to the drama, is acting out its ignoramus idea of self-determination on Ethiopia favoring the secessionist Eritrean independent state and undermining the very mother country of ancient linage.

Just recently the United States Representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Bolton, has admonished the Security Council to force Ethiopia accept the Border Commission�s  decision of 2004, a decision that is entered in violation of international human rights and the sovereignty of a Member State of the United Nations. Moreover, the decision of the Border Commission was illegal on procedural violations of impartiality and corruption of the Commission Members. The Commission Chairman was working for the United States as an attorney on record in a case before the ICJ [Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)] and had long-standing relationship with the United States Government at a time when he was also deciding the case on the border conflict between �Eritrea� and Ethiopia. Virtually the Commission was a one-man show of the Chairman since the other four Commission members cancel out each other being appointed equally by the contending parties. It is a fact that the United States was and still is an interested party in the outcome of the border conflict between Ethiopia and �Eritrea.� The decision of the Commission is a corrupt one due to such conflict of interest of the Chairman of the Commission and due to numerous other irregularities and lack of capacity to arbitrate such a conflict. [30] Thus, for Ambassador Bolton or any one else to insist that Ethiopia must accept such illegal decision by the Border Commission is either a case of utter ignorance of the principles and workings of international law and processes or shameless arrogance of disregard of the rule of law. All of the actions of the officials of the United States Government is based on self-interest, in disregard of the legitimate rights of millions of Afar Ethiopians affected by the boundary demarcation  in the disputed areas, and the historical rights of seventy million Ethiopians in their territorial integrity of the Afar Coastal territories and the territorial waters of the Red Sea.

In a nutshell, such is the technical and close interpretation of the regime of international law and principles applicable to problems of minorities, ethnic groups and other protected persons and groups. Are we heading anywhere with this type of analysis. Yes, we are. It is important to understand that Ethiopia as a state is endowed with tremendous power and privileges under international law. There is no need to buckle every time some individual with questionable following challenges the State of Ethiopia with some version of a liberation movement.  There are sufficient legal actions that must be put into play with that form of dissention. The right procedure is to take the matter through a political and legal process. When it comes to our relationship with the Government of the United States and European national governments, the best approach is firmness and proper legally defensible presentation of our interest.

4) The Case of Ethiopia: Human Rights

The subject of human rights in the Ethiopian setting is quite complex as is also the case in parts of the world I have either visited or studied from news, books, interviews et cetera. There seems to be similar pattern of abuse and violations of the rights of the individual common in all societies, the difference being in magnitude and spread. Ethiopia is a truly ancient nation with a government and territory and a form of state identity that literally dates back to the time of the Greek civilizations. It is the one nation that had survived all these thousands of years with an unbelievable degree of compactness and territorial integrity and cultural hegemony.  In fact, it is an amazing history that is unique in its longevity in all of the history of the lives of states or nations.

I just finished reading the multi-volume seminal work of Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, a work I recommend to all who have time on their hands to read. Other than the fact that the book is speculative in areas that Toynbee has no expertise, I also realized how wrong the great historian was in his book, in his own field of expertise (history), in dismissing Ethiopia as a relic, a state stagnant in its own frozen culture protected by its impenetrable natural barrier of dessert and high escarpment. Despite the fact that Toynbee is an improvement on both the 18^th and 19^th Centuries historians and scholars representing the steepest decline of western scholarship since the Middle Ages on the subject of the contribution of non-western cultures and civilizations to the advancement of mankind, I find his speculation that asserted only natural phenomenon protected Ethiopians from colonization is simply rubbish. What is also obvious in looking at the long history and uninterrupted history of Ethiopia is the fact that the issue of colonialism or colonial subjugation claim by anyone in the Ethiopian setting simply shows misunderstanding of the process of the evolution of states.    

Human rights violations in Ethiopia compared to other nations in the region or else where in the world, to a great extent, is far less dehumanizing. The penal system in Ethiopia is far more benign even under such poor human living conditions. The humane content of punishment is far more pronounced in any Ethiopian prison than prison systems I have read about else where in the world.  Ethiopians are truly a great moral agents. If you seek in achieves and written records, as well as oral tradition, except a couple of reports by foreign travelers such as the sensationalist James Bruce, Ethiopians hardly ever demonstrated the types of cruelty prevalent in Europe, the Middle East, Asia et cetera. One may even consider our type of punishment innocent and like a child�s play compared to the innovative and utterly cruel forms of punishments practiced in other communist around the world. We never have any form of stretching and quartering of human beings while they are still alive as practiced in England for centuries. We never had the �iron maid� that medieval Europe developed to its macabre effect, we never developed the impelling, crucifying, or of burning in huge bonfires of individuals as a punishment. Even their Churches were not immune to such barbarity when we think of the hundreds of thousands tortured by their Inquisition and panels of learned churchmen. This is not to deny past and current practices of Ethiopian Emperors and warlords of administering some sever punishments like hanging, cutting off limbs et cetera; however, the practice was very limited in scope and not a fraction in its barbarity and violence compared to Europe and their descendants that settled in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. There is nothing Europe or Asia or America can teach us about morality or virtuous behavior.

Let me ask a rhetorical question, what nation having undergone the types of suffering that Ethiopians have gone through would not have sold its soul? We have witnessed how quickly individuals in the West faced with temporary set backs revert to barbarism, and a good example is the looting, murder, et cetera we all witnessed as reported by the media after the destruction of some Southern States coastal areas by Hurricane Katerina. Another example of much significance is the response of President George Bush to the 9/11 attack and murder of innocent people. Even if that violence was abhorrent, nevertheless the response by the United States Government has violated a number of internationally accepted principles on just wars. It is not morally defensible when we consider the disproportional suffering unleashed on innocent people where by his own admission Bush�s Government has killed thirty thousand Iraqis most of whom innocent women and children. At any rate, Iraq has nothing to do with the 9/11 attack. Conservative estimate of the total number of innocent people killed by American Government soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq is over a hundred thousand. What type of modern arithmetic would equalize the lives of about three thousand Americans to be worth more than a hundred thousand Iraqis and Afghans? Are Western politicians the types of moral human beings in any position to preach to us about ethical behavior and human rights?  Human rights concept in its subdivision or entirety is our making and not that of the West. It is ironic that the children of colonialists and genocide perpetrators claiming the higher ground of morality when we know that all of our problems around the world are traceable to their aggressive and violent legacy.

Do I have to be grateful for not being molested by this government or that government for my out spoken words? Not at all, I have every right to be here or else where in the world, and I have the unalienable freedom to speak my mind. Gratitude for not being violated is not a virtue, but a morality of a caged soul. To use force against me for my exercise of my natural and fundamental rights and for making an ethical stand is simply a demonstration of the moral degeneration of the party who dare attack me for my being or my presence or my conscious. Ultimately, the truth is the final arbiter of our humanity�and that truth so far points at the singular barbarism of Western governments throughout history. 

In conclusion, I emphasize the fact that we Ethiopians never built a Coliseum in order to watch human beings killing each other or being mauled and killed by wild animals. We did not build concentration camps where millions were starved, gassed, brutalized to death. We did not burn hundreds of thousands of people for religious reason. We did not create gulags and slave camps where millions were worked to their bones and to their death. We did not commit genocide of millions of people so that our own people could claim the land of the exterminated indigenous population. It is absurd even to think that such people with such blood-socked history are also the agents who established, safeguarded, and defended human rights. Instead, we are the originators and champions of human rights! END OF SERIES

Tecola W. Hagos

December 15, 2005

Copyright � by Phineaus St. Claire, Washington DC. December 15 2005.

Footnote limited to few indicative sources:

Section  I.

1. See G. Woodcock, Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (1966); and Ronald Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press (2000).
2. Plato, Crito,  Trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Harvard Classics,  Ed. Charles W. Elliot, New York NY: P. F. Collier & Sons, 1937.
3. John Rawls, Theory of Justice; Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971; - �Civil Disobedience and the Social Contract,� in  Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidny Hook, New York: New York University Press, 1968.
4. Henery Daivid Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, (1849).
5. Leo Tolstoy, Tolstoy's Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-violence. New York NY: Bergman Publishers, 1967.
6. Mahatma Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha), (originally published by the Navjivan Trust, Ahmedabad India 1951) Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001; -  Satyagraha in South Africa. Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950.
7. Martin Luther King, Why We Can�t Wait, New York NY: Harper & Row, 1964.
8. John Rawls, �Civil Disobedience and the Social Contract� in Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook, New York NY: New York University Press, 1968; Further elaborated version included as Part Two in A Theory of Justice, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
9. John Rawls, Ibid
10. Getatchew Haile, �Criticism without Substance,� Ethiomedia, November 17, 2005.
11. Getatchew Haile, Ibid
12. Minasse Haile, �Comparing human rights in two Ethiopian constitutions: the Emperor's and the �Republic's��--cucullus non facit monachum. 13 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1-59 (2005); - "The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact Upon Unity, Human Rights, and Development," 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'l l. REV. 1 (1996).
13. Getatchew Haile, �Criticism without Substance,� (November 17 �05, Ethiomedia. 

Section II

1. L. Jonathan Cohen, The Dialogue of Reason: An Analysis of Analytical Philosophy, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1986; L.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1956;  R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 1956.  Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
2. Flipe Fernandez-Armesto, Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (Black Swan, 1998).
3.  John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, (1930) London UK: Macmillan; - Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2003; - G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd ed., Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
4. Martine Heidegger, Parmenides, Trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1998.
5. O'Connor, D. J., The Correspondence Theory of Truth, London: Hutchinson, 1975.
6. Frederick F. Schmitt, ed. Theories of Truth,  Oxford: Blackwell, 2003; Nicholas Rescher, 1973, The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1982.
7. William James. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longman Green and Co., 1907

Section III:

1. There are many publications, both scientific and popular, on the topic about comparative valuation of human and animal behavior. The one book I found to be extremely enlightening as well as very disturbing is the book by Dale Peterson and Jane Goodall, Visions of Caliban: On Chimpanzees and People, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993.    
2. There are numerous books on the moral and cognitive developments of human beings. At the very least, any person writing on issues of human rights must read the following books: Robert Coles, The Moral Life of Children, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987;  Lawrence Kohlberg, Philosophy of Moral Development, New York: Harper & Row, 1981; Gareth Matthew, Philosophy and the Young Child, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980; and  Jean Piaget, Moral Judgment of the Child, New York: Free Press, 1965. Even if we do not get total illumination on moral development by reading these books, at least we will be able to gain some insight as to the development of values of people who are not of our 'civilization' that would make us a lot less disparaging and judgmental about their humanity and sense of worth.
3. Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996; - Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: the Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy, Montreal & New York: Black Rose Books, 1991.
4. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. "Human rights represent a distinctive set of social practices, tied to particular notions of human dignity, that initially arose in the modern West in response to the social and political changes produced by modern states and modern capitalist market economies. Most non-Western cultural and political tradition, like the premodern West, lacked not only the practice of human rights but also the very concept." (50)]
5. David Couzens Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory, Oxford UK and Cambridge M: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. "Exclusively deconstructionist approaches fail to appreciate that the unconditionality of ideas of reason harbors not only a dogmatic but a subversive potential: context-transcendent claims to validity are permanently exposed to criticism from all sides. Postmodernist critique is itself unintelligible without this, that is, without the supposition that the received views it criticizes claim a validity transcending the contexts in which they were put forward. Understood pragmatically, then, the unconditionality of validity claims also runs counter to what its postmodernist critics suppose - toward the ongoing critique of dogmatism, error, and self-deception in all other forms." (37)
6. Goran Hyden, "The Challenges of Domesticating Rights in Africa," in Human Rights and Governance in Africa, Roland Cohen, Goran Hyden, and Winston P.Nagan eds., Gainsville FL: University Press of Florida, 1993, 16.
7. See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak, John Hopkins University press, 1976; - Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf, New York and London: Routledge, 1994.
8. Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, 22; Margins of Philosophy, trans. and additional notes Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982, talking 88-108, writing 309-330;
9. G.S.Kirk, J.E.Raven and M.Schofield, (1957) The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1995, 181-212.
10. David Roochnik, The Tragedy of Reason: Toward a Platonic Conception of Logos, New York and London: Routledge, Chapman and hall Inc., 1990, 132-139.
11. Attar Chand, Politics of Human Rights and Civil Liberties: A Global Survey, Delhi: K.K. Thukral, UDH Publishers, 1985, 44-45. - The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948). see Appendix I; Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999
12. Olaudah Equiano, (1795) The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings, ed. Vincent Carretta New York: Penguin Classics, 1995, 51. (emphasis added)
13. See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.
14. See Bassam Tibi, "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam" in Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 104-132,  Abdullahi A. An-Na'im and Francis M. Deng ed., Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1990.
15. Jon Bennett with Susan George, The hunger Machine: The Politics of Food, Cambridge GB: CBC Enterprise, 1987, 5-6.
16. Goran Hyden, "The Challenges of Domesticating Rights in Africa," in Human Rights and Governance in Africa, 257, Roland Cohen, Goran Hyden, and Winston P.Nagan eds., Gainsville FL: University Press of Florida, 1993.
17. See Clinton M. Jean, Behind The Eurocentric Veils: The Search for African Realities, Amherst MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1991.
18. Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa, Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.17-23
19. See also Timothy Fernyhough, "Human Rights and Precolonial Africa," Human Rights and Governance in Africa, supra note 16, at 41-53. - The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [hereinafter the Constitution], Article 10 (1) �Human rights and freedoms inviolable and inalienable. They are inherent in the dignity of human beings.� (2) �Human and democratic rights of Ethiopian citizens shall be respected.�
20. Attar Chand, Politics of Human Rights and Civil Liberties: A Global Survey, Delhi, India: KK Thukral, UDH Publishers, 1985, 16.
21. Art Hansen, "African Refugees: Defining And Defending Their Human Rights," Human Rights and Governance in Africa, Supra note 16, at 139-167.
22. See Attat Chand, Politics of Human Rights and Civil Liberties: A Global Survey, supra note 20, 15-16.
23. Henry Steiner and Phillip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; - A.J.M. Milane, Human Rights and Human Diversity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights, London: Macmillan, 1986;  - John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980; - Leo Strauss, (1950) Natural Right and History, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
24. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
25. Claude E.Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995, 276.
26. Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Princeton University Press, 2004; -  Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Penguin, 2003; - Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton University Press, 2003; -  Human Rights as Politics and as Idolatry: The Tanner Lectures 1999. Princeton University Press, 2001;  Henry Steiner and Phillip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996
27. - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR) (article 2, 7); - Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (article 1, 3);

- Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,  GA Resolution (1960)

- United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial        Discrimination (1963)

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) This treaty entered into force in 1969. This is the most comprehensive treaty concerning the rights of racial and ethnic minorities. It lays down in detail the steps required by states to prevent racial discrimination and violence and to foster greater racial harmony;

- International Convention on Economic, Social and Culture Rights (1966) (article 2 );

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (article 2, 20, 26, 27)
The Covenant lays out the principle that Rights are to all "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (article 2). Governments are charged with the responsibilities to prohibit by law any "national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" (article 20). The Covenant provides also the equal treatment before the law without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law (article 26). �Minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language� (article 27);

- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979);

- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) [articles 6 and 7(j)]
The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) gives the court jurisdiction over acts of genocide of specific national, ethnic, racial or religious groups under article 6. Apartheid is further defined as a crime against humanity in article 7(j).

28. The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,                      Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992); the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; the declaration at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993); the declaration at the World Summit for Social Development in Coppenhagen; and the Habitate II conference in Istanbul and the charter of the United Nations dealing with the issue of self-determination. The ILO convention of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1957 and 1989.
29. Office of High Commissioner For Human Rights - General Recommendation No. 21: Right  to Self-Determination: -23/08/96 (Fortyeighth Session,1996)                                                                                                                       
    1. The Committee notes that ethnic or religious groups or minorities frequently refer to the right to self-determination as a basis for an alleged right to secession. In this connection the Committee wishes to express the following views.
    2. The right to self-determination of peoples is a fundamental principle of international law. It is enshrined in article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, in article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in other international human rights instruments. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for the rights of peoples to self-determination besides the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own language.
    3. The Committee emphasizes that in accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, it is the duty of States to promote the right to self-determination of peoples. But the implementation of the principle of self-determination requires every State to promote, through joint and separate action, universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context the Committee draws the attention of Governments to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992.
    4. In respect of the self-determination of peoples two aspects have to be distinguished. The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, that is to say, the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference. In that respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level, as referred to in article 5 (c) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In consequence, Governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. The external aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have the right to determine freely their political status and their place in the international community based upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.
    5. In order to respect fully the rights of all peoples within a State, Governments are again called upon to adhere to and implement fully the international human rights instruments and in particular the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Concern for the protection of individual rights without discrimination on racial, ethnic, tribal, religious or other grounds must guide the policies of Governments. In accordance with article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and other relevant international documents, Governments should be sensitive towards the rights of persons belonging to ethnic groups, particularly their right to lead lives of dignity, to preserve their culture, to share equitably in the fruits of national growth and to play their part in the Government of the country of which they are citizens. Also, Governments should consider, within their respective constitutional frameworks, vesting persons belonging to ethnic or linguistic groups comprised of their citizens, where appropriate, with the right to engage in activities which are particularly relevant to the preservation of the identity of such persons or groups.

6.The Committee emphasizes that, in accordance with the Declaration on Friendly Relations, none of the Committee's actions shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and possessing a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory, without distinction as to race, creed or colour. In the view of the Committee, international law has not recognized a general right of peoples unilaterally to declare secession from a State. In this respect, the

7.Committee follows the views expressed in An Agenda for Peace (paras. 17 and following), namely, that a fragmentation of States may be detrimental to the protection of human rights, as well as to the preservation of peace and security. This does not, however, exclude the possibility of arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties concerned.

     30.             Hereunder I have excerpted a very important item from an article I wrote and posted in this Website on October 23, 2003 on the illegality of the Border Commission and the invalidity of its decision.

 �..

2. Conflict of Interest: Disqualification of Lauterpacht: All international adjudication/arbitration forums have certain standards of integrity that must be upheld by members of such forums/courts/tribunals/commissions. The basic documents of the ICJ as well as that of the International Permanent Court of Arbitration and the UNCITRAL rules all have provisions providing for �high moral� standards that members sitting to adjudicate or advise or arbitrate parties to a controversy and the world at large are expected and required to observe. The independence of any such body from undue influence of third parties is a well established principle that evolved out of centuries of the development of customary international law and principles. We have to consider also general principles of law practiced by all �civilized nations� of the World in connection with the integrity of an international court or forum Article 2 of the Statue of the ICJ holds that �[t]he Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected... from among persons of high moral character.� [Emphasis added]

Article 23 of the 1899 basic document that created the Permanent Court of Arbitration [Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dispute] holds that �each Signatory Power shall select four persons...of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of Arbitrators.� [Emphasis added]

From the verse quoted here from the Bible, at least, we should consider its moral teaching.

�For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.� Matt. 6:21

We should understand the role of arbitrators to be distinct from that of ICJ judges in context of how arbitrators are chosen or appointed in the first place. However, this does not mean that we have to throw out all professional ethical standards when it comes to arbitrators. By the nature of their appointment or election, arbitrators do have certain preferences in supporting the position of the party that appointed or elected them. However, this does not mean that they are not bound by the �highest moral reputation� standard. It may be argued that that their preference to the party that appointed them may not disqualify them from being arbitrators. However, when it comes to the president or chairman elected by the arbitrators themselves pursuant to the arbitration agreed upon procedure, I believe both standards of �independence� and �highest moral reputation� standards are applicable to arbitrators who are thus elected by the other arbitrators to be presidents of particular commissions or tribunals.

The Commission members, especially the President, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, have displayed an unusually blatant disregard of both the �high moral� standard expected of his position and impropriety in his activities that clearly shows his lack of independence from the influence of third party governments. It is with sincere regret that one is forced to challenge Lauterpacht�s professional ethical standard due to the gravity of the problem facing one�s nation. Lauterpacht is a seventy five year old international jurist who had led a distinguished life until this moment.

Lauterpacht has displayed a degree of liberties in his words of communication with the Government of Ethiopia that boarders an impertinence. He seems to have cast his role as an ICJ judge or a �Secretary General� of an international organization like the United Nations rather than a �President� of a privately established arbitration tribunal. Let us consider the situation in a holistic manner taking into account other activities of undue interferences by third parties that may have direct bearing on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. Not withstanding the hollow diatribe of the Representative of �Eritrea� at the recent General Assembly of the United Nations, looked at with such global perspective, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission arbitration process is in a real mess. The Security Council, and the Secretary General are assuming roles that was never envisioned or authorized through practice�roles of a Judiciary (a supreme court) and that of a Chief �Justice.

Thus, it is obvious that the United States is acting in an adversarial role in the case involving the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is no more an impartial neutral body. With such public background in full view, the United States has further stained the arbitration process with its uncouth act of retaining as its lawyer Lauterpacht in its case with Mexico, a case pending at the ICJ [Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)]. This act of the United States is no different, for example, from Eritrea hiring Lauterpacht to work on some legal case while Lauterpacht is still a member of the Commission. If that was the case, everybody with some legal background would have called out �conflict of interest� at the top of his or her voice. Thus, the fact of an interested party such as the United States retaining a sitting-Commissioner as its lawyer is only slightly a shade different than the actual party in the controversy�Ethiopia or �Eritrea��retaining any of the sitting-Commissioners as a private lawyer. It does not in any way mitigate the unethical and conflict of interest situation by identifying when Lauterpacht was retained as counsel for the United States, rather what remains is the negative shadow cast on the fitness of Lauterpacht as an arbitrator and the independence of the Commission as a whole. One must realize the Commission�s work is not yet concluded, thus the members of the Commission are still bound by the standards set by the Basic document of the Court of Arbitration and principles developed for such purposes by customary international law.

It is only proper for Ethiopia to demand full disclosure by Lauterpacht of all his activities with third parties that are directly or remotely involved with the on going border dispute with Eritrea. If this is not a clear case of conflict of interest, loss of independence, and a compromise of the principle of �high moral� standing expected and required of the members of the Commission, show me what is.

Not only Lauterpacht is personally involved in such blatant conflict of interest, but also Riesman, another member of the Commission appointed by Eritrea, is involved in other cases that put his behavior in a compromised position. It seems that Lauterpacht is using the Permanent Court of Arbitration based commissions and tribunals as his private law firm away from his home base from his Chambers at 20 Essex Street. His partner Arthur Watts at the Chambers at 20 Essex Street is supposedly picked by Ethiopia for the Commission. Here you have an incestuous relationship where the same characters are showing up again and again as commission or tribunal members. Both the appearance of conflict of interest or conflict of interest in fact is rampant in the whole arbitration process where the �high moral� and �independence� standards are compromised.

Ideally, international arbitration was to be carried out by choosing from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration already designated by their respective governments who are signatories of the 1899 or 1907 Treaties (Conventions). With the adoption of the UNCITRAL rules the forum was expanded to include ad hoc arbitrators who are not designated by any member nations. This process seems to have opened the door for corruption and conflict of interest problems. One must not lose sight of the initial reasons why in 1899 the arbitration forum was needed. It seems there was an interest by the kings, queens, heads of States et cetera who meet at the Hague an idealized element of public duty to bring about peace and security to a Europe and a world at large racked with war and violence and �to record in an international agreement the principles of equity and right on which are based the security of States and the welfare of peoples,� [Preamble, 1899 Convention]. It was envisioned that seasoned statesmen and international law jurists would help stabilize the world through their wisdom by arbitrating conflicting claims by states. It was never meant a career promoting and money making scheme for lawyers.

Looking at the record of the last three to four years, one cannot but notice that Lauterpacht and a few of his exclusive group of individuals seem to have made the process of �arbitration� a money making mechanism for their insatiable appetite for money. Most anyone would be tempted with the prospect of earning an exorbitant amount of money at an hourly rate of 200 to 300 hundred dollars. When I examined the docket of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ad hoc tribunals and commissions, I was amazed to read how Lauterpacht and Riesman seem to have their hands in every pot. Are these individuals truly �disposed to accept the duties of Arbitrators� or are they involved in some kind of money making scheme that compromised and defeated the purpose of having an arbitration in the first place?

Raising the issue of professional responsibility (conflict of interest, corruption et cetera) is a very sensitive and complex matter for anyone. It should not be a point of contention without solid ground. I have first hand experience of good intentions going sour and affecting the judicial system. The psychology of the individual involved is not that important in determining such issues. After all the history of mankind�s failure is littered with good intentions. Neither accusing the messenger of personal misdeeds nor giving examples of the trespasses of others can mitigate the harm done as a result of practices by a couple of Commissioners that undermined the integrity of the arbitration process and the rule of law in general. It is with great concern that I have addressed the issues discussed in this article.

The Government of Ethiopia has every right to void all agreements, including the Algiers Agreement, and to reject the entire decision of the Commission. Ethiopia cannot be obliged to accept a decision by a Commission that is corrupted where some members of the Commission have compromised their duty to exercise �independence� and �high moral� standards. It is not important to show that all and every member of the Commission is involved in such conflict of interest. As long as one can show at least one member is involved in such conflict of interest, the entire proceeding and all decisions thereof, which flowed from such process, are tainted, thus void. Ethiopia should demand the disqualification of the President of the Commission, Elihu Lauterpacht, for conflict of interest and corruption.

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Copyright � by Phineaus St. Claire, Washington DC. December 15 2005.