Blue Nile Treaties : for Ethiopia or Egypt ?
Getachew Sisay

 One of the peculiar features in management and allocation of Nile River is the absence of single term of agreement or treaty that represents all of the ten riparian states (Hillawi, 1998; Hultin, 1995; Girma, 2000). The practical application and acceptability of the existing partially established treaties are not back up by any comprehensive agreement of all riparian countries and hence lacking enforcement power. The governing power and conflict solving capacity is, therefore, uncertain and inefficient.  This is not, in fact, different from the global experience as described by Elhance (1999). 

 The current status of affairs with the use and distribution of Nile water in general and Blue Nile in particular is based on several historical agreements. Some of them were formulated and signature by the colonial administer of the regions. Allan (1999) briefly explained that the water of the Nile Basin was influenced by the United Kingdom, which directly or indirectly controlled the political economy of the basin. The surprising character of these treaties is that almost all of them were intentionally crafted to benefit Egypt and offered unlimited freedom to dominate and be a monopoly superpower in the region. The British is responsible for the ever-arising conflict that would happen since it is the main architects of these treaties (Daniel, 1999). 

 Discussion on some of the treaties on Blue Nile is sufficient to grasp and understand the conflict of interests on the whole watercourse of the Nile since the lion�s share of the Nile water is from the Blue Nile. The case of Blue Nile is sufficiently enough to explain the cause for the inability of Ethiopia to use other potential water resources. In addition, Ethiopia is the only never colonized country for which none of treaties signed on its foot. For seek of clarity those treaties that are prominent source of conflicts, where Ethiopia is being part or affected by, was dealt briefly in chorological sequences.

I) The 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Accord

This accord was made between the Ethiopian King and Great Britain (for Sudan). The main framework of this agreement was in Article III where the Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia promised,� not to construct or allowed to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat (Baro) �� (Berber, 1959; Hillawi, 1998). Since Britain is no more represent Sudan, the agreement was never ratify by Ethiopia Crown Council or British Parliament (Daniel, 1999) and the situation on the use of water have changed dramatically rendering the inapplicability of the article (Girma, 1997).

II) The 1925 Anglo-Italian Exchange of Notes

After the failure of another 1906 Tripartite Treaty (among British, Italy and France), British, however, continued to pursue vigorously its interest in controlling the headwater of the Blue Nile. This was the stealth agreement between Britain and Italy for which Ethiopia had denounced the secret deal and brought the matter before the then League of Nations (Daniel, 1999)[3]. The agreement, inter alia, had thought to recognize the prior hydraulic right of Egypt and the Sudan (Hillawi, 1998).

 III) The 1929 Nile Agreement between Egypt and Britain (Sudan)

 The exchange of agreement took place between Great Britain and Egypt. The main contested part was �no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the river Nile and its branch or on the lakes from which it in so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration� (Barber, 1959). Pessimistically, the doom feature of this accord was the British acknowledgement of the natural and historic right of Egypt and safeguarding of those rights as a fundamental principle of its policy. As defended by Barber (ibid) these are strictly the opposite of legal rights and fundamental principle of international law. Since Ethiopia had never been a British colony, or any other, this agreement had no legal effect (Daniel, 1999). Girma (1997) stated Ethiopian position, �According to the principle of treaty making, a treaty made between two parties cannot have a binding effect on a third party without res inter alios acta�.

  IV) The 1959 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt

Even though the previous treaties had their own potential conflict of interests, the conflict has attained its zenith and intolerable limit at this time when almost fully water recipient Egypt and Sudan agreed a so-called �Full Utilization of the Nile Water�. Besides, it is still a puzzle how the agreement between two nearly non-water contributories, among ten countries, can claim full utilization. The agreement was designed to allocate 55.5 billion cubic meters (75%) to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters (25%) to Sudan (Hillawi, 1998; Daniel, 1999; Girma, 1997; Elhance, 1999). Girma (2002) describes this unfair scrap as �Nile starts in Sudan and ends in Egypt�.  According to Allan (1999) the core objective of this agreement was Egypt�s wish to control Ethiopian flood by creating storage at its southern border with Sudan.

 Egypt found it important to seek guarantee from Sudan and international recognition for financing and technology of the dam by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) - the World Bank group. The central point is that why do provision had not been taken for upstream riparian states where their land offers this blessing. What did they rely on to do so? What do force upstream countries simply give their blessing while they are severely affected by drought and famine? Why did the World Bank, IBRD, give greater consideration to the right of Egypt? It is still a mystery but indicates its robust affiliation and support.

More strikingly, more than four decades later, Egypt and Sudan have alleged that the agreement still serve as a binding for the Nile Basin River (Hillawi, 1998). It has plainly displayed the historical and profound negligence of Egypt and Sudan towards other upstream countries. Generally speaking, this agreement could be criticized as being too rigid and incomprehensive.  Rigid in a scene that, it didn�t take into account the underlining environmental, socio-economic and political changes that the basin countries experienced. (Hultin, 1995). It didn�t give any alternative loophole for further negotiation and then cooperation. This has aggravated the existing conflicts. Besides, all concerned countries didn�t participate or consulted or ratify in the process, hence it lacked comprehensiveness.

 Egypt and Hydro-politics on Blue Nile River

 One of the leading experts in the area, Elhance, defines hydro-politics as �a systematic study of the conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders� (Elhance, 1999). It is apparent that states sharing rivers or lakes or even ground waters naturally form highly interdependent unit in many aspects. Hence economic, political, social, cultural and secular dynamics are intimately tied to the hydro-politics. More significantly, in the condition of external influence, unfair allocation, over exploitation by few states, and natural and non natural trend in the increasing scarcity of water have led the hydro-politics of the region more and more sever. Some times, countries could engage in armed conflict to maintain their national interest. 

 The main player in the hydro-politics of the Nile River in general and the Blue Nile in particular is definitely Egypt. In historical opportunities and under the auspices of strong alliance, Egypt has dominated and led the hydro-politics of this poor region. One can easily confirm this fact by looking its policies and the speech addressed by its leaders. Needless to say, without the water of Nile, Egypt is totally a vast desert land (98% of the total land except small Mediterranean strip and the narrow Nile valley). Its civilization and development depends on the Nile.

 As early as the fourth century B. C., Herodotus observed that Egypt was a gift of the Nile (But Nile is not a gift of Egypt) (Daniel, 1999). No country in the world, however, is more dependent on irrigated agriculture than Egypt (Hultin, 1995). In addition, Nile is a source of hydroelectric power, drinking and sanitation water, industrial bases, tourism, and fishing. The ability of Egypt to get the monopoly power over Nile has helped to control the hydro-politics of the region. In like manner, this enables to build up what is need for the development of the country. It has favored to vest power for facilitating and manipulating legal, environmental, social, economics and political concerns in the benefit of itself, some times to Sudan. Diplomatic efficiency, the availability of potential human resources and the attachment with influential countries and donors and their affiliation are some of the inherent strength to exploit the resources than any riparian. Egypt has extra ordinary skill to judge and balance the international politics along its national priority.

 For its national priority, it has definitely persuaded opposite political direction with Ethiopia. During the Emperor regime of Haile Selasea I, Ethiopia had close relation with USA. The counterpart, Egypt had hand-glove relation with the former Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Zionist Soviet Union and East Germany. By using its close tie, it was able to construct the gigantic Aswan High Dam. At Ethiopian Socialist era, Egypt converted to the Western bloc, moreover attracted the immediate attention of USA and stands next to Israel, the second economic and military support beneficiary.

 In addition, the representatives of Egypt have reflected the hydro-politics and the subsequent conflict of interest in various occasions. Late President Anuar Sadat warned Ethiopia, �Any action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war� (Daniel, 1999). In 1979 just after signing the peace treaty with Israel, he added, �The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water� (Hultin, 1995).

The former UN Secretary General Mr. Butrous Butrous Ghali is widely known by his repeated anxiety about the conflict on the Nile. At time when he was Egypt�s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made the following speech, �The national security of Egypt, which is the based on the water of the Nile, is in the hand of other African countries (Ethiopia). The next war in our region will be over the water of the Nile� (Ibid). I am witness that the current president Hussen Moubarak has threatened to bomb Ethiopia if it plans to build any dams on the Blue Nile.

 Egypt has a firm conviction that the new instrument should by no way affect the existing ridiculous water agreement (Caflish, 1998). It has continued in the implementation of huge and extensive projects even by diverting the natural flow of the Nile without consulting other rightful riparian countries. For country that has such extremist stand expecting negotiation, cooperation, and equitable utilization in a peaceful manner is reliably absurd.  That is why, until now, the hydro-polices of Nile water is a Zero-Sum game win by Egypt. Tony Allan, a leading scholar and scientists on the water issue in general and the Nile in particular, pointing out the injustice in the Egyptian position and calls the plan �preposterous, a national fantasy� (Kinfe, 2000b).

With its firm conviction of the 1959 so called �Full Utilization�, Egypt is generally unwilling to have any further negotiation. Moreover, it obsolete fashioned doctrine of �primary need, prior user and acquired water user� is the impediment for any agreements. Frequency of drought, climatic changes and population pressure in Ethiopia lead to enviable demand of Nile water than any time before. Hence, pessimistically, the existing conflict of interests, even war, would continue as far as Egypt�s position is towards only maintaining its unilateral national affairs.

The Position of Ethiopia on Nile issues

Ethiopia has never ever accepted unilateral agreements for their perilous prejudice. According to Hillawi (1998), during 1959 it claimed, �Ethiopia has reserved the right to utilize the water resources of the Nile for the benefit of its people, whatever might be the measure of such waters sought by riparian states�. Irrespective of the type of regime in Addis Ababa, the position of Ethiopia is one and one - to have a win- win solution and legitimate right to use the Nile water for the socio-economic development of the country and the region as a whole. In addition to the historical reference of �natural and territorial right�, Ethiopia has to utilize its water to feed the people. No one is requested to offer this legitimate right at all.

 Ethiopia has a firm belief of accepting negotiation in good faith and confidence, on the basis of equitable utilization. Through this, the riparian states of the Nile can avoid the danger of engaging in competitive and conflicting use of the water. Ethiopia needs a flexible and comprehensive agreement that takes in to account the socio-economic and natural conditions of the riparian in the shortest possible time. According to Ethiopia, efficient utilization based on research and conserving the environment for sustainable uses should be adopted for mutual benefit of all.

 The president of Ethiopian International Institute of Peace and Development (EIIPD), Professor Kinfe Abreha, expresses the Ethiopian status as follows:

 In any genuine attempt to tackle the problem of food and energy, Ethiopia has no option but effectively use her Nile waters for consumptive and non-consump�tive purposes. There is no legal or institutional obligation, which de�tracts Ethiopian policy makers as well as planners from fulfilling this duty in the best interest of their people (Kinfe, 2000b).

This is also in line with the UN convention on the equitable and sustainable utilization of the country�s resources with in its territory as an attribute to its sovereignty. Nevertheless, while the right of Ethiopia to utilize its water resources remains valid, its desire to reach an agreement on allocation has persisted for the simple reasons that it is firmly committed to peace and a win-win situation, which can be derived from cooperation (Ibid).

SELECTED OTHER READINGS

• ALLAN, Tony (1999) The Nile: Evolving Approaches of the Nile Water Management. SOAS Water Issues Study Group, Occasional Papers. London, University of London; School of Oriental and African Studies.

• ALLAN, Tony (2001) The Middle East Water Question: Hydrropolitics and the Global Economy. New York, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

• ALLEN, Andrew (2002) International Law and International Lenders: Protecting Rich Countries on the Nile? On-line available at www.iwlri/Documents/studentsMaterial/AndrewAllan/Nile (Accessed on 14/01/2003)

•  BERBER, F.J. (1959) Rivers in International Law. London; Stevens & Sons Limited.

• CAFLISCH, Lucius (1998) Regulation of the Uses of International Watercourses. in SALMAN, Salman M. A. and de CHAZOURNES, L. B.(ed.)  (1998)

•  DANIEL, Kendie, (1999) Egypt and the Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River. Northeast African Studies, Henderson; Henderson State University, Vol. 6, No. 1-2, pp. 141-169..

•  ELHANCE, P. Arun(1999) Hydro-politics in the 3rd world: Conflict and Cooperation in the International River Basins. Washington D.C; United State Institute of Peace Press.

•  FDRE- MWR (2000) Water Policy of Ethiopian., Addis Ababa.

•  FDRE - SDPRSP (2002) Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Addis Ababa.

• FISSEHA, Yimer (1997) The convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Waterways: An Assessment. Ethiopscope, Addis Ababa, Quarterly Magazine of Foreign Minister of Ethiopia. Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 13-19.

•  FOOD AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (1997) Irrigation potential in Africa. Land and Water Bulletin, No.4. Italy, Rome.

•  GIRMA, Amare (1997) The Nile Water: the Imperative need for Negotiation on its Utilization. Ethiopscope, Addis Ababa, Quarterly Magazine of the Foreign  Minister of Ethiopia, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 3-12.

•  GIRMA, Amare (2000) Nile Waters- Hydrological Cooperation Vs Hydropolitics. Paper  Presented for the 8 th Nile 2002 Conference, Addis Ababa,  26 June.

•  HILLAWI, Tadesse (1998) The Nile River Basin: Its Use and Development. Ethiopscope, Addis Ababa, Quarterly Magazine of Foreign  Minister of Ethiopia, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 13-23.

•  HULTIN, Jan (1995)The Nile: Source of Life, Source of Conflict. in OHLESSEN, Lief (1995) (ed.) Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraints, New Jersey, Atlantic Highlands

• KINFE, Abraham (2000a) Nile Hurdles: Psycho-Political Roadblocks to an Agreement and the way forward toward a Rapprochement. Occasional Paper, Series No. 14, Addis Ababa, EIIPD.

• KINFE, Abraham (2000b) Nile Imperatives: Avenue toward a Win-Win Situation. Occasional Paper, Series No. 15, Addis Ababa, EIIPD.

•  McCAFFREY, Stephen. 1998. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls. in SALMAN, Salman M. A. and de CHAZOURNES, L. B. (1998) (ed.)

• NILE BASIN INITIATIVE (NBI) web site www.nilebasin.org/index.htm

•  OHLESSEN, Lief.(ed.) (1995) Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraints. Atlantic Highlands: New Jersey.

•  SALMAN, Salman M. A. & de CHAZOURNES, L. B. (ed.) (1998). International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflicts. Proceeding of a World Bank Seminar, Washington, D.C, World Bank Technical Paper No. 414.