�APOCALYPSE
SOON.� REALLY? AND WHO CARES?
By
Tecola W. Hagos
PART ONE
I. Introduction
�You
hypocrite, first take the plank out of your eye, and then you will
see clearly to remove the speck from your brother's eye.� [Luke 6:
42] There is a very interesting article by Robert S. McNamara in the
May/June issue of FP
[Foreign Policy], on the danger of stockpiling nuclear
weapons and their accidental or intentional use. [Robert S.
McNamara, �Apocalypse Soon,� FP
[Foreign Policy], May/June, 2005, pp29-35.]. McNamara has
been often portrayed as the hawkish Defense Secretary during the
Vietnam War. Now it has come to light also, even more importantly,
that he was the central player during the Cuban missile crises,
which incident is used by McNamara in his article as his main point
to fortify his concern about the possibility of
the use of nuclear weapons intentionally. McNamara stressed
the fact how close the two Super Powers were to a nuclear all-out
war during the Cuban missile crisis.
Even though we may
be skeptical to listen to newly converted �peace activists� and
cheerleaders for the Democratic Party campaign against George Bush
in the 2005 Presidential Election, it is important that we really
consider the ramification of the article by McNamara. [The article
by McNamara may be considered as an extension of the spellbinding
and brilliant presentation by Michael Moore of the documentary
featuring McNamara in The
Fog of War.] This is one example where age (growing old
gracefully) definitely has imparted wisdom to an individual. I have
never been a great fan of McNamara. In fact, his performance at the
World Bank (or the lack of it), and his role during the Vietnam War,
directly or indirectly responsible for the death of millions of
human beings, is not something that can be easily forgotten or
forgiven. McNamara has admitted in his narrative in
The Fog of War that he and others could have been tried
for war crimes had there been a trial [like in Nuremberg]. My
general feeling is that no matter what McNamara might have done or
failed to have done in his heydays, he has now truly mended his
mistakes, and is teaching as all not to get caught in a kind of
political or power loop where we find ourselves helplessly carried
into making decisions that would hurt far too many fellow human
beings.
McNamara opened his
essay with an important all-inclusive thesis, which sadly he did not
fully develop because of the limits usually set to articles in
journals and magazines of that nature. He wrote, �It is
time�well past time, in my view�for the United States to cease
its Cold War-style reliance on nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy
tool. At the risk of appearing simplistic and provocative, I
would characterize current U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral,
illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous. The
risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch is unacceptably
high.� [Emphasis
added] In this article, by way of providing some of the missing
foundation for the rhetoric of the essay by McNamara, I will attempt
to develop the moral and legal basis for the argument to ban
completely nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. And then, I
will challenge the activities and the right to maintain nuclear
weapon arsenal by the Permanent Members of the Security Council.
II. Legal Basis for Banning Nuclear Weapons
A. General Principles of International law and Practices
The first item one
must consider in the effort to get rid of nuclear weapons is to look
into the development of international law and principles. The
�international law and principles� I am referring to here is not
the narrowly understood instrumentalist or constructivist
(positivist) international law and principles, but the far more
deeply seated normative international law that has its roots firmly
planted in Platonist-stoic natural law. It is a fact that jurists
writing on international law avoid the direct question of what
international law is and opt to address the question of sources of
international law and principles instead. The sources of
international law and principles are commonly understood to be
multifaceted as indicated in Article 38 of the Charter of the United
Nations Statute of the International Court of Justice. The
multiplicity of sources does not mean relativism and conditionality,
for all sources are oriented toward one goal. For the purpose of our
discussion we need to acknowledge foremost that societies through
the ages have made a distinction between the way societies in
conflict justified their cause for going to war from how their
soldiers conducted themselves in the actual battles. In our modern
parlance we now have the concept of a �just war� properly
bisected into two sets of principles that are identified by Latin
phrases�the jus ad bellum
and the jus in bello.
1. �Just Cause� vs. �Just War�
�I dare say you
love him not so ill, to wish him here alone, howsoever you speak
this to feel other men's minds: methinks I could not die any where
so contented as in the king's company; his cause being just and
his quarrel honourable.� [Shakespeare, Henry V: Act 4.
Emphasis added.]
The idea of a
�just cause� to go to war may be distinguished from the idea of
a �just war.� In the sense that a �just cause� may deal with
problems involving the leadership in carrying out its executive
duties and commitments, whereas a �just war� involves the
nation as a whole on questions of national survival and serious threat
to the existence and security of a nation. In that sense going to
war for territorial acquisition in the past may have an element of a
just cause, for example, but it does not necessarily constitute a
just war. The quotation from Henry V above may be considered as a
dramatist�s interpretation of the implied distinction between �a
just cause� and �a just war.� The philosopher-historian Howard
Zinn made that important distinction in one of his incisive articles
on war and human suffering. �I believe
that the progressive supporters of the war have confused a �just
cause� with a �just war.� There are unjust causes, such as the
attempt of the United States to establish its power in Vietnam, or
to dominate Panama or Grenada, or to subvert the government of
Nicaragua. And a cause may be just--getting North Korea to withdraw
from South Korea, getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, or
ending terrorism--but it does not follow that going to war on behalf
of that cause, with the inevitable mayhem that follows, is just.�
[Howard Zinn, �A Just Cause, Not a Just War,� The Progressive,
December, 2001.]
The �just war�
concept is a modern condensation of ideas developed over the ages
throughout all civilizations predating Christianity. The reason for
going to war and how one conducts oneself in the actual battle
ground had preoccupied mankind throughout the world. The great epic
stories told over and over in all societies about great wars and
great warriors often spoke of �just wars� and heroic conducts of
warriors. No one is undermining here the atrocities of wars of past
or of the present times. War is horrible, thus speaking of �just
war� is simply a paradigm of limited value. If we confine
ourselves for a moment to the Christian world in following the
development of the �just war� idea leading to some of the
institutions and legal regimes of our time, it might help us relate
and even sympathize with those who advocate for total banning of
nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.
Early Christians were pacifists. In fact, it was only after
Christianity became a state religion during Constantine�s reign in
AD 313, that Christians had resorted to the use of violence to
defend against �barbarians� from the North in order to preserve
their newly acquired empire. The New Testament had hitherto provided
the authority for not defending oneself against persecution and
violence. The stoic philosophy of the time must have influenced
greatly the Christian pacifist theology. However, with Christianity
becoming a religion of the �State,� some change had to be made
from pacifism to active engagement in wars.
By AD 400, the
challenge to Rome was taking its toll and non-Christian Romans
blamed Christian pacifism as the cause of the decline of the Roman
Empire. St Augustine provided the first comprehensive concept of the
�just war� whereby Christian Emperors may defend their Christian
empire without violating God�s commandment and the teachings of
the Christ of love and peace. Augustine found authority in the Old
Testament wherein �violence� is the main stay of both God and
man, in order to justify the new Christian leaders to be able to
fight without breaking any of the biblical commandments or violating
the teachings of the Christ.
[The teaching of the
Christ is so radically different from the stories and principles in
the Old Testament that any parallel or derivative relationship
claimed by politicians and theologians throughout the ages is
absolutely bogus and serves a utilitarian and not religious truth.
The Old Testament glorifies and endorses the most perverse and
savage acts of genocide over and over, and no amount of
interpretation and doctoring of the text would remedy that defect.
At any rate, whatever religious text I have read, and I have read
several, I find mankind, with such limited resources and fragile
body, cast out naked with nothing more than his capacity to reason,
to be far nobler and far more worthy of respect in his deeds and his
pitiful struggle to survive than the �God� or �Gods and
Goddesses� supposedly creators of the universe. For example,
neither the Holocaust nor the Genocide in Rwanda, where millions of
innocent human beings were murdered by utterly savage leaders
(representing defects in mankind), could even amount to a fraction
of the destruction of the entire world as was caused by the acts of
a vengeful God who wanted to punish a few sinners by flooding the
entire world, as reported in the Old Testament, in the story of the
�Flood� of Noah�s time.]
It is extremely rare to find
the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello used
before 1930. Neither was mentioned during the 1899 and 1907 Peace
Conferences, among whose aims was codification of the law of war.
Enriques used the term jus ad
bellum in 1928, having apparently invented it on the spot to
serve a specific need. Keydel drew a clear distinction between the
two branches of the law in a well-researched thesis on recourse to
war published in 1931 in a scholarly review edited by Professor
Strupp, but did not use the terms in question. Keydel, like Strupp
himself, diligently enumerated all the Latin words and expressions
relating to the matter. It may be concluded, therefore, that up to
the early 1930s the terms jus
ad bellum and jus in bello
had no currency. They began to gain recognition towards the middle
of the decade, in particular, it would seem, at the prompting of the
School of Vienna. Among
the first to use these terms was Josef Kunz, who may well be the one
who coined them. Kunz had a gift for formulating precise concepts
and giving them incisive Latin names (he later came up with the term
bellum legale); the
phrases we are concerned with appear in an article he published in
1934 and a book that followed in 1935. Two years later, Alfred
Verdross used the term jus in
bello in exactly the same way as Kunz, placing it in parentheses
after the word Kriegsrecht in his handbook on public
international law. The chapter on recourse to force was published
only in the second edition, and here the term jus
ad bellum appeared. Around the same time, R. Regout made frequent use
of both terms in his book on the doctrine of just war, making it
clear from the outset that they reflected a fundamental distinction,
and W. Ballis followed suit. It is impossible to say whether these
were independent developments or otherwise.� [International
Review of the Red Cross no
320, p.553-562 by Robert Kolb, �Origin of the twin terms
jus ad bellum/jus in bello.�
Footnotes omitted.]
After the Second
World War, the community of nations created the United Nations.
Ethiopia was one of the founding members of the United Nations
represented by its highly capable international law expert, Aklilu
Habtewold. In the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, the
community of nations declared their primary reason for the creation
of the United Nations: �to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind.� In the operative or substantive provisions of
the Charter in Chapter VI it is envisioned that all conflicts would
be resolved peacefully. Even the case of self-defense against �an
armed attack,� the problem is addressed as an exception to the
principle of peaceful conflict resolution as stated in Article 51 of
Chapter VI.
In his 1960 book, We
Hold These Truths, John Courtney Murray, S.J., the American
theologian, put together the many ethical and legal principles of a
�just war,� principles that were developed over the centuries,
into a unified whole. The Catholic Bishops of America in 1983 issued
a pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, on banning the use
of nuclear weapons even in cases as a counter deterrence, and they
also reaffirmed the �just war� international principles that had
evolved from the days of St. Augustine to the modern times. [U.S.
Catholic Conference, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and
Our Response (Washington, D.C., 1983.)]
2.
The United Nations System and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)
The General Assembly of the United Nations by Resolution
1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, has declared that the use of nuclear
weapons is "a direct violation of the Charter of the United
Nations" and "is contrary to the rules of international
law and to the laws of humanity", and that any State using
nuclear weapons is to be considered "as committing a crime
against mankind and civilization." Resolution 1653 (XVI) was
adopted by a vote of 55 to 20, with 26 abstentions. Four of the five
Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations
voted against that Resolution. That fact should not impress us at
all, for the Members were already amassed huge stockpile of nuclear
weapons in their arsenals. Moreover, there were also other
subsequent resolutions, such as Resolution 36/92 I, which called for
the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
The ICJ, initially declined to give
its opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
when requested by the World Health Organization (WHO). The Court
stated, �It is not able to give the advisory opinion which was
requested of it under World Health Assembly resolution WHA46.40
dated 14 May 1993.� However, the United Nations General Assembly,
stepping into the occasion, by Resolution 49/75 K, adopted on
15 December 1994, transmitted to the ICJ an identical
question to the question earlier sent by WHO. The United Nations
General Assembly asked, �Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance permitted under international law?� The ICJ in
an advisory opinion rendered by a divided court, with the President
casting the deciding vote, stated that it could not definitively
render an opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapon
although it did state it is would be an exceptional situation of
self-defense that the use of such weapon may be considered.
The ICJ rejected the argument to draw
by analogy a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons to be
specifically prohibited on the basis of certain provisions of the
Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to the
Hague Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Geneva
Protocol. Further more the Court rejected any inference to be made
to recent international agreements with the development and
stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. In Paragraph 57, the
Court stated, �The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass
destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments. The most
recent such instruments are the Convention of 10 April 1972 on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
destruction, which prohibits the possession of bacteriological and
toxic weapons and reinforces the prohibition of their use, and the
Convention of 13 January 1993 on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, which prohibits all use of chemical weapons and
requires the destruction of existing stocks. Each of these
instruments has been negotiated and adopted in its own context and
for its own reasons. The Court does not find any specific
prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons in treaties expressly
prohibiting the use of certain weapons of mass destruction.� [Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996. para. 57]
However, when it comes to the use of
nuclear weapons, the Court held that the rules [humanitarian law]
dealing with the conduct of war jus
in bello are applicable. Nevertheless, that is no news at all
because all of the governments with nuclear weapons in their arsenal
have in some form acknowledged that fact. The ICJ taking out time to
answer a point of lest controversy, in so many words, what is not
really challenged to begin with, is a form of lessening the impact
of its unconscionable and wrong decision on the primary question on
the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of
principle. At any rate, here is the statement by the majority on the
issue of the conduct of war with the use of nuclear weapons. The
Court stated in Paragraph 87, �Finally, the Court points to the
Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and applicability is not
to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules of
humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons.� [Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1996. para. 87]
B. The �Non-Proliferation� International Legal Regime
"Why do you
look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no
attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your
brother, 'Brother, let me take the speck out of your eye,' when you
yourself fail to see the plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first
take the plank out of your eye, and then you will see clearly to
remove the speck from your brother's eye.� [Luke 6:41-42] The
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for
signature in 1968 and was entered into force on 5 March 1970.
Ethiopia signed the Treaty on 5 September 1968 and deposited its
instrument of ratification on 5 February 1970. So far, one hundred
eighty nine states are parties to the Treaty.
The few countries
that have not ratified the Treaty such as Israel, Pakistan, and
India have developed their nuclear weapons despite the concern of
the world community of nations. Moreover, even countries that are
parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other related treaties,
such as Argentina, Brazil, et cetera did develop nuclear weapons and
later claimed they have closed down their programs. However,
countries such as Iran and North Korea are openly pursuing and
developing nuclear weapons. The point here is that, it is very
difficult to ban nuclear weapons when there is an exclusive club of
nations with nuclear weapons. The task is particularly difficult
when you have leaders in the United States government, a government
with a record of using nuclear weapons on civilian population for
which it has not fully accounted for as yet, ever boasting and
threatening other nations in conflict with the imperialistic foreign
policy of the United States.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as all subsequent ramifications by
United Nations Resolutions to control the spread of nuclear weapons
and the expertise on the building of such powerful weapons and their
delivery systems were all inherently flawed. The idea of
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the effort to control the
transfer of the technical expertise was first proposed by the Soviet
Union attempting to contain the number of nations with possible
nuclear weapons threatening its very existence. However, it seems
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is aimed to protect those who
already have nuclear weapons�the five United Nations Security
Council Members�rather than the elimination of all nuclear weapons
in the world. None of the provisions of the Treaty required those
nations to destroy or in any meaning full manner to reduce their
nuclear weapons. The relevant article for such purpose has no bite
because it is a wish list rather than a provision with
serious time schedule for disarmament, supervisory power to
investigate national governments military industry, international
agency responsible for disarmament, annual report on the progress of
the disarmament et cetera. It is Article VI of the 1968 Treaty that has the clearest
statement about taking steps to towards the elimination nuclear
weapons, the rest are negative statements about not doing something.
�Article VI: Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.�
Most of the 1968
Treaty articles are open-ended and none has a timeline for those
nations with nuclear weapons to stop further production of nuclear
weapons. In fact, the opposite seems to have happened since 1968
such that the nuclear power nations have either increased their
production of nuclear weapons, or even where they profess
elimination of some weapon systems, they have, as a matter of fact,
upgraded the technology and effectiveness of their nuclear arsenal.
In other words, it is clear that the Treaty was biased toward
maintaining the dominant position of the Western World over the rest
of the nations of the World. Because
of the devastation caused by the detonation the nuclear bombs as
evidenced in the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nations
of the world were very eager to sign anything that would help
minimize such occurrence from being repeated elsewhere in the world.
As of now, one hundred eighty nine governments have signed or
ratified the Treaty. Nevertheless, for the last forty years, the
world has witnessed the arrogance of Western nations, specially that
of the United States that has been at war with the world somewhere
directly or through surrogates. These western nations rather than
disarming they have upgraded the quality of their weapons, have
created new ones, and have been spending more money training their
military. They have been selling military hard ware, and training
military personnel all over the world thereby have created
conditions for conflict and the means to carry out such conflicts.
The fact of the existence of the 1968
Treaty, even though severely inadequate in its impact, points to the
fact that the world community does not want weapon of such
destructive power to be in anyone�s arsenal.
We also have to consider the 1968 Treaty in relation and as
part of the United Nations Disarmament Commission�s Work and the
Disarmament Conferences. There have been also several international
agreements entered between the United States and the Soviet Union
dealing with the reduction and outright banning of particular types
of weapon systems.
In my view, Judge Weeramantry's
dissenting opinion is the finest ever rendered by a judge at the ICJ
from the time of the establishment of that Court. Judge Weeramantry
stated in his opinion that as a matter of customary international
law, multilateral treaties/agreements, and as a matter of
ethics/morality the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapon
is absolutely prohibited. He further explained that international
law principles are not limited to Western traditions, but also the
fact that there was also equally rich tradition in other parts of
the world dealing with issues of the �just war� concepts of jus
ad bellum and jus in bello.
This is consistent with Article 38 (b) and (c) of the Charter of the
United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Judge Weeramantry, coming from one of
the great civilizations of the world, correctly cited a great
international customary law and principle from his part of the
World: �The Mahabharatha relates the story of an epic
struggle between the Kauravas and the Pandavas. It refers likewise
to the principle forbidding hyper-destructive weapons when it
records that: Arjuna, observing the laws of war, refrained from
using the 'pasupathastra', a hyper-destructive weapon,
because when the fight was restricted to ordinary conventional
weapons, the use of extraordinary or unconventional types was not
even moral, let alone in conformity with religion or the recognized
laws of warfare. Weapons causing unnecessary suffering were also
banned by the Laws of Manu as, for example, arrows with hooked
spikes which, after entering the body would be difficult to take
out, or arrows with heated or poisoned tips.� [Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports, 1996, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry.]
Although
both Judge Weeramantry and Judge Schwebel (Stephen M.)
criticized the Court�s refusal to render an opinion on the use of
nuclear weapon in case of self-defence, their understanding or
appreciation of the corpus
(source) of international law is dramatically different. Judge
Weeramantry�s dissenting opinion has as its basis both the
authority of the letter of the law and the spirit
of Article 38 (b) and (c) of the Charter of the United
Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is
progressive and normative. By contrast, Judge Schwebel dissenting
opinion is arrogantly positivistic, limited in its scope, and
narrowly patrician in the extreme. Moreover, there is very serious
flaw in his reasoning dealing with the role of the United Nations
General Assembly in the progressive development of international law
principles and norms. [See
Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports, 1996, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel.]
There is no doubt in my mind that the
divided international Court agonized on its decision. The court
seems to have found itself in a peculiar area of supposedly
uncharted legal wilderness full of dangerous pitfalls. It
compromised principles for principles plus expediency in its halfway
decent opinion. It is in this regard that the opinion of Judge
Weeramantry is fresh and unique breath of life in an otherwise
disappointing advisory opinion. It is worth our time to quote the
respected Judge�s concluding remark both as a statement of great
legal principle and moral authority to follow in the future. The
Judge stated, �In this Opinion I have set down my conclusions as
to the law. While conscious of the magnitude of the issues, I have
focused my attention on the law as it is - on the numerous
principles worked out by customary international law, and
humanitarian law in particular, which cover the particular instances
of the damage caused by nuclear weapons. As stated at the outset, my
considered opinion on this matter is that the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons is incompatible with international law and with
the very foundations on which that system rests. I have sought in
this Opinion to set out my reasons in some detail and to state why
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is absolutely prohibited
by existing law - in all circumstances and without
reservation. It comforts me that these legal conclusions accord
also with what I perceive to be the moralities of the matter and the
interests of humanity.� [Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports, 1996, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry.
Emphasis in the original]
C.
The Genocide Convention of 1948
I believe that Article II of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 1948 is authoritatively a source of international law principle
to ban the use of nuclear weapons completely. Even though the
Genocide Convention was signed after the end of World War II, its
main principles were derived from existing international customary
law and practices as well as numerous treaties signed by different
states in conflict throughout the ages.
One good starting point to examine the
applicability of the Genocide Convention to ban the use of nuclear
weapons under all circumstances is to examine the situation leading
up to the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Taking into account the United States Government�s propaganda and
widely circulated anti-Japanese rhetoric through the media of the
time, and studying carefully the reasoning behind the internment of
American citizens with Japanese ancestry that seems to have been
carried out for no other reason but for fear or suspicion based on
race, before the dropping of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with hundreds of thousands of civilian population, one must
conclude that the act of the United States Government as a racist
genocidal act per se. It
can be inferred that any such use of weapon of mass destruction
necessarily would have elements of racism if ever used against
ethnically different nations.
The very stockpiling and use of such
weapons would have in it criminal intent of killing non-combatants
in violation of several United Nations treaties and resolutions. It
serves no military purpose. It is not even an issue of the reckless
disregard of the lives of non-combatants, but a deliberate
cold-blooded murder of hundreds of thousands of protected persons by
numerous international law principles and practices.
END OF PART ONE
Tecola W. Hagos
15 July 2005
NEXT:
PART
TWO: The Ethical and Moral Ground For Banning Nuclear Weapons
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