The Somalia Crisis: Eye on the Big Picture

By Hanna Yohannes

Although events in the Horn of Africa (e.g., war, famine, natural disasters, and unending fundamental political disagreements) tend to be portrayed sensationally, we must not lose sight of the basic realities of the region.  However unpalatable to some, here are three realities (among many) that all concerned parties should live with; and the sooner they accept such realities, the better for the stability of the Horn of Africa.

Reality #1:  Ethiopia is the Horn of Africa

First, with the exception of a small Somali nation in the South East and a small Eritrean nation in the North, there are several time-tested evidences to suggest that the greater number of people in the Horn of Africa prefer to live in �Ethiopia� and strongly identify with an �Ethiopian� identity.  This is true in spite of the fact that there is tremendous debate on centralization vs. decentralization of the Ethiopian state, culture, language, economic system and political system.  Irrespective of how some choose to represent such contentious issues, such debate is actually very healthy for Ethiopia.  Second, we must appreciate the important fact that over eighty-five percent (85%) of the people in the Horn of Africa currently live in Ethiopia.  Despite the large land mass of Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, there is relatively few people living in these mostly desert countries.  Third, it is also a historical fact that the only relatively stable country in the Horn of Africa that has stood the test of time is Ethiopia.  Unlike Ethiopia, the other countries are ever-changing entities and were/are carved out in conferences across the globe by interested parties or by less-farsighted Ethiopian rulers.  (Djibouti is nothing more than a French outpost that should have been legally returned to Ethiopia in the late twentieth century.)  Fourth, the recent secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the severe political repression in Eritrea (no doubt suppression of pro-Ethiopia elements) is the living proof of the dysfunctional Eritrean state as it is currently formed.  And fifth, Ethiopia has been tested politically, economically and even militarily (�foolishly� comes to mind) by Somalia and Eritrea along with their foreign sponsors.  Each time�past, present and likely future�Ethiopia has defended itself well and then some.   

Reality #2:  Poverty = Ignorance = Foreign Manipulation

As the timeless saying (most recently attributed to Alexander Hamilton) goes, �To control a man�s sustenance is to control his will�.  Despite the patriotism calls in Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, and religious incitation in Somalia, we must not lose sight of the fact that such �international� conflicts are unfortunate fights between poor people, and that wealthy foreigners easily manipulate these poor people.  Individual exceptions aside, the people of the Horn of Africa are probably the poorest (materially speaking) people on earth.  No doubt that such appalling level of poverty brings along with it tremendous amount of ignorance.   This combination makes the region ripe for foreign manipulation�be it

(1) half-baked ideologies such as communism [mainly Russian/USSR],

(2) zealot religious philosophies such as extremist/fundamentalist, intolerant, political Islam [mainly Middle Eastern],

(3) simple materialism [mainly Chinese] or

(4) complicated materialism [mainly Western].  Of course what makes Western materialism more �complicated� is its selective application of free market ideology and its denial of Ethiopia�s basic security and economic rights.  The unfortunate reality of Ethiopia in our times is that its poverty has turned it into a playground of foolish and selfish foreign experiments.

Reality #3:  Dominance of the Ruling Group

The current leadership team in Ethiopia has played, continues to play and will likely play a major role in the past, present and foreseeable future of Ethiopia.  No Ethiopian political party or other organization has shown as much of a dedication as the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)/Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) to securing, maintaining and exercising power.  The center of power of the organization (EPRDF vs. TPLF, General Membership vs. Central Committee vs. Politburo, Meles vs. the Collective, etc.) is certainly a source of debate.  Nevertheless, the EPRDF/TPLF is a force to be reckoned with and has a place in Ethiopia�s future.

It is only with the acceptance of these realities, and thereby �getting on the same page�, that we can have meaningful discussions about Ethiopia�s foreign policy.

Right to Clean House

In order for peace, democracy and economic growth to permanently settle in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government should do all it can to ensure that law and order prevail in the country and its neighborhood. 

The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) did tremendous damage to the Ethiopian state and its people by challenging Ethiopia, its territorial integrity and the authority of the Ethiopian government among other things.  Most direct, the UIC declared war on Ethiopia.  But even more menacing were its constant pokes to drag Ethiopia down to the chaotic level of Somalia.  For instance, the UIC made the Ethiopian people, especially those living in the Ogaden region, less secure with its ridiculous claims.  [The UIC, and Awyes in particular, seems to hold a dark view of humanity that every ethnic group should live in a state by itself.  The concept of a tolerant, fair, multi-ethnic state seems lost on him and his ilk.]  Moreover, by attempting to block trade with Ethiopia, including shipments through the Port of Djibouti and Somaliland, the UIC eroded confidence in the Ethiopian Birr/economy.  If left unchecked, the UIC would have likely evolved into a permanent menace like Issayas Afewerki and his team in Eritrea.  Ethiopia is justified to attempt to eradicate this menace to its well-being.

~Side Point #1:  The fact that the UIC received so much undeserved (hype) big/international media press coverage (thereby amplifying the damage to Ethiopia and necessitating Ethiopian response) is simply testament to Reality #2.  Other examples of such manipulation include the constant reference across most news wires of �Ethiopia and its arch foe Eritrea�, �Muslim Somalia vs. Christian Ethiopia� and as of late �Muslim Somalia and Ethiopia, which has a large Christian population�.  This is nothing more than a deliberate attempt to position Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia as equals and as constant/mortal enemies.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  (See Reality #1.)

~Side Point #2:  The UIC�s rudimentary understanding of Islam came shining through with its �Jihad Call� against Ethiopia.  Despite its obvious hatred of Ethiopia, the UIC failed to understand that Ethiopia has a much longer and more substantial link to Islam, and its Muslim population is nearly three times that of Somalia.

Grudging Support for the Unknown and the Un-Prioritized

While support for Ethiopia is justified in the current conflict based on the afore-mentioned reasons, it would be a grave mistake to enthusiastically support the efforts of the current Ethiopian government. First and foremost, as recent history of the Ethio-Eritrean war, the botched Algiers Agreement, the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Commission and the current stalemate suggests, there is no guarantee�despite decisive military victory�that the final outcome of hostilities will be in Ethiopia�s interest.  Simply put, this Ethiopian government has been unable to capitalize on military victories to the benefit of all parties.  If history is indicative, the outcome of this war is likely going to be a lose-lose scenario for both Somalia and Ethiopia.

Secondly, it should be acknowledged that the more immediate threat to Ethiopia emanates from the troublesome Eritrean government of Isayas Afewerki.  As such, the war against Somalia seems to be mistakenly prioritized.  Even more fundamentally, as previously discussed, Ethiopia�s real foreign policy threats/challenges emanate from its inability to wipe out the failed ideology of communism, mitigating zealot religious philosophies such as extremist/fundamentalist/intolerant political Islam and containing materialism/exploitation.  We must never forget that the UIC (or the current Eritrean government for that matter) is simply a manifestation of these challenges.  Aweys, Isayas and their supporters are nothing more than poor natives who have been molded into action against their long-term interests.  As such, support for this war should be less than enthusiastic on the grounds that it is a war against �tools�/manipulated poor people; resolution of the problem at hand requires engagement with a whole set of other players.

Third, we must never forget that War is a necessary evil, an ugly event with a lot of collateral damage�and support of it must always be tempered.  Very little doubt that many innocent bystanders (including child soldiers) perished in this conflict.  We must always be sensitive to this fact.  Ethiopia, as the victor, must show magnanimity. By any standard, this war does not fall into the category of �Without a sign, his sward the brave man draws, and asks no omen but his country�s cause�.

Ethiopia�s Real Foreign Policy Challenges

As previously discussed, Ethiopia�s real foreign policy challenges emanate from its inability to wipe out the failed ideology of communism, mitigating zealot religious philosophies and containing exploitation.  Ethiopia does not appear to be presenting a comprehensive response to these challenges coming from all corners of the globe.  Rather than focus on the root causes of these problems, the Ethiopian government has taken a combative stance against weaker entities in its neighborhood that are not worthy of its time and attention.

Ethiopia should focus its attention and meager resources in a new direction.  In fact, a lot of the countries that play a negative role in the Horn of Africa are themselves sitting on fragile political environments and landscapes.  As an example, let�s take a look at Libya and Pakistan and their respective strongmen Colonel Qadhafi and General Musharraf.  Do they play a positive or negative role in the Horn of Africa?  If there is consensus that they are not helping to stabilize the Horn of Africa and pushing it in the right direction, then it should be up to Ethiopia to challenge their activities not only in its neighborhood but also on their turf.  After all, both these countries are military dictatorships, wherein there is substantial domestic and foreign-based opposition to their governments.  In the case of Pakistan, there is a significant armed opposition (overt and covert) that has attempted to assassinate General Musharraf on at least two occasions.  In the case of Libya, there is a sizable opposition to the Colonel�s rule based out of London, U.K.  How seriously has Ethiopia considered engaging these opposition forces (potential allies)?  It is high time that Ethiopia �thinks outside its borders� and re-exports these destabilizing policies to their places of origin.

Equally important, Ethiopia�s foreign policy should be intertwined with its yet-to-be-developed, comprehensive economic growth policy including but not limited to�

(1) privatization of land,

(2) focus on geographically-advantaged development,

(3) creation of independent private sector/termination of government ownership of businesses,

(4) securing sovereign sea access,

(5) creation of free markets/free trade environment with less dependence on government-led development, and

(6) population control.

The Real Debate

In discussing Ethiopia�s foreign policy (also its domestic policy for that matter), it would be of serious interest if we could hear from (however indirectly) those who are actually setting policy.  It is unfortunate that those of us in the general public are relegated to hearing the official government line and the disconnected and un-influential opposition.  (As an example of the uselessness of inter-party foreign policy debates, look no further than the Election 2005 Foreign Policy Debate between the current Foreign Minister and the opposition candidates.  One doesn�t even have to wait for the content of the discussion; a simple observance of dress code and demeanor tells the whole story.)  Or worst yet, the public is subjected to the ratings of likes of Isayas and Aweys.  It is obvious that the only serious policy discussion that occurs in Ethiopia is within the EPRDF/TPLF circles.  Those of us interested in Ethiopia�s foreign policy would certainly benefit if these discussions would ever see the light of day. May God bless Ethiopia? 

Hanna Yohannes

Washington DC

January 16, 2007