Summary

I. Statement of Fact

It is an established fact that �Eritrea� has repeatedly violated the 2000 Algiers Agreement by moving its troop and militarizing the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) [here after �Buffer Zone�], which Zone was to be kept free of militarization by the Eritrean government as part of the peace process pursuant to the 2000 Algiers Agreement. The United Nations former Secretary General Kofe Annan and the current Secretary General Ban Ki-moon have publicly stated as fact such violations of militarization of the Buffer Zone by �Eritrea.� The Monitoring Group on Somalia also concluded that the Government of Eritrea has made deliberate attempts to hide its activities and mislead the international community about its involvement� of shipping weapon to Somalia. The Report was submitted to the Security Council on the 17^{th of July 2007 [S/2007/436].}

Further more, he Eritrean Government has hosted the Islamic Courts and other subversive groups that are trained and supplied weapon to fight in Ethiopia, such as the ONLF, which has resulted in the loss of the lives of Ethiopians and foreigners legitimately exploring for oil on Ethiopian territory in the Ogadeen. There is no doubt that the Eritrean Government has violated both the letters and the spirit of the Algiers Agreement of 2000 by its violent activities of aggression against Ethiopia.

II. Meles Zenawi: Act Now and Dump the Algiers Agreement and void and invalidate the Boundary Commission and it Decision

There are several recorded aggressive violations committed by the Eritrean Government that warrant the immediate invalidation and nullification of the 2000 Algiers Agreement and all subsequent actions, processes, and decisions taken or entered by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, which Commission was established pursuant to the 2000 Algiers Agreement. The purpose of the Algiers Peace Agreement was to bring about peace and security to the people of the two signatory parties. It has done neither. The Eritrean Government has continued its aggression and violated the purpose of the Algiers Agreement from the very day the Agreement was signed.

The following are some of the reasons for invalidating and nullifying the 2000 Algiers Agreement:

1. The Government of Meles Zenawi in 1993 was neither a legitimate nor representative government of Ethiopia, and thus cannot bind Ethiopia to any international treaty or agreement nor encumber future generations of Ethiopians with any international obligations. The independence of Eritrea was achieved through collusion and complacency of the leadership of the EPRDF (still in power) and through force; however, neither method is legitimate under international law and practices. Thus, any agreement entered by the two leaders or their agents at that time and subsequent to that time is invalid (null and void) with no legal consequences on Ethiopia and Ethiopians.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Article 49 (Fraud), Article 50 (Corruption of a representative of a State), Article 51 (Coercion of a representative of a State), and Article 53 (Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law �jus cogens�) provides the legal basis for the invalidation and nullification of the 2000 Algiers Agreement due to fraud (Art. 49), due to corruption i.e. collusion of the leaders (Art. 50), and due to the violation of �jus cogens� (Art. 53).

2. The Boundary Commission should have known and taken into consideration as public knowledge (judicial notice): a) the fact that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and President Isaias Afeworki are leaders of liberation fronts, with long standing relationship supportive of each others organizations; and b) the fact that Meles Zenawi and his Government gave unprecedented support to the independence of Eritrea due to the two leaders long standing understanding or agreement while they were in the bush, i.e., before they took over the Government of Ethiopia in 1991.

The independence of Eritrea was a result of such prior agreed upon scheme during the years the two leaders and their organizations launched a guerrilla war against the legitimate successive governments of Ethiopia. The same bush-agreement was later used as the basis of the Algiers Agreement. There was no disclosure to the Ethiopian people of such prior understanding or agreement. Thus, there has never been at-arms-length negotiated agreement at Algiers. The Algiers Agreement is a result of collusion thus fraudulent. It does not bind the State of Ethiopia and Ethiopians to any obligation. [Sebhat Nega�s interview of May 28, 2007 confirms the collusion that existed between the leaders of the present Governments of Ethiopia and that of Eritrea.]

3. The 2000 Algiers Agreement resurrected long defunct, dead, terminated, invalidated international instrument (1908) and annex (1900, 1902) from a hundred years ago. There is no precedent in the history of international bilateral or multilateral treaties where such long defunct, dead, terminated, invalidated treaties, annex, or international legal instruments to have ever been resurrected to a new life for the sole purpose to benefit one party to a dispute. Thus, the validity of the Algiers Agreement is a highly prejudicial and bad precedent that should be rejected outright. In fact, the validity of those instruments is highly questionable even at the time of their creation because they violate long established principles of customary international law on treaties formation and executions between states.

4. The Boundary Commission did not specifically cite the principle of uti possidetis in its decision. However, the Commission�s use of the international instruments (1908) and annex (1900, 1902) in order to establish legal rights amounts to the same thing. The development of such international legal principle must be understood in its contextual use first in several Latin American cases to settle disputed territorial boundaries and possessions. The concept developed forked solution one dealing with the test based on historic rights (Sovereign) and the second dealing with effective control (possession). At any rate, the principle of uti possidetis in its evolved form through the decisions of the ICJ as indicated below favors Ethiopia if it had claimed properly the Afar Coastal territories as its legitimate historic territory. [See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 12 July 2005.] The concept of �effectivites� the ICJ introduced in order to fine tune the uti possidetis principle would recognize that Ethiopia is the parent nation that has exercised such control on the area and also the fact that the disputed area with its population is the natural extension of its territory and demography. The majority of Afars, over ninety percent are found within the larger region within Ethiopia. Thus, there is no reason or principle of international law that would deliberately dived a people into such discreet areas with diminished human and political rights in order to award some territory to a newly created entity. Such process defies all reason, equity, principles of law whether international or domestic.

5. In the Qatar v. Bahrain (2001) case Judge S.O. Kooijmans in his individual concurring opinion introduced the principle of �superior claim� a principle that should have played a central role dealing with issues involving such an ancient state of Ethiopia. Had the Arbitration Commission considered properly the principle of �superior claim� it would have found out that Ethiopia had far superior claim that is more significant than any claim based on colonial treaty, and would have disqualified itself (Commission) for lack of capacity. [See the Decision Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 16 March, 2001.]

6. Special difference and accommodation should have been accorded the State of Ethiopia in its dispute with the new state of �Eritrea.� The wrong approach of the Boundary Commission has been to treat the exercise of state and sovereign power of an independent state like Ethiopia on equal footing with that of a colonial (Italy) or trust (British) administration, practices that are being succeeded to by the government of �Eritrea.� The ICJ in a recent case has made it absolutely clear that such approach is wrong. �The Chamber observes that the concept of the intention and will to act as sovereign, as mentioned in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway) case (1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45-46), is a concept of international law and cannot be transplanted purely and simply to colonial law.� See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 12 July 2005. In other words, all other sovereign attributes of the independent state of Ethiopia dealing with a colonial or trust administration has to be seen in favor of Ethiopia for Ethiopia has the superior claim to any of the claims based on colonial matrix. [See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 12 July 2005.]

7. The 2000 Algiers Agreement preemptively benefits one party and negates the rights of the second party without the benefit of negotiation or representations because it is based on the Colonial Treaties and Annex that favored the colonial power ambition and does not reflect the reality on the ground. It is absolutely clear, even to a child; the only party benefiting from the resurrection of long dead and defunct treaties or annex or international legal instrument is done with a single beneficiary in mind--the interest and claims of �Eritrea,� and the approach of preemptively awarding all the benefits derived from a treaty against a second party is against public policy and against long established international law and practices.

8. The 2000 Algiers Agreement authorized a subordinate organ, the Boundary Commission, with power and authority that far exceeded its own, for the Decision of the Commission may end up affecting the human rights of individuals in violations of the principle of Jus Cogens.

9. The Boundary Commission established under the 2000 Algiers Agreement is invalid since it is based on an illegal and invalid agreement due to fraud and collusion as pointed out above in (1) and (2).

10. The Boundary Commission decision shows inconsistency in its treatment of issues it claims to be within its discretion where it claims it was not deciding ex aequo et bono. The technical assistance provided by the United Nations on the determination of sites from maps is unscientific, confused, and irresponsible to be of any use in any demarcation or delimitation of a boundary between �Eritrea� and Ethiopia.

11. The Boundary Commission based all of its decision without ever visiting a single area under dispute. It is unrealistic and unjust to decide a very important and complex problem in dispute without considering the possibility of the unreliability of hearsay and on the basis of old maps and statements by individual�s self serving dairies or travel logs, individuals who were not familiar with local languages, understanding of villagizations, nomadic life of pasturing and watering traditions et cetera in that part of Ethiopia.

12. The Boundary Commission was unduly influenced by the international political structure of the United Nations Security Council, mainly by the United States and its European allies. The replacement of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War era by a single Super-Power, the United States, has resulted in an unprecedented imposition and dictation of international relations by the United States that has resulted in the deformity and distortion of hitherto well established norms and principles of international customary law and practices. Ethiopia as a weak nation is treated as a dispensable pawn on a political chessboard totally dominated and controlled by the United States. Ethiopians should reject such degradation and being subjected to decisions for political expediency and the American strategy for that part of the World serving the national interest of the United States rather than principles of law.

13. The Chairman of the Boundary Commission, Elihu Lauterpacht, must be disqualified for breach of professional ethics (conflict of interest). Because of Lauterpacht�s activities, the decision of the Boundary Commission is tainted and such decision must be declared null and void. The reasons for disqualification are previous and later arrangements Lauterpacht had with the Government of the United States. During the time Lauterpacht was the Chairman of the Commission, he was also retained as a lawyer by the United States as legal advisor earlier and as listed-counsel in the Avena case with Mexico. The United States is an interested party that has repeatedly expressed its preference of the �Eritrean� claims. At the same time Lauterpacht was working as Chairman of the Commission, he was also being paid by the United States Government as its legal advisor and counsel. [See ICJ case Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America).] And Article 23 of the 1899 basic document that created the Permanent Court of Arbitration [Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dispute] holds that �persons...of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of Arbitrators.� That principle of the �highest moral reputation� applies to all arbitrators who are chosen or elected to be arbitrators under the umbrella of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Members of Boundary Commission have collectively and individually violated that standard of professional responsibility.

14. The role of an arbitration tribunal is not like that of a Court. A court has no other option except to render judgment. However, an arbitration tribunal can withdrew from rendering an arbitration decision. This is in the nature of arbitration as opposed to a judicial process. An arbitration tribunal is essentially a creation of the parties, thus does not have that �public� dimension as is the case with Courts. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission seems to have confused its role and status with that of the ICJ, and in few instances it seems to act as the ICJ. Where the parties to a dispute in an arbitration process have been uncooperative for any number of reasons, where one of the parties namely �Eritrea� has violated the very base for the creation of the Commission, the Algiers Agreement, the Commission has no valid authority whatsoever to enter a decision on its own right, for all of its authority is a derivative authority coming down directly from the parties (Ethiopia and Eritrea). Thus, any attempt to force on the parties a decision under the current situation is beyond the Commissions mandate and ultra virus. The Commission has no authority to draw boundary lines on a piece of paper and declare as the demarcation of boundaries.

15. The Boundary Commission faced with such hostile parties has one option and only one option, and that option is to withdraw from the Arbitration process. This is not the first time arbitrators have withdrawn from making a decision or from moving with a decision reached with some defect.

16. The Boundary Commission Members have not submitted their full accounting. What they have submitted are statements for billings. The Ethiopian Government has every right to demand �full accounting� that will require the Commission Members to give detailed accounting of their activities hour by hour in their handling of the Arbitration.

17. Ultimately, the United Nations Charter entrusts to the Security Council the power and duty to deal with any situation that may plunge any region or the world as whole into armed conflicts, in several Articles. [See Articles 24, 33-34, 39-44, (52-54)]. Land locking Ethiopia under circumstances perceived by millions of Ethiopians as an injustice is not going to be a peaceful situation at all. Sooner than later, the region will be immersed in wars and conflicts and unimaginable suffering. Already in the 1999-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea due to border and other frictions had resulted in the death of no less than a hundred thousand soldiers, with enormous economic setback to both Ethiopia and Eritrea. In light of such injustice and the destabilization of the region, the Security Council is duty bound to throw out the decision of the Boundary Commission�s decision of 2002. The Security Council must adopt a new policy and strategic decision by returning Ethiopian Afar Coastal territories back to Ethiopian Sovereignty. This would solve largely the looming disaster in the area if things were left the way they are at this moment.

The Eritrean Government may not shield itself by claiming that it has not signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Other than the fact of a strong case that can be made under customary international law on the law of �State Successions,� even more strong evidence of authority for adhering to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties� could be found in the legislative history of that Convention and in the general customary international law principles and practices. The International Law Commission stated: �In short, the law of treaties is not itself dependent on treaty, but is part of general customary international law. Queries might arise if the law of treaties were embodied in a multilateral convention, but some States did not become parties to the convention, or became parties to it and then subsequently denounced it; for they would in fact be or remain bound by the provisions of the treaty in so far as these embodied customary international law de lege lata.� See ^{Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1959HYPERLINK "https://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1959_v2_e.pdf" \t "_blank" , vol. II, document A/4169.}

III. Legal and Policy reasons to declare the 2000 Algiers Agreement null and void.

1. Principle of Jus Cogens: Brownlie, an international law jurist of great depth and notoriety, pointed out the principle of jus cogens that states that there �are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect.�[Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 515.] In Osca Chinn Case (1934)P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63, pp134-36, 146-50, the Court introduced the concept of international public policy.] with international dimension. However, �according to some authors, some international public policy has always existed.� [Sztucki, Jerzy, Jus Cogens the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, Wien New York: Springer-Verlog, 1974, 8.]

Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codified the well established principle of Jus Cogens in no uncertain terms as follows: �Article 53: Treaty Conflicting with Peremptory Norm of General International Law (Jus Cogens) A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.� The Algiers Agreement at its time of signing preemptively obligate Ethiopia under defunct, long dead, and supplanted international instruments, with dubious validity even at the time of their presentations in 1900, 1902 and 1908, to cede millions of acres of land and coastal territorial waters and islands dispossessing its own citizens or driving them of their ancestral homes; acts that would violate all fundamental principles of human rights incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and numerous General Assembly Resolutions. The status of human rights is considered to be jus cogens and the violation of which imposes erga omnes obligations on each Member State of the United Nations.

The purchase of land by a private party and passing it to a foreign national government has confused ownership with sovereignty. The initial phase of the Rubattino Steamship Company in 1870 purchase of land in Assab (Ethiopia) was simply a simple contractual passing of ownership/possession of a piece of land under the legal system of a sovereign country, and the passing of such ownership right to the government of Italy later is not any different for the piece of land is still under the sovereign power of the State where the transaction took place. When an individual or an entity owns property under the sovereign power of a people constituting a state, such as Ethiopia, irrespective of the fact of the personal status (citizen, foreigner, immigrant, male, female, single, married, et cetera) or corporate status (corporation, foreign governments, representatives of charitable or non-charitable organizations, et cetera) of that individual or entity, such ownership is exercised at the pleasure of the granting Sovereign Power (in this case the People of Ethiopia as constituted as the State of Ethiopia). What the Algiers Agreement created is a legal anomaly that cannot be sustained under any principle of international law. There is no precedent how one can resurrect long dead colonial treaties without first violating principles of Jus Cogens and others in the present case of border dispute and alienation of hundreds of thousands of people into subjugation and minority status.

2. Fraud, Corruption (Collusion): The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is a codification of customary international law, in Part V on �Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties� in several Articles has embodied that principle. Both customary international law and multinational treaty based principles hold agreements entered where there is lack of competence (Article 46), or through fraud (Article 49), collusion (corruption) (Article 50), or under duress or coercion (Articles 51 and 52) to be void or voidable. 

It is a fact that the TPLF/EPRDF and the EPLF had been in close cooperation as guerilla movements for over twenty years. They had coordinated their activities against the Ethiopian government during the period leading to their victory in 1991. There are eyewitnesses and documentary evidence proving prior agreements between the leadership of the two guerrilla movements against the interest of the Ethiopian people and the State of Ethiopia. It was none other than Meles Zenawi, along with Abai Tsehai, who signed on behalf of the TPLF such an agreement with the EPLF. No such agreement was ever disclosed to the people of Ethiopia (or Eritrea) when the two guerilla Leaders became head of states or governments after their victory over the Ethiopian Government in 1991. It is with such undisclosed prior agreement with hidden agenda the new Algiers Agreement was signed by the same guerrilla leaders pretending as if the Agreement was an arms-length negotiated agreement.

Where officials representing states had made some other arrangement unknown to their respective government organs (parliament, council of ministers et cetera) entrusted with the power to delegate state authorization to such agents, and where the entry of an agreement by such colluding agents is harmful to the interest of one of the signatories of such an agreement to benefit the other, there is collusion; consequently, a base for voiding and nullifying such an agreement by the prejudiced party. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is absolutely clear on fraud corruption (collusion) in Part V as cited above.

3. Coercion and Interference by the United States and Others: The Government of the United States through the United Nations Security Council and on its own national agenda is intimately involved with the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. The United States government has coerced, threatened, and openly expressed its illegal desire to landlock Ethiopia in pursuit of its ill-conceived foreign policy and self interest. It has established �Eritrea� to acquire illegally Ethiopian territory.

Some members of Congress (Lantos, Payne et cetera) had introduced a bill [H.R. 2760 of 16 July 2003] condemning the Ethiopian government [SEC. 5(3)], and were involved in a process no different than cheap blackmailing of the current Ethiopian government with economic and military sanctions [SEC. 6 (a) and(b)] if the Ethiopian government does not go along with the highly prejudicial scheme the United States government had put in place in collaboration with �Eritrea� and Meles Zenawi starting with the drive for the independence of �Eritrea� to the signing of the Algiers Agreement and the setting up of the Commission. The replacement to H.R. 2760, namely H. R. 2003 that was passed by Congress carries that legacy undermining the Sovereignty of Ethiopia.

IV. Rejection of the Decision of the Arbitration Commission:

1. Precedent for the Rejection of the Decision of the Commission: Rejection of the determination of an international dispute by an arbitration tribunal or even by the more public forum of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is not something unusual. It is in the nature of the dynamic relationship of states that determination by international tribunal such as the ICJ or the Arbitration Commission could be set aside by states against whose interest such decision has been entered where the �vital interest� of such states was at stake.

Thus, consider the following examples: a) In 1974 France informed the United Nations Secretariat that it will not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ in its verdict in favor of Australian and New Zealand�s concern of the nuclear test conducted by France in the Pacific Ocean. The ICJ has directed France to stop its nuclear testing. [Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) 1973- 1974; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France, 1973-1974].

b) In 1984 the United States Government refused to accept the decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States case [Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgments, I.C.J. Reports 1986]. The ICJ has found the United States has violated the rights of Nicaragua.

(c) In 1999 the ICJ ordered the stay of execution of a German national on a finding that the United States had violated international law; nevertheless, the United States rejecting the order executed the German citizen and his brother. [The LaGrand Case(Germany v. United States of America) 5 March 1999]. Both the United States and France found it necessary to reject decisions of questionable impact on the survival or sovereignty of France or the United States by a far more public forum, the ICJ, than the case of Ethiopia rejecting a far reaching decision of a low level arbitration tribunal.

2. Conflict of Interest: a) Disqualification of Lauterpacht: All international adjudication/arbitration forums have certain standards of integrity that must be upheld by members of such Forums, courts, tribunals, or commissions. The basic documents of the ICJ as well as that of the International Permanent Court of Arbitration and the UNCITRAL rules all have provisions providing for �high moral� standards that members sitting to adjudicate or advise or arbitrate parties to a controversy and the world at large are expected and required to observe. The independence of any such body from undue influence of third parties is a well established principle that evolved out of centuries of the development of customary international law and principles. We have to consider also general principles of law practiced by all �civilized nations� of the World in connection with the integrity of an international court or forum such as arbitration tribunals.

We should understand the role of arbitrators to be distinct from that of ICJ judges in context of how arbitrators are chosen or appointed in the first place. However, this does not mean that we have to throw out all professional ethical standards when it comes to arbitrators. By the nature of their appointment or election, arbitrators do have certain preferences in supporting the position of the party that appointed or elected them. However, this does not mean that they are not bound by the �highest moral reputation� standard. It may be argued that that their preference to the party that appointed them may not disqualify them from being arbitrators. However, when it comes to the president or chairman elected by the arbitrators themselves pursuant to the arbitration agreed upon procedure, I believe both standards of �independence� and �highest moral reputation� standards are applicable to arbitrators who are thus elected by the other arbitrators to be presidents of particular commissions or tribunals.

Thus, it is obvious that the United States is acting in an adversarial role in the case involving the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is no more an impartial neutral body. With such public background in full view, the United States has further stained the arbitration process with its uncouth act of retaining as its lawyer Lauterpacht in its case with Mexico, a case pending at the ICJ [Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)]. This act of the United States is no different, for example, from Eritrea hiring Lauterpacht to work on some legal case while Lauterpacht is still a member of the Commission. Thus, the fact of an interested party such as the United States retaining a sitting-Commissioner as its lawyer is only slightly a shade different than the actual party in the controversy�Ethiopia or �Eritrea��retaining any of the sitting-Commissioners as a private lawyer. It does not in any way mitigate the unethical and conflict of interest situation whether the Ethiopian Government new of the activities of Lauterpacht and not lodging objections thereof nor would it matter or make any difference identifying when Lauterpacht was retained as counsel for the United States.

Not only Lauterpacht is personally involved in such blatant conflict of interest, but also Watt and Riesman, the other Members of the Commission are also involved in other cases that put their behavior in a compromised position. It seems that Lauterpacht is using the Permanent Court of Arbitration based commissions and tribunals as his private law firm away from his home base from his Chambers at 20 Essex Street. His partner Arthur Watts at the Chambers at 20 Essex Street is supposedly picked by Ethiopia for the Commission. Here you have an incestuous relationship where the same characters are showing up again and again as commission or tribunal members. Both the appearance of conflict of interest or conflict of interest in fact is rampant in the whole arbitration process where the �high moral� and �independence� standards are compromised.

Raising the issue of professional responsibility (conflict of interest, corruption et cetera) is a very sensitive and complex matter for anyone. The Government of Ethiopia has every right to void all agreements, including the Algiers Agreement, and to reject the entire decision of the Commission. Ethiopia cannot be obliged to accept a decision by a Commission that is corrupted where some members of the Commission have compromised their duty to exercise �independence� and �high moral� standards. It is not important to show that all and every member of the Commission is involved in such conflict of interest. As long as one can show at least one member is involved in such conflict of interest, the entire proceeding and all decisions thereof, which flowed from such process, are tainted, thus void. Ethiopia should demand the disqualification of the President of the Commission, Elihu Lauterpacht, for conflict of interest and corruption.

b) Disqualification of Lawyers on the Ethiopian Team: A lawyer has a duty to serve the best interest of his client. The client in the boundary dispute between Ethiopia and �Eritrea� is the State of Ethiopia not Meles Zenawi or any body else. In an arbitration proceeding, the first designation of �Agent� of a particular government/state does not necessarily means that it is the so called �Agent� that will do the actual presentation of the case on behalf of Ethiopia. Through the use of agency legal principles, individuals from law firms, legal experts from law schools et cetera could be hired to do the presentations at arbitration tribunals. Those individuals are held also to the highest professional responsibilities and ethics in their respective professional associations.

I believe the key members of the Ethiopian Team have compromised their professional responsibility to their Client, the State of Ethiopia, by knowingly accepting and going forth with a case that is underdeveloped lacking integrity of evidence, censoring of documentation, et cetera by the Officials of the Government of Ethiopia, with a situation both embarrassing to themselves and harmful to their Client�s best interest. They should have withdrawn from participating in a rigged situation where both Government Leaders of Ethiopia and �Eritrea� were working to insure the interest of �Eritrea� and against the interest of their Client the State of Ethiopia.

V. Third Party Funding as Corruption:

The fact of setting a �Fund� out of which Boundary Commissions� expenses and the compensation for the Members of the Boundary Commissions is paid has introduced into the process of arbitration an element that goes contrary to the desired independence of such forums. The problem is compounded by the fact of the involvement of the United Nations Security Council. Such direct involvement has subverted the process of Arbitration by invading the Boundary Commission with doses of political considerations rather than law and principles as the deciding factors playing major roles in the decision making process of the arbitration. Such new structure has further polarized and distorted the independence of the umbrella organization the International Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The United Nations role as played out by the Security Council in the Ethiopia � Eritrea arbitration process was an affront to the Sovereignty of Ethiopia. The recent concerted attack on Ethiopia by the United States House of Representatives to the point of passing a bill H.R. 2003 that challenges the very sovereignty of Ethiopia is a good evidence to show to what abominable length or extent the historic enemies of Ethiopia work through such institutions to undermine the survival of Ethiopia. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and numerous Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as long established principles and practices of international law, to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.Ω

Tecola W. Hagos

Washington DC, November 18, 2007

* Few of the points identified above in II, and extensively in III. IV, and V were taken and modified from articles I wrote and posted in this Website titled �^{ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BOARDER DISPUTE: Challenging the Opposition,� of December 30, 2005, and �Dumping the Decision of the Boundary Arbitration Commission� of June 10, 2007.}

Reference:

The Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Entered into force on 27 January 1980.

PART V
INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES